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ABSTRACT

The legal consequences of renouncing Islam or apostasy, which include depriving the apostate
from some civil rights, and the non-recognition of the act itself by law in Egypt have been usually
criticized as a blatant violation of the right to religious freedom. Such criticisms are based on the
right’s definition according to international human rights law precisely the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. The dominant reasoning for this violation according to the majority
of the related literature is the conservative interpretation of Sharia, the principal source of law, that
has been adopted by Egyptian judiciary for more than fifty years. The advocates of this point of
view argue that such violation could be resolved through adopting more lenient Sharia rulings
concerning apostasy. Investigating the situation of apostasy from a broader legal perspective
beyond the rhetoric of human rights demonstrates that resolving the complicated legal status of
apostasy starts from realizing the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt as a single indication
among others of legal pluralism. It is a problem that stems from the conflict between the rulings
of both Sharia and IHRL, as law sources, regarding apostasy and their interpretation by the state.
In light of its approach regarding constitutional Islamization, the Egyptian state through its
legislature and judiciary has maintained the ambiguity of the legal situation of apostasy to balance
between its constitutional obligation to apply Sharia and its international obligation to ensure the
consistency of its laws with IHRL. Egyptian courts have undertaken this mission through
reconstructing the application of some apostasy juristic and legal consequences under some secular
legal regulations and the concept of public policy in contrast to the juristic position of apostasy
according to Sharia.
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I. Introduction:
Most Muslim states, including Egypt, became parties to different international human rights
treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was
adopted on 16 December 1966. After signing and ratifying the ICCPR, Muslim states became
obliged to ensure the rights that were recognized in this treaty to all individuals within their
territories without any kind of distinction. All states parties to the ICCPR have to use their
domestic laws to facilitate the implementation of the recognized rights according to Article 2(2)
of the treaty.1This obligation has posed many challenges to domestic legal systems of Muslim
states. These legal systems have to balance between the full implementation of the ICCPR
provisions and the full adherence to Sharia, which is the main source of law in many Muslim
states like Egypt.2
The fulfillment of the notion of religious freedom as recognized in the ICCPR is one of the main
challenges that face these legal systems because it contradicts with some aspects of the concept
of religious freedom in Sharia. The difference between religious freedom in Sharia and IHRL has
resulted in major areas of contention concerning religious freedom in the Middle East. These
areas include the practice of monotheistic religions (like preaching and building churches),
freedom of non-monotheistic religions, conversion from Islam to another religion, pluralism
within the same religious field, and freedom of expression. This research focuses mainly on
assessing the legal situation of one of these areas of contention in Egypt precisely apostasy or
conversion from Islam. In order to fulfill its international obligation regarding the right to
religious freedom, the Egyptian state confirmed through its constitution that the State shall
guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites.3Moreover,
Egyptian courts have always asserted in their verdicts the consistency of their rulings with the
ICCPR’s definition of religious freedom.

1

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 19 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976), available
at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.
2
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, as amended, May 22, 1980, art. 2.
3
Id. art. 46
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The tension between on the one hand the Egyptian state’s constitutional obligation to adhere to
Sharia as the principal source of legislation and on the other hand its international obligation to
ensure the fulfilment of the concept of religious freedom according to IHRL invites this research
to study the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt as a clear indication of it. The purpose of this
research is to assess this legal framework from different aspects to understand how the Egyptian
state through its legislature and judiciary managed the conflict between different law sources
regarding apostasy to impose its understanding of the concept of religious freedom in both Sharia
and IHRL; as a result, the state could shape the legal framework of apostasy. Consequently, in
order to understand and asses this legal situation, it is crucial to examine some key aspects of this
issue which include features of legal pluralism in Egypt, the legal position of Sharia as a
principal source of law in Egypt, the juristic situation of apostasy in Sharia, the ICCPR’s
definition of the concept of religious freedom, Egyptian court’s approach regarding apostasy, and
the role of public Policy as a key factor in Imposing state’s definition of religious freedom and
some apostasy consequences in Egypt.
This thesis argues that the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt is a manifestation of secular
reconstruction of Sharia by a modern state. In addition, it argues that the legal situation of
apostasy in Egypt contradicts with the concept of religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL.
Accordingly, it challenges the dominant debate that has limited apostasy law in Egypt as only a
violation of the Egyptian state’s international obligation to ensure religious freedom and a
reflection of conservative interpretation and implementation of Sharia rules by judiciary. Rather,
Egyptian courts have exploited the legal regulation of apostasy, which is characterized by
ambiguity and fragmentation, to enforce state’s definition of religious freedom through the
reconstruction of some apostasy legal consequences either under some legal regulations or the
concept of public policy.
The thesis is composed of two main chapters. The first chapter investigates the scope of religious
freedom in Sharia and IHRL as key factors in shaping the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt.
The first section of this chapter focuses on illustrating the concept of legal pluralism and its
features in Egypt including the legal situation of Sharia as the principal source of law. The
second section examines the scope of religious freedom according to Sharia focusing precisely
on illustrating the juristic position of apostasy (renouncing Islam). The third section defines the
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scope of religious freedom as considered by IHRL and the interpretation of this international
obligation by Egyptian courts. The second chapter evaluates the legal framework of apostasy in
Egypt. The first section of this chapter assesses this legal framework in different law fields
according the legal regulation of apostasy rules and Egyptian courts’ approach in this regard. The
second section of this chapter explains the role of the concept of public policy as a key factor in
imposing state’s definition of religious freedom and shaping the legal framework of apostasy.
II. Understanding the Scope of Religious Freedom in Both Sharia and IHRL as key
Factors in Shaping the Legal Framework of Apostasy in Egypt:
The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt must be understood as a single indication between
others of legal pluralism in Egypt. Accordingly, discussing this framework requires examining
the role of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt and its definition by the SCC. Such
definition has demarcated the ambiguous legal situation of conversion from Islam in Egypt since
decades. Moreover, it also requires investigating the legal position of apostasy according to each
of the conflicting law sources in Egypt Sharia and IHRL. The first section of this chapter focuses
on illustrating the concept of legal pluralism and its features in Egypt including the legal
situation of Sharia as the principal source of law. The second section examines the scope of
religious freedom according to Sharia focusing precisely on illustrating the juristic position of
apostasy. The third section defines the scope of religious freedom as considered by IHRL and the
interpretation of this international obligation by Egyptian courts. Through the introduced analysis
in this chapter, we could conceive the ambiguity of the definition of Sharia principles in the
Egyptian legal system and the apparent contradiction between Sharia and IHRL regarding
apostasy or conversion from Islam.
A. Legal Pluralism in Egypt:
The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt must be understood as a single indication between
others of legal pluralism in Egypt. The concept of legal pluralism simply means the coexistence
of more than one legal source or system that govern the same conduct within the same social
field. Examining this legal concept and its main features enables us not to conceive apostasy law
in Egypt as an isolated legal phenomenon, but as a result of legal pluralism in Egypt and the
conflict between different law sources (Sharia, IHRL, State secular law). Consequently,
reforming religious freedom related laws and their jurisprudence including apostasy legal
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framework could not be achieved by limiting the discussed issue as a human rights problem that
can be resolved by adopting more liberal law provisions within the existing legal system;
otherwise, it is a problem that stems from the conflict between different law sources and their
interpretation by the state. This requires us to understand the definition of legal pluralism,
examine the position of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt and display the role of the
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) in defining Sharia law in Egypt.

1. Defining the Concept of Legal Pluralism:
a. The Idea of Legal Pluralism:
Legal pluralism has no single or strict definition; rather it has various definitions that reflect its
nature as a model for analysis aims to achieve reconceptualization of the law and society
relation. Legal pluralism traditionally defined as “a situation in which two or more legal systems
coexist in the same social field.”4Considering the broad meaning of this definition entails that
legal pluralism also includes situations when any social “functioning subgroup” constructs its
own internal legal order, that varies from other subgroups’ and also from the state’s legal
system.5These subgroups may include political confederations, factories, syndicates, universities,
families, tribes, etc. This broadens the definition of legal system not only to include the system
of courts, judges and law enforcement forces supported by the state but also to include non-legal
forms of normative ordering;6 hence, this may lead us to conclude that “virtually every society is
legally plural.”7 4From another perspective, defining legal pluralism according to the governing
law code could be “a multiplicity of diverse communicative processes that observe social action
under the binary code of legal/illegal.”8There are more than one code governing the existing
legal system and judging social conducts and these normative codes could be either legal or
4

John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 18 J. of Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L.1-55 (1986), cited in Sally Engle
Merry, Legal Pluralism, [22, No.5.] L. & Soc'y Rev. 869, 869-96 (1988).
5
Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, [22, No.5.] L. & Soc'y Rev. 869, 869-96 (1988).
6
Id.
7
Id. at 871.
8
Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism,13 Cardozo L. Rev.1443 (1992), cited in
Kilian Bälz, Shari‘a and Qanun in Egyptian Law: A Systems Theory Approach to Legal Pluralism, 2 Y.B. Islamic &
Middle E. L. 37, 53 (1995).
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illegal (like religious law or customary law) in nature.9Furthermore, if we review legal pluralism
as an observed socio legal phenomenon, it may be defined as “the condition in which a
population observes more than one body of law”10Accordingly, this negates the idea of legal
centralism, which supposes the emergence of all law rules from the state, because the condition
of plurality is achieved by merely the observance of more than one body of law regardless of
their sources either the state or not. As we can see, according to the mentioned definitions there
is no one theory or single definition of legal pluralism. This confirms that it is a model for
analysis aims to achieve reconceptualization of the law and society relation that “seemed to need
modification according to each specific case.”11

Elaborating the idea of legal pluralism and the premises of its definitions requires referring to
some of the leading literature in this regard to be able to comprehend the different situations of
legal pluralism that will be discussed in this section. Jacques Vanderlinden in Le Pluralisme
Juridique defines legal pluralism as “the existence within a particular society of different legal
mechanisms applying to identical situations.”12The type of the applicable law in this situation
varies according to the subject of law who committed the conduct. Barry Hooker in his book
Legal Pluralism defines legal pluralism as “the situation in which two or more laws
interact”13Hooker in his work focuses mainly on instances of legal pluralism which have resulted
from the transplantation of a developed body of law in a new territory without replacing the
original law sources of this territory.14This case was manifested in the colonial period when
many colonized territories received colonizers’ laws to coexist with their original laws including
religious or customary law. John Griffiths in his paper What is Legal Pluralism? defines legal
pluralism as “the state of affairs, for any social field, in which behavior pursuant to more than
one legal order occurs”15Griffiths believes that state law acts only as an order among others in
Kilian Bälz, Shari‘a and Qanun in Egyptian Law: A Systems Theory Approach to Legal Pluralism, 2 Y.B. Islamic
& Middle E. L. 37, 53 (1995).
10
BAUDOUIN DUPRET, MAURITS BERGER & LAILA AL-ZWAINI, LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 3(1999).
11
Id. at xii.
12
Jaques Venderlin, Le Pluralisme Juridique: Essaie De Synthese, in LA PLURALISME JURIDIQUE (l'Universite de
Bruxelles ed., 1972), cited in BAUDOUIN DUPRET, MAURITS BERGER & LAILA AL-ZWAINI, LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE
ARAB WORLD 4(1999).
13
Id. at 5.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 9.
9
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any social field. According to this idea, legal pluralism only happens when there are other
parallel independent legal orders operating outside that of the state in the same social field or
territory, so any other subdivision or plurality within the state’s legal system is “a feature of the
arrangement of state law.”16Such point of view has been rejected by many legal authors who
emphasize the practical usefulness of identifying situations of legal pluralism within state law17I
think that even if we take into account that the majority of legal authors and lawyers believe in
the existence of legal pluralism within state law, these different perspectives could show us that
the utility of the model of legal pluralism in solving situations of conflict between different
bodies of law could vary according to the types of these laws and their relations in these
situations. Legal pluralism is only useful if it helps to develop the existing laws and legal policies
to be compatible with another body of law without violating the essence of the latter.
The realization of Legal pluralism as a model for analysis, that introduces different solutions to
reform state laws so that they could reconcile with other bodies or sources of law, requires
recognizing types of law in situations of legal pluralism and different possibilities of their
relation. We could distinguish between types of law in situations of legal pluralism according to
two typologies or classifications; the first one is the distinction between state and non-state law,
and the second is identifying law types as constituent elements of situations of legal pluralism.18
State law refers to all normative orders that are associated and administrated by state institutions,
so state law may include legislation, customary law, precedents (which are combinations of
legislation and customary law).19On the other hand, non-state law is considered to be all
normative orders unassociated with the state like customary law, religious law and foreign
legislations. Recognizing the mentioned classification of law entails distinction between two
general categories of legal pluralism: state law pluralism and deep legal pluralism.20State law
pluralism arises when “a state law is composed in a part of an elaborated body of norms first
developed as a state law, and in part of another body of norms which has been developed outside
the context of state law and given recognition by state law in question.”21For instance, the
16

Id. at 10.
See generally Id. at 4-14 (demonstrating the weakness of this point of view and the significance of internal legal
pluralism).
18
Id. at 11.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 5.
21
Id. at 8.
17

6

mentioned example of colonized territories that received colonizers’ laws to coexist with their
original laws including religious or customary law. In the most of these cases the colonizers’ law
had been developed to serve as state law, whereas natives’ laws were given effect and recognized
to operate in particular law fields. State law pluralism has two main features; firstly, it aims at
regulating the relations between different laws to avoid “internal conflict of laws”22and
uncertainty of the applicable law. Secondly, it is studied to identify methods of recognition of
one law by its counterpart. In deep legal pluralism, the constituent elements of this situation are
state law and non-state law which is not recognized by the state. In this case there is a conflict
between these different normative orders in the same social field or territory. Now let us turn to
the second typology, the distinction between law types as constituent elements of situations of
legal pluralism.23According to this classification, these constituent elements could be one of
three types: legislation, customary law, and religious law.24Legislation is regarded as the
common form of state law, and it becomes law only after passing through certain institutional
procedures. It also could be made in non-state law and proclaimed orally. Customary law is
“created by a consensus within a community, reached over a period of time in a relatively
informal manner. It is not normally written, although some customary laws have been recorded
in writing.”25So customary law could be transformed into written legislations in sometimes.
Religious law usually refers to rules or normative orders which are derived from any religion and
gain their authority from their divine origin. When any religious law is recognized by a modern
state as a source of law, this creates a situation of legal pluralism. For instance, this paper
primarily discusses a situation of legal pluralism in Egypt, which Sharia is one of its constituent
elements. The observance of more than one body of law of the mentioned types creates situations
of legal pluralism. The relations between these constituent laws in situations of legal pluralism
could be one of the following26agglomeration, conflict, integration, recognition, separation, and
unification.27Agglomeration happens when two bodies of legal norms govern separate fields of
activity in the same social field. Conflict exists when “the laws in a situation of legal pluralism
22

Id. at 9.
Id. at 15.
24
For the purpose of this paper, it is not intended here to mention the various definitions and the main features of
these three types, but only to make a passing reference to them.
25
DUPRET ET AL., supra note10, at 15.
26
The author based this classification on Vanderlinden’s in his work Le Pluralisme Juridique.
27
DUPRET ET AL., supra note10, at 16-19.
23
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contain norms which impose mutually contradictory requirements upon the population.”28This
means that while one law urges its subjects to commit a certain deed, the other one forbids them
from committing it. The conflict could be avoided by integration because this kind of legal
pluralism redesigns the norms of both laws to be compatible with each other. For example, if one
law urges its subjects to commit a certain deed, the other one should at least neither forbid nor
require it. In the situation of recognition, one constituent law of a case of legal pluralism
recognizes the other law(s) and refers to their existence.29If this recognition leads only to achieve
compatibility between these laws, this form could be regarded as a case of agglomeration. In
addition to this form, recognition has two other important forms. Normative recognition occurs
when “one body of law includes provisions requiring its own institutions to give effect to the
norms of another law.”30Secondly, institutional recognition occurs when the institutions of the
recognized law are incorporated within their counterparts of the recognizing law. Both normative
and institutional recognition usually occurs in situations of state law pluralism, when the
recognizing state law receives another body of law. Legal pluralism is terminated in both cases
of separation and unification, when the different bodies of laws either unified or separated. After
displaying types of law in situations of legal pluralism and different possibilities of their relation,
this could enable us to identify and analyze legal plurality in Egypt especially concerning the
position of Sharia as the main source of law.
b. Investigating some Features of Legal Pluralism in Egypt and the Arab World:
By scrutinizing the Egyptian legal system, as a leading example of the existing legal systems in
the Arab world, it appears clearly that Sharia acts as the main legal player that forms legal
pluralism in Muslim countries. According to the mentioned types of laws and situations of legal
pluralism, legal pluralism in these states could be regarded as a normative recognition in a
situation of state law pluralism. This because most of the Arab countries during the colonization
era since the early nineteenth century received the colonizers’ law, which had been developed to
serve as state law. On the other hand, Sharia that was the common law of Muslim countries
before this time was given effect and recognized to operate in particular law fields like personal
28

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
30
Id.
29
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status law.31The marginalization of Sharia started gradually by adopting “Islamic” law codes
modeled on secular or European codes like the Mecelle of the ottoman empire that was
promulgated in the1870s.32Although Egypt was not under effective control of the Ottoman
empire in this time, it also started a similar legal “reform” as a result of “the imperialist, liberal,
and statist pressures[.]”33In 1883 the Egyptian government issued codes based on the French
code at this time.34This was followed by establishing a new national centralized court system
mirrored that of the French system to apply the issued codes.35The adoption of such reforms was
at the expense of the implementation of Sharia and the jurisdiction of Sharia courts, which was
abrogated finally in 1955. There was no effective political opposition to the trend of
secularization of law until the early twentieth century.36Islamist political opposition during the
decolonization era introduced Islamic law or the application of Sharia as “the national legal
tradition, providing the basis for a law that reflects the national character as opposed to borrowed
European codes that were increasingly perceived as the legacy of the colonial age.”37The
struggle of this opposition, its powerful support by the Egyptian public, and the acceptance of the
Islamic trend by the ruling regime in Egypt (as an alternative political choice to liberalism,
communism, socialism, etc.) and other regimes in the middle east led finally to the recognition of
Sharia as a source of law in these states. Finally, in 1971 the Egyptian constitution recognized
Sharia in Article 2 as a “a chief source of legislation” before being amended in 1980 to regard
Sharia principles as “the chief source of legislation”38Accordingly, Arab or Muslim countries
could be divided into two groups in matters of legislations.39The first group counties recognize
Sharia as a source of law among other sources of legislation, while the second group countries
found their legislation entirely on Sharia by codifying its legal rules and principles which were
derived from its sources (Quraan, Sunnah, etc.). In Egypt, as it will be explained in detail, Sharia
is recognized by the constitution as the chief source of law and not merely as a source among
31

Bälz, supra note 9, at 37.
The Mecelle is the Islamic civil code of the ottoman empire.
33
NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF 23 (1997).
34
CLARK BENNER LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE INCORPORATION OF THE SHARĪʻA
INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (2006).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 72.
37
Bälz, supra note 9 , at 37.
38
LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 133.
39
DUPRET ET AL., supra note 10, at 125.
32
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others. Whether this constitutional recognition of Sharia within a secular based legal system is
sufficient or not to restore the historical role of Sharia as the common law of the state or achieve
a real reconciliation between Sharia and a European modeled legal system in an assumed
situation of legal pluralism is always a disputed matter. I think that since these amendments it
has become obvious that the restoration of the historical role of Sharia without restoring the
privileged positions of its judicial system and Ulama is practically impossible. Concerning the
compatibility of the existing laws and judicial decisions with Sharia, the upcoming analysis of
apostasy law in Egypt in this paper would show us that this recognition has not solved the
contradiction between Sharia norms and the secular based legal system in Egypt.

The successive failure of the Egyptian state to achieve the proposed compatibility between
Sharia and its secular modeled legislations since 1971 has made some legal writers consider the
constitutional recognition of Sharia in Egypt as a kind of legal duality and contradiction rather
than a situation of legal pluralism.40The proponents of this point of view justify it on the grounds
that the word pluralism by itself implies a peaceful legal coexistence among different legal
systems or bodies of norms, whereas legal duality means that there are contradictions between
different law sources within an official legal system. Accordingly, in Egypt this duality exists
because there are contradictions within the official legal system between secular western law
references and purely religious law references like Sharia.41It is believed that “[t]he state always
produces such dualities through the elaboration of official constitutional and political laws which
the state hastens to violate.”42Also, if we would categorize the existing contradiction under the
concept of legal pluralism it could be categorized as a conflict in a situation of state law
pluralism rather than a recognition. I think that the primary standard to assess whether there is a
situation of duality or plurality in any legal system is the degree of adherence to the genuine
essence and standards of the recognized source of law. Also, the genuine standards of this source
of law should not be defined according to the recipient law, but according to the recognized law
itself. For instance, if we talk about religious freedom in Sharia, the adherence to this notion
should be assessed according to Sharia standards and not to “the official definition of religious
40

Id. at 159.
Id.
42
Id. at 161.
41
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freedom in Sharia by Egyptian jurisprudence”. Thus, if the recognition of Sharia as a source of
law within the Egyptian legal system achieved reconciliation between different law sources
without breaching sharia standards according to Sharia itself, then it is a situation of legal
pluralism. On the other hand, if this recognition results in contradictions between different law
sources and breaches Sharia standards as defined by it, then we face a situation of duality or
conflict. As it will be discussed later in this paper, such legal duality is employed to impose
modern state’s definitions of the constituent law sources and, as a result, its definitions of the
scope of all rights.

Before explaining in detail the position of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt, I think that
a crucial question to our analysis should be answered. If we are faced with legal duality or a
conflict situation of legal pluralism in Egypt, how could two contradicting legal orders coexist
and interact within a legal system of a modern state?43I agree with the point of view that prefers
to answer this question in “a manner that permits a move away from a rather simplistic model of
"influence" to a more sophisticated paradigm which offers an explanation as to how two
autonomous legal orders that remain radically divorced nevertheless interact.”44Accordingly, the
relation between Sharia and western based legislations should be discussed from another
perspective other than that focuses on considering the relation between both systems of norms as
a simple mutual influence that has resulted in the “Islamization” of secular modeled laws or
“secularization” of Sharia norms. In this regard, there is an analysis that could give us a deeper
explanation for this relation. Kilian Bälz reintroduced the paradigm of "operational closure and
cognitive openness" that was proposed by the theory of autopoiesis45to provide a new
explanation for the study of legal pluralism in the Middle East concerning the relation between
Sharia (traditional law) and Qanun (modern law). According to this analysis, the development of
modern legal systems as alternatives to the existing traditional (Islamic) legal systems in Muslim
states involves splitting the existing legal system into modern legal system that operates on
The following paragraph draws heavily on Kilian Bälz, Shari‘a and Qanun in Egyptian Law: A Systems Theory
Approach to Legal Pluralism, 44-53.
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modern law code, and traditional legal system that operates on traditional law code.46As it was
illustrated previously, the marginalization of traditional legal system takes place through
shrinking its jurisdiction in favor of modern legal order and its newly promulgated laws. After
this fragmentation, both traditional and modern legal systems have operated as two autonomous
legal systems, which struggle to preserve their operational closure and autonomy through being
cognitively opened systems. The proposed analysis assumes the operational closure of any
subsystem implies or means that this system’s operations are guided by “a specific distinction the
binary code.”47Accordingly, both traditional and modern legal systems apply their own
normative codes of legal/illegal or valid/void. This means that each legal system decides whether
any deed is valid or void only according to its normative rules. In order to adapt to various social
or political conditions, each legal system reconstructs other legal systems ‘elements and extralegal concepts as external references into the system.48By adopting such cognitive openness,
these normative orders maintain their operational closure and existence. Bälz illustrates the
application of this paradigm concerning the interaction between Sharia and “man-made” or
modern law when he points out that:
one can isolate a pattern similar to that underlying the renewal of Islamic law. The
system of secular law must remain operationally closed. Letting Islamic law take over
the code, i.e. leaving the decision legal/illegal to Islamic law, would lead to an
immediate dissolution of the system. However, facing the political challenge of the
call for a comprehensive Islamization of the law, the system of secular law can only
maintain operational closure by being cognitively open, i.e. reconstructing principles
of Islamic law within the system. However, the principles of Islamic law contained in
the Draft Code are a purely internal construct of the system of secular law. As in the
case of the application of Islamic law by the Mixed and National Courts, the
reconstruction of the principles of Islamic law in the Draft Code caused a
transformation of the principles of traditional Islamic law.49
This transformation took place through the process of codifying the principles of Islamic law in
the language of modern statutory law. I believe that even if this process of codification has
traditionally been regarded or declared by legislators as an urgent development of Islamic law to
cope with the requirements of the modern state without distorting Sharia’s identity, it has been
the main guarantee of the existence of secular legal systems in Muslim states. We can say that
46
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through this process modern legal system could have governed the “terms of the game”. These
terms include choosing the incorporated principles of Sharia, choosing the adopted juristic
opinions, and having the exclusive power of interpreting “Islamized” law statutes. Through these
terms Islamic law principles have been re-constructed to be compatible with secular legal
systems’ policies and not vice versa. For instance, Islamic draft code of civil transactions, which
was drafted by the Egyptian parliament in the late 1970s to replace 1948’s civil code, validated
insurance transactions.50Such kind of transactions are void according to Sharia because “they
contain an unlawful aleatory moment (gharar)”51The draft code reconstructed the principal of
partnership in profit and loss (sharikat al-mudaraba) in Sharia as a basis for insurance contract
that was defined by the draft as a cooperative contract. The main conclusion that could be drawn
from the displayed analysis is that legislating Islamic law represents no more than a process of
reconstruction of these norms to achieve policies of a modern legal system by using an Islamic
scheme to overcome any calls for the application of Sharia.
2. Sharia as the Principal Source of Law in Egypt:
As it will be illustrated in the last section of this chapter, Egyptian statutory laws do not
explicitly regulate apostasy law in Egypt. The absence of this explicit regulation has always
made the Egyptian constitutions have a direct rule in shaping the legal framework of apostasy in
Egypt. This because the absence of any regulation of apostasy in the codified laws drives
Egyptian courts to interpret constitutional provisions regarding Sharia and religious freedom to
make their decisions on apostasy related cases. Consequently, displaying the position of Sharia
throughout different Egyptian constitutions is a substantial point for the current research.
Illustrating the different references to Sharia in these constitutions and focusing primarily on its
position since 1971’s constitution could show us how the ambiguity of Islamic supremacy clause
could be used by successive ruling regimes in Egypt as a guarantee of their legitimacy and
political power. The ambiguity of the discussed clause has resulted in promoting the role of the
Egyptian judiciary in demarcating Islamization and all its related cases, like apostasy, in Egypt.
This could give us an explanation for the absence of any explicit regulation of the act of apostasy
50
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in statutory laws in Egypt. The Egyptian state has always maintained this legal ambiguity to
impose its own definition of Sharia and its principles.
The legal status of Sharia in the Egyptian constitutions has been changed since the promulgation
of the first Egyptian constitution in 1882.52Islam was referred to as the official religion of the
state for the first time53in 1923’s constitution and its counterparts in years 1930, 1953, 1956,
1958, and 1964. The Egyptian constitution of 1971 adopted for the first time the principles of
Sharia as a principal source of legislation in Article 2, which states that “Islam is the religion of
the state. Arabic is its official language, and the principles of the Islamic Sharia shall be a chief
source of legislation.”54There are two main observations about this article; firstly, by regarding
the principles of Sharia as “a chief” source of legislation, Article 2 did not consider Sharia as a
supreme source over other sources of legislation.55Thus, the inconsistency of any Egyptian law
with Sharia under this constitution did not have to entail the invalidity of this law. Secondly,
Article 2 was vague as it did not identify the principles of Sharia or how they could be
interpreted.56These observations was directly related to the political interests of the ruling regime
at this time that inspired its adoption of such article for the first time. President Anwar al-Sadat
managed to enhance the legitimacy of his regime and face his predecessor’s political supporters
by gaining the support of other marginalized political groups.57He released many political
prisoners including Islamists, liberalists, judges, and lawyers. Moreover, the new constitution
that was promulgated in 1971 included a number of liberal measures58as well as Sharia close in
Article 2. It is believed that “Sadat’s motivation in including an Islamic supremacy clause then
lay in using it as a political device that would legitimate extensive presidential authority
contained in this constitution.”59Accordingly, this constitution focused on fusing many political
52
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powers in the person of the president.60Through being regarded as the “Believing President” who
adopted the Islamic supremacy clause for the first time in any Egyptian constitution, Sadat could
acquire Islamists’ and public’s political support to promulgate a constitution that broadened his
presidential authority. I believe that these political circumstances could justify the vagueness of
Article 2. The ambiguity of Article 2 drove the Supreme Court in April 1976 to issue a striking
opinion pointing out that “Article 2, as vague as it was, might require all Egyptian law[s] to be
consistent with the essential principles of Sharia.”61Also, the vagueness of Article 2 enabled the
government or the ruling regime to negotiate Islamization terms with both Islamists and
liberalists to acquire their political support without giving up the state’s ultimate control over the
process.62Searching for more political support from Islamists and ordinary Egyptians to face the
increasing domestic opposition to its economic and foreign policies, Sadat’s ruling regime
rushed to negotiated Islamization for the second time in 1980. On May 22, 1980, Article 2 was
amended to state that “. . . the principles of Islamic Sharia are the chief source of
legislation”63According to this amendment, any Egyptian law contradicts with Sharia principles
would be invalid. However, Article 2 still vague as it does not identify the principles of Sharia or
how they could be interpreted. The claimed intention of the legislature through adopting this
amendment was clarified by the report of the official committee which states that “[The
amendment] means that it is imperative to review the laws which were in effect before the
Constitution of 1971 and to amend these laws in such a manner as to make them conform to the
principles of Islamic law. . .”64This normative recognition of Sharia in the Egyptian constitution
imposed a constitutional obligation on the legislature and judiciary to give effect to Sharia
norms. Regarding the identification of the principles of Sharia, the drafting committee points out
that the legislature should consider “Quran, the Sunna and the opinions of learned jurists and
imams.”65It was intended to leave the interpretation methodology of Sharia principles as
ambiguous as it was to acquire the ruling regime a flexible position in negotiating Islamism with
different political powers. Such flexibility would be lost if Sharia principles or their
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interpretation methodology was identified by the amended constitution. Also, authorizing the
official religious institution “Al-Azhar” to take over this process might threaten state’s control
over it. It is notable that the amendment of Article 2 in 1980 was also accompanied by amending
another article to enable Sadat to stay in power.66The proposed comprehensive Islamic review of
the existing laws has not been carried out since amending Article 2 in 1980. It is believed that the
executive in Egypt renounced its public commitment to Islamization after the assassination of
Sadat in 1981 by an extremist Islamic military cell.67The intended closure of such a political
process, that could carry out a comprehensive Islamic law review of the existing laws, has
promoted the role of litigation as an alternative process through which Islamists could enforce
Article 2.68This justifies the crucial role of Egyptian judiciary in shaping legal Islamization in
Egypt during 80s and 90s. The Egyptian courts led by the SCC had to develop their official
methodology of interpreting Article 2 and deducing Sharia norms to be able to make their
decisions on lawsuits concerning the application of Sharia. Most of these lawsuits were brought
to courts by Islamists against legislations that were claimed to be contrary to Sharia principles. In
addition, others were filed by normal people or lawyers to challenge both state and non-state
actions that they believed to be contrary to Sharia norms. Through this litigation process, the
Egyptian state could control the borders of constitutional Islamization in Egypt. This will be
demonstrated in the next section through exploring the SCC’s methodology of interpreting
Article 2. After shutting down all other political channels, it seems that liberals, Islamists and all
other political powers in Egypt accepted the litigation choice as the only way was permitted by
the ruling regime in Egypt to challenge, define or fulfil constitutional Islamization. I believe that
it is important to refer that the ambiguity of Article 2 in the discussed constitution not only
served the political interests of the ruling regime in Egypt but also served as a guarantee of nonconservative or modernist application of Sharia in Egypt. This simply because defining Sharia
principles and the methodology of interpreting Quran and Sunnah by the constitution would
make judges under a constitutional obligation to adhere to all these rules strictly. Moreover,
authorizing the official religious institution Al-Azhar to takeover this process would ensure a
stricter application of Sharia norms than to be applied by western educated judges. This point
66
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leads us to take a look at the status of Sharia in Egypt’s 2012 constitution.69 Examining the
position of Sharia in this short-lived constitution could show us how liberals and human rights
activists are very susceptible to any constitutional amendment that could resolve the legal
ambiguity of Article 2 and, as a result, lead to more conservative interpretation of Sharia.
After the fall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, a new Egyptian constitution was
promulgated in 2012. It was promulgated by the Constituent Assembly whose membership was
dominated by the Muslim Brotherhoods and Salafis.70This domination happened because “[t]he
transitional provision regulating the election of the C A—a provision approved in the March
2011 referendum—required an absolute majority vote of the elected members of Parliament.”71
Both the Freedom and Justice Party (representing the Muslim Brotherhoods) and Al-Nur party
(representing Salafis) had a majority exceeding two thirds of seats of the newly elected
parliament at this time. With a majority of Islamists, the Constituent Assembly of the 2012
constitution added some constitutional articles to consolidate and clarify the authority of Islamic
law in the new adopted constitution.72 In addition to Article 2, whose form was not changed,
Articles 4 and 219 were added to clarify the ambiguity of the definition of Sharia principles and
their implementation. Article 4 states that:
Al-Azhar is an independent Islamic institution of higher learning. It handles all its affairs
without outside interference. It leads the call into Islam and assumes responsibility for
religious studies and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. The al-Azhar’s Body of
Senior Scholars is to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law.73
According to this article Al -Azhar could provide advisory opinions on any matter related to
Sharia, while Article 175 reserved the SCC’s exclusive jurisdiction on the constitutional matters.
Article 219 explains the principles of Sharia as it states that “Sharia principles include Sharia’s
general evidences (adillah kulliyah), rules of jurisprudence (qawa‘id usuliyyah) and juristic
principles (qawa’id fiqhiyyah) and the sources considered by the Sunni schools of law”74
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Introducing Art. 4 into the new adopted constitution resulted in raising many objections from
liberals and human rights activists as Moataz El Fegiery summarizes in the following paragraph:
This Article has provoked outrage from a wide range of liberals and human rights
activists. In a public statement, 23 Egyptian human rights NGOs considered this move as
a bold step towards theocracy, where unaccountable religious scholars intervene in the
work of the elected bodies. They expressed worries that this Article copies the Iranian
system of wilayat al faqih but in a different shape. According to them, Article 4
‘undermines the concept of the modern democratic state and sets the country up for
significant legal uncertainty’. Even though the opinions of the Association of Senior
Scholars are not mandatory, the Constitution provides religious scholars with a powerful
moral and religious authority over elected parliamentarians. Their opinions would be
hardly ignored.75
These objections and worries from liberals, NGOs, and human rights activists could show us
how the legal ambiguity of Article 2 and its interpretation is not only sponsored by the Egyptian
state but also backed up by secular or liberal elites. I think that according to this perspective,
legal ambiguity that leads to a modernist interpretation of Sharia is more acceptable than legal
certainty that could lead to a conservative interpretation of Sharia. Moreover, “advisory”
opinions of “unaccountable” religious scholars in Sharia matters is a blatant intervention in the
work of the elected bodies, while the binding interpretation of Sharia by secular educated and
state appointed judges has not been regarded as an intervention in the work of the elected bodies
since 80s! It is not supposed here, according to the scope of this research, to assess whether or
not these added Articles could end the existing legal ambiguity or to examine the surrounding
political circumstances that caused these amendments.76The point here is to be aware that leaving
Article 2 with its original ambiguous form since 1981 has enabled the Egyptian judiciary to
adopt a centrist or modernist interpretation of Sharia. Liberals opposed the added articles because
“[u]nder Articles 4 and 219, liberal and un-orthodox approaches of Islamic law have no
legitimacy in Egyptian legal reasoning.”77This point is crucial to the upcoming analysis of the
legal framework of apostasy in Egypt. I believe this because, with such ambiguous definition of
Sharia principles, it is irrational to agree with any claims considering this legal framework as a
result of a conservative interpretation or implementation of Sharia in Egypt. Then why did
liberals, NGOs, and human rights activists objected the consultation of al-Azhar in matters
75
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pertaining to Islamic law if we already have a conservative interpretation of Sharia by the state? I
think that the answer is because there is a difference between the state’s modernist interpretations
of Sharia under a single ambiguous constitutional article and its classic interpretations by
religious scholars under a constitutional article defining its principles. After the deposition of
Morsi and his government in the summer of 2013, the new military backed government drafted a
new constitution that was approved by a national referendum in January 2014.78Article 2 was
kept with the same form in the new constitution, whereas Art. 219 and the paragraph stating the
consultation of Al-Azhar in matters pertaining to Islamic law were both omitted.
Before explaining the SCC’s methodology of interpreting Article 2, let’s summarize some
important findings that should be taken into consideration. The political intention of adopting
Article 2 or Sharia supremacy clause since 1971 was not to enforce Sharia principles within the
Egyptian legal system; rather, it was adopted to consolidate the political power of the ruling
regime at this time. Consequently, Article 2 was formulated and kept with its vagueness without
a definite interpretation of Sharia principles or the methodology of their deduction to push all its
related political and legal conflicts to courts and litigation process. This process has been the
only remained channel to discuss or reform constitutional Islamization after the closure of all
other political channels including legislation. As it will be demonstrated, the vague form of
Article 2 has enabled the state through its constitutional judiciary to have an ultimate control
over the definition of Sharia principles and the scope of its enforcement. Also, the ambiguity of
the definition of Sharia principles has been backed up by liberals or secularists who have
opposed any further mandatory constitutional definition of these principles that could lead to a
more conservative interpretation of Sharia. The present findings confirm that “the introduction of
Article 2 has not substantially changed the Egyptian legal system, which has maintained its
secular features.”79Now, let’s see how the SCC has adopted a modernist approach to interpret
and deduce Sharia principles and norms. Such approach has kept “the incorporation of Islamic
law into the Egyptian legal system to a minimum.”80
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3. Examining the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC)’s Approach to the
Interpretation of Article 2:
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) has an exclusive power to interpret and apply
constitutional provisions; thus, the SCC has a main role in interpreting Article 2 including the
definition of Sharia principles and the scope of their application within the Egyptian legal
system. The evolution of the SCC’s substantive Article 2 jurisprudence since its establishment
right now is a direct result of the historical evolution of constitutional review in the Egyptian
legal system. For many decades before 1969, all Egyptian courts had the authority to consider or
discuss the constitutionality of legislations.81Accordingly, any court could decide not to apply
laws that were considered by the court to be unconstitutional according to a legal practice called
abstention control.82In 1969 the Supreme Court was established by Law No. 81 of 1969 to have
an exclusive authority of constitutional review of all legislations.83The 1971 constitution
introduced for the first time the SCC to “undertake the judicial control in respect of the
constitutionality of the laws and regulations and .. undertake the interpretation of the legislative
texts in the manner prescribed by law.”84The court was established in 1979 under Law No. 48,
which regulates the operation of the court.85According to this law, lower courts act as gate
keepers that “determine which constitutional claims can be brought before the SCC [through] a
function that is often referred to as their ‘gate keeping function’.”86Since the early 1990s the
court’s justices have worked to identify the general principles that should govern their
interpretation of all constitutional texts.87The court has consistently confirmed through its official
reports and publications that the “constitution must be interpreted as an organic whole.”88This
implies that the interpretation of any constitutional text must be consistent with all governing
constitutional principles that are identified by the court. These principles include: the
commitment to democracy and separation of powers, the commitment to equitable social and
economic policies, the commitment to ensure that Egyptian law respects the “rule of law”, and
81

LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 143.
Id.
83
Id. at 144.
84
Egyptian Constitution, supra note 54, art. 175.
85
LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 144.
86
Id. at 145.
87
Id. at 150.
88
Id. at 149.
82

20

the commitment that Egyptian law must respect the principles of Sharia.89Both the third and the
fourth principles has shaped the SCC’s methodology of interpreting Article 2.The commitment
to ensure that Egyptian law respects the “rule of law” has been interpreted by the court to mean
that “the government [has] to respect human rights, including ones widely recognized as
fundamental human rights in international agreements and by constitutional courts around the
world.”90In addition, the forth principle requires from the court to ensure that all its
interpretations of constitutional texts must be consistent with Sharia norms as the main source of
legislation in Egypt. The court’s desire to balance between these two principles has ensured its
liberal interpretation of Article 2 to fulfil its international commitment to human rights. In other
words, the SCC’s commitment to develop “a holistic interpretation of the constitution led it to
demand that Egyptian constitutional law be harmonized with unwritten international human
rights norms.”91I think that there is a rational question that could be raised here; why it is
assumed here that the SCC’s commitment to a holistic interpretation of the constitution has led to
a liberal interpretation of Sharia and not to a conservative interpretation of international human
rights? There are two reasons that confirm this assumption. The first one is that the upcoming
analysis of the court’s methodology of interpreting Article 2 would show us how it has
developed such methodology to ensure a liberal or non-conservative interpretation of Sharia
norms. The second reason is because the SCC as the exclusive interpreter of Article 2, and as a
result, of Sharia principles it is not restricted to any other interpretation of Sharia principles. On
the other hand, the SCC’s interpretation of human rights is restricted to IHRL and could be
criticized or reviewed by international human rights organizations and international community.
In order to take its time to develop its own theory of Islamic legislation and to identify its
methodology of interpreting Sharia principles, the SCC postponed any substantive Article 2
opinions till 1993.92The court had ensured this by issuing two opinions in 1985 to confirm that
“it had limited authority to exercise Article 2 review. It could not exercise review of laws that
were in force at the time that Article 2 was amended in 1980. It could, however, review laws that
entered into force thereafter.”93It is believed that the court applied the principle of non89
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retroactivity of legislation to the constitutional amendment of Art. 2 because it was reluctant to
reveal a systematic theory of Islamic legal interpretations before taking its time to ensure that its
reasoning would be accepted by the executive branch, lower courts, political powers including
liberals and Islamists, public, and international community. According to what will be illustrated,
we could see how this intention has resulted in an ambiguous theory that is formulated in
concepts and terms drawn from different theories of Islamic law.94

The critical question that the SCC has tried to answer through its methodology of interpreting
Sharia principles: under which circumstances are legislations to be considered unconstitutional
on the basis that they violate the principles of Sharia?95In order to answer this question, the court
defines Sharia principles in one of its decision on the case known as the “battle over the veil”,
which states that:
It is not permitted for a legislative text to contradict those shari'a rulings that are certain
with respect to their authenticity and meaning (al-ahkam al-shar'iyya alqat'iyya fi
thubutiha wa dalalatiha), considering that these rulings alone are those for which ijtihad
is forbidden, because they signify [the Islamic shari 'a's] universal principles (mabadi
'aha al-kulliyya) and its fixed roots (usulaha al-thabita), which accept neither
interpretation nor substitution. And accordingly, it is unimaginable that the
understanding of [such rulings] would change with a change of time and place. They
cannot be amended. It is forbidden to contravene them or twist their meaning. The
Supreme Constitutional Court has been charged with the duty to watch out for violation
of these [shari 'a rulings that are absolutely certain with respect to both their authenticity
and meaning] and to overturn any [statutory] rule (qa'ida) that contradicts them.96
In its interpretation of Article 2 the SCC has attempted to “develop an approach to Islamic legal
interpretation that would be respected by a wide range of people-including a wide range of
Islamists”97and consistent with the protection of IHRL as well. According to the SCC’s
interpretation to Article 2, the Egyptian laws should meet two criteria; firstly, consistency “with
94
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universally applicable scriptural rules of Islamic Shari'a.”98Secondly, these laws must advance
the goals of Sharia.99Regarding the first standard, the SCC identified “universally applicable
scriptural rules of Islamic Shari'a” by searching for principles that are authentic and have certain
meaning. The court accepted the Quran as authentic, but has not clarified its method of
“separating the absolutely trustworthy hadiths from the merely probable.”100Since the SCC
considers a scriptural command is not binding unless it is certain with respect to both
authenticity and meaning, the Court could find few of such binding scriptural commands. The
next question that had to be answered by the court’s theory of interpretation was: how to
differentiate between universally applicable scriptural rules of Islamic Shari'a, for which ijtihad
is forbidden, and other Sharia rulings which are subject to change or contradiction by enacted
laws? The court defines these “flexible” Sharia principles as:
And whereas: Use of the rule of reason, where there is no [scriptural] text, develops
practical rules (qawa'id 'amliyya) that are, in their ramifications, gentler for the people
and more concerned with their affairs and [that] better protect their true interests
(masalihhim al-haqiqiyya)… The statements of the classical Islamic jurists (fuqaha ') on
a matter related to the shari 'a are not granted any sanctity or placed beyond review or
reexamination. Rather, they can be replaced by other [interpretations of Islamic law].
Opinions based on ijtihad in debated questions do not in themselves have any force
applying to those who do not hold them. It is not permitted to hold [such opinions] to be
firm, settled shari'a law that cannot be contravened.101
Accordingly, the violation of these disputed or flexible rules of Islamic law regarding texts that
are speculative in their origin or meaning (ẓannī al-ṯubūt aw al-dalālah) by any legislative
enactment does not entail its unconstitutionality unless the SCC decides so. Moreover, the court
has an exclusive authority to decide which of Sharia norms are regarded as universally applicable
scriptural rules and which are flexible rules. The court also could elevate any disputed rule to be
a universally applicable scriptural rule through preventing its contravention by any enacted
law.102It is believed that the SCC had to explain some issues that govern its categorization and
deduction of Sharia norms to lend its new developed methodology much more legal credibility,
and to give lower courts’ judges more guidance about how to deduce, interpret and categorize
Sharia rules. These issues include: what is the adopted Islamic legal theory by the court to
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deduce rules from Sharia principal and supplementary sources? How do the court purify and
categorize the Prophet’s hadiths as a principal source of Sharia? How would the court integrate
the rulings of both Quran and Sunnah within its legal reasoning? The lack of any answer to these
questions has made it obvious that “the SCC exploits the differentiation between definite and
flexible rules of Islamic law in order to enlarge the scope of legislative discretion.”103The court
has misused Islamic technical terms without rational Islamic legal reasoning to declare its
constitutional theory of interpretation as an Islamic. Concerning Sharia goals, the court believes
that there are specific goals that should be promoted by specific types of laws and general goals
that must be promoted or not be impeded by all laws.104The Court determines specific goals
through textual analysis and analysis of history, while the general goals are derived by reason.
According to the Court, the general goals “must give effect to the unambiguous, utilitarian
principle announced in the hadith, namely ‘no harm and no retribution’ (la darar wa-la
dirar)”105Thus, they include advancing human welfare. The flexibility of the SCC’s theory of
interpretation of Article 2 enables it to ensure that enforcing Sharia norms on enacted legislations
will be consistent with its international commitments to liberal economic philosophy and to the
protection of civil and political rights. This because the justices of the court have always
considered “the enjoyment of human rights (as these have been defined by the court) as
axiomatically good”106; as a result, their violation by any law is not permitted. The SCC has
written its Article 2 opinions in a compact language that does not illustrate how the court reached
its liberal conclusions about Sharia command.107The members of the court haven’t clearly
explained their methodology of interpretation of Sharia for their successors or lower courts to
follow because they might be uncertain themselves about the adequacy of their approach.108
Other courts including the Court of Cassation, administrative courts, and regular courts have
followed the SCC’s theory in a slightly more conservative approach.109This does not absolutely
mean that these courts have always adopted more conservative juristic opinions that contradict
the liberal approach of the SCC; rather, their decisions only implied more systematic use of
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Hadith or Sunnah literature. Hence, “[t]he most striking pattern in the judiciary’s application of
the SCC’s theory is the implicit resistance to the SCC use (or non-use) of the hadith
literature.”110In the absence of any guidance from the SCC, checking the authenticity and the
interpretation of any Hadith falls only under the discretion of the concerned court. judges who
have different training than traditional Islamic religious scholars could not introduce an
alternative theory of Islamic interpretation, but they misuse Islamic technical terms in order to
Islamize’ state law in a pattern that is consistent with democracy, international human rights and
economic liberalism.111

The main conclusion that can be drawn is that the SCC has adopted a modernist approach to
interpret and deduce Sharia principles and norms to maintain the secular nature of the Egyptian
legal system. In the absence of a clear definition of Sharia principles by the adopted constitution
of 1981 and precisely by the discussed Article, on one hand, and renouncing a comprehensive
Islamic review of the existing laws to be carried out by legislatures, on the other hand, the SCC
had to innovate an interpretation theory to face the increasing resort to litigation procedure to
reach political ends. The constitutional court managed to innovate its interpretation theory to
balance between two requirements; firstly, to have an Islamic template to be accepted by the
public, Islamists, and judges of other courts. Secondly, to create an interpretation methodology
that ensures a liberal or modern interpretation of Sharia sources and norms as a fulfillment of its
international commitments to protect international human rights and economic liberalism. In
order to achieve this balance, the court’s methodology has relied upon a process of a secular
reconstruction of Islamic law.112
On the other hand, there is a counter point of view challenging the “secularizing effect” of the
constitutional judicial review of Sharia in Egypt. For instance, in her article The Least Religious
Branch? Judicial Review and The New Islamic Constitutionalism Intisar Rabb argues that “prior
judicial practice reveals that Egypt's constitutional court engaged rather than contained or
secularized Islamic law; and the more it engaged, the stronger and more legitimate the bases for
110
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the Court's decisions.”113She asserts that Article 2 established jurisprudence closely examines and
explores the elements of the Islamic legal tradition. Intisar adds that the SCC’s judges throughout
1990s and 2000s interpreted a variety of Islamic law sources, arguments, classical
interpretations, general goals of law, classical and modern notions of public interest, and legal
maxims.114Our analysis here does not deny such engagement; rather, it proves that the Court’s
consideration of some elements of Islamic legal tradition has aimed to control their interpretation
and integration within the Egyptian legal system. The paradigm of operational closure and
cognitive openness is manifested in the court’s adopted methodology. The court’s theory ensures
that Egyptian courts leaded by the SCC are the official readers and interpreters of Sharia texts
and norms; thus, they have the authority to categorize sacred texts and Sharia sources, determine
their obligatory nature, choose adopted juristic opinions, and choose the incorporated principles
of Sharia. The system of secular law has maintained its operational closure by reconstructing
principles of Islamic law within itself. In his impressive analysis of the SCC’s interpretation of
Article 2, Balz asserts that this interpretation:
[I]llustrates the struggle to defend the autonomy of the secular legal order. The
underlying strategy of the Court’s decision[s] is to gain control over the authoritative
interpretation of Islamic law: the SCC pays rhetorical tribute to being “bound” by the
rules of Islamic law in principle, while it reserves the right to determine the substance
of these rules. It is exactly this “substantializing” of Islamic legal rules within the
secular legal order that allows the latter to maintain its autonomy.115
However, such adopted interpretation methodology has not introduced a real alternative theory
of Islamic interpretation to be followed by judges to take over the process. The SCC has only
misused Islamic technical terms to Islamize its interpretation of Sharia upon which its decisions
were built. The present findings confirm that the normative recognition of Sharia as a main
source of law in Egypt since 1971 has not created a real case of legal pluralism in Egypt where
the existing laws and legal policies were developed to be compatible with Sharia without
violating the essence of the latter. In contrast, it has created a situation of legal duality or conflict
where the modern state monopolized and exploited the interpretation of the constituent law
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sources and, as a result, its definitions of the scope of all rights. As supposed earlier in this
research, the primary standard to assess whether there is a situation of duality or plurality in any
legal system is the degree of adherence to the genuine essence and standards of the recognized
source of law. The genuine standards of this source of law should not be defined according to the
recipient law, but according to the recognized law itself. Having a full picture of how the
discussed interpretation of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt by the SCC has led to the
current contradicting and ambiguous legal framework of apostasy, it is substantial to have a brief
or a simple introduction to Sharia sources and Islamic legal theory. Such introduction would give
us a general background about the classic or the “genuine” categorization of Sharia sources and
Sunni legal theory (Usul al-Fiqh) that has been used in deducting Sharia rules from sources.

B. The Scope of Religious Freedom According to Sharia:
Assessing and analyzing the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt requires examining the main
features of religious freedom according to Sharia as a key aspect of our current research. The
importance of such examination stems from the assumption that evaluating Egyptian courts’
approach (including the SCC’s) to the act of turning away from Islam or apostasy should include
exploring the position of the same act in Sharia. This because the status of apostasy within
Sharia, as the main source of law in Egypt, is considered as the original reference according to
which apostasy is prohibited or criminalized, and its legal consequences are applied. Thus,
regarding Egyptian judges’ approach to the act and its legal framework as a conservative, liberal,
secular, or ambiguous should be supported by the comparison with its status in Sharia. After
explaining the concept of Sharia as defined and understood by the SCC, I will start here by a
simple introduction to the classic or the traditional definition of Sharia sources and Islamic legal
theory. This introduction could show us how the SCC’s definition and interpretation of Sharia
differs from its definition from the perspective of Sharia itself. The definition of the classic
meaning of Sharia will be followed by investigating the scope of religious freedom according to
Sharia including main juristic opinions regarding the legal consequences of apostasy.
1. What do we Mean by Sharia?
Before defining Sharia and its sources, it is substantial to identify the conceptual indication of the
term Sharia in this thesis. Sharia refers to the traditional or scriptural meaning of the word.
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Consequently, refers to juristic rulings which are derived from divinely revealed scriptures of the
Quran or Sunnah and they acquire their authority from their Divine origin. These rulings could
be stated explicitly in Quran legislative verses or in Sunnah speeches of the Prophet Muhammad
()ﷺ. Deriving Sharia rulings has been practiced through scholars and jurists “who develop their
own methodology for the classification of sources, derivation of specific rules from general
principles, and so forth.”116Such traditional or fundamentalist concept of Sharia contradicts with
some modernist and functionalist approaches, which consider Sharia as mere normative rules
produced from human practice of reasoning and interpretation of jurists and scholars to reach to
what they believe to be the law of God and they also include law in action.117Accordingly, from
this perspective, Sharia norms are not always connected with scriptural legitimacy or acquire
sacredness. Holding the traditional concept of Sharia in this thesis is based upon two main
reasons; firstly, besides its consideration as the “dominant Islamic religious belief”118among
Muslims, the prohibition of apostasy in Islam is stated explicitly in Quran and acquires its juristic
authority from its Divine origin. Secondly, as we pointed out earlier, the drafting committee of
the 1971 constitution referred that in order to identify the principles of Islamic Sharia, the
legislatures must consider Quran, the Sunna and the opinions of learned jurists and imams.

Defining and explaining the meaning of Sharia here as a key concept of this research includes a
simple introduction to the literal meaning of the term itself, Sharia sources, and its legal theory.
Sharia literally means in Arabic “the right path or the clear approach”119Sharia could be defined
as “the divine law as embodied by God’s Word (the Quran) and the sayings and actions of His
prophet Muhammad (the Sunna)”120 The term could be also defined as “a ‘divine,’ ‘religious,’ or
‘sacred’ law representing the will of God as expressed in revealed scriptures to the Prophet
Muhammad.”121Sharia has different categories of sources from which its rules and norms are
deduced. The primary sources are the Quran and the Sunnah, while secondary sources are
116
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consensus (ijma’) and analogy (qiyas). In addition, Sharia disputed sources include public
interest (istslah), juristic preference (istihsan), custom (urf), etc.122Quran is considered by
Muslims as “the most sacred source of law, embodying knowledge that God had revealed about
human beliefs, about God himself, and about how the believer should conduct himself or herself
in this world.”123Concerning the authenticity of Quranic texts, Quran is regarded by Muslims as
wholly certain. The second primary source of Sharia is Sunnah, which had the form of specific
narratives called hadith.124Hadith corpus narrates the Prophet’s deeds and speeches along his life.
The legitimacy and the importance of Sunnah as a primary source of norms in Islam stems from
Muslims’ belief that the Prophet Muhammad (“ )ﷺwas God’s chosen messenger [who]
understood God’s [messages and orders] better than anyone else and acted upon them in his daily
life.”125The authenticity of the hadiths concerning their transmission chain (isnad), their main
texts (matn) and other aspects has been confirmed through different criteria determined by
scholars and jurists through the science of hadith and its rubrics. Jurists refined trustworthy
hadiths from other weak or fabricated ones and produced several collections of hadith including
main six canonical collections that report Sunnah. In addition to the primary sources of Sharia,
jurists and scholars uses secondary sources when Quran and Sunnah are silent regarding the
researched case. Consensus (ijma’) could be defined as “the agreement of community as
represented by its highly learned jurists living in a particular age or generation, an agreement that
bestows on those rulings or opinions subject to it a conclusive, certain knowledge.”126It has
commonly been assumed that consensus has been considered as dead source of law because it
became practically impossible to ascertain after the dispersion of Muslims across wide Islamic
territories.127Accordingly, the normative legitimacy of consensus as a source of Islamic law is
limited to the era preceding the Prophet's death in 632 CE. Analogy (qiyas) is considered as the
fourth source of law in Sharia.128It could be defined as “a form of analogical reasoning through
which prescribed norms in the Qur'an, Sunna or Ijma' can be extended to unregulated legal
problems if they share the same 'illa, or ratio legis.”129The other disputed sources of norms in
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Sharia are sources which there is a disagreement among jurists and scholars about their
legitimacy as sources of rules. This means that while some jurists regard these sources could
include rules and norms to solve issues that primary and secondary sources are silent about,
others deny this. They include public interest (istslah), juristic preference (istihsan), custom
(urf), Prophet’s companions’ consensus, prior judicial decisions of Sharia judges and Muftis,
preceding nations’ rulings (Sharā‘min qablinā), etc.

Deriving rules from various Sharia sources to deal with the new arising issues facing Muslims in
their daily life has not been practiced through a random process, but according to standards set
by Islamic legal theory which called in Sharia the science of Usul al-Fiqh. The science of Usul
al-Fiqh is defined as “the general principles that are used to deduce the legal rules of conduct
from their detailed sources.”130Thus, Usul al-Fiqh is the methodology of deriving the rules of
Sharia, that governs the conducts of Muslims, from its primary, secondary and disputed sources
of Sharia. The main function of Usul al- Fiqh is to develop methods to enable jurists to
understand and combine between the judgements that are mentioned explicitly in Quran and
authentic Sunnah reports; for instance, Usul al- Fiqh mentions the required conditions to apply
abrogation among different Quranic or hadith texts. Moreover, it develops methods for jurists to
discover what is supposed to be God’s judgment about the issues that are not mentioned
explicitly in these sources; for example, it sets the required rules of analogy. To avoid the error
that may result from the personal judgement of any jurist, Usul al-Fiqh “draw[s] a master plan of
systematic methodology not only for the purpose of understanding the contents of the sources but
also for drawing conclusions that are thought to be identical to those of the lex divina.”131The
foundation of the science of Usul al-Fiqh and its development have been progressed as a
response to the need of Muslims to discover Sharia rules regarding the arising issues in each era
of the Islamic history. Starting with the age of the Prophet ()ﷺ, the Prophet’s companions used to
ask him about any arising questions regarding Sharia rules. These questions were answered
either by Quran or by the Prophet ( )ﷺhimself (hadith). During their age, the prophet’s
companions did not face many hurdles in interpreting Quran and Sunnah and discovering Sharia
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rules for the new arising issues. This because they had known the interpretation of these sources
and the occasion of each text from the Prophet.132Also, in answering the new arising questions,
which were few, they used some methods of Usul al- Fiqh like analogy only as a concept without
reference to their terms. During the era of followers, jurists expanded in their reference to the
methods that have been used in deducting Sharia rules from sources due to the increasing
number of the new arising cases.133By the second century of hijra, jurists managed to establish
the science of Usul al-Fiqh to avoid any error in deducing Sharia rules from sources due to the
mixture of Arabs and non-Arabs (ajam) Muslims and the expansion of the territories of the
Islamic state. Al-Shafii’s book Al-Resala is considered as the first significant book that
assembled the main rules of Usul al-Fiqh as a distinctive science of Sharia. This historical
background shows that the study and the development of Usul a-Fiqh in any age has been
inspired by the needs of the Islamic community to discover Sharia rules regarding the arising
problems and should be adopted by scholars and jurists who have “complete understanding of
the Qur'an and the Sunna, the foremost sources of law”134

The concluded corpus of legal rules regarding any case are called in Sharia Fiqh rulings. The
science of fiqh could be defined as “the knowledge of Shari'a rules concerning the acts of
worshipers or Muslims.”135The usage of Usul Al- fiqh methodologies and methodological tools
does not ensure reaching the same conclusions regarding furu or unprecedented questions by
different jurists; rather, it may lead to a variety of juristic opinions for the same issue. This
justifies the fact that “no less than 19 schools (Fiqh Madhhab) developed during the first four
centuries of Islam producing diverse juristic opinions.”136The main Sunni doctrinal legal schools
in Islamic law are: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali. They are named after their founder
jurists. The reached fiqh rulings regarding any act or issue aim to establish a legal norm for every
132
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new case.137Sharia recognizes five types of norms under which the entire range of human activity
is categorized. According to this categorization, any act committed by Muslim could be
considered as forbidden (muharram), obligatory (wajeb), neutral (mubah), recommended
(mandoob), or disapproved (makrouh).138 Thus, any jurist aims through his reasoning to establish
a judgement on the conducts of Muslims that he believes is identical to God’s judgment about
the researched issues.

One of the most significant findings to emerge from our investigation here is that there is a major
difference between the classic or the “genuine” meaning of Sharia (including its sources, legal
theory, and legal rules) and its interpretation as elaborated by the SCC. The SCC’s interpretation
of Sharia principles could be considered as a distorted or deficient recognition of Sharia. A
possible explanation for this might be that such recognition failed to introduce a clear review of
the adopted approach to deal with Sharia sources other than Quran, its legal theory, and its
different juristic perspectives. Hence, we are talking about a case of recognition where the
recipient legal system ignored to take into consideration the constituent elements of the
recognized law. This deficient recognition of Sharia within the Egyptian legal system has
resulted in the contradicting legal position of apostasy in Egypt as what will be illustrated later in
this research.
2. The Scope of Religious Freedom According to Sharia:
The principle of non-compulsion in religion is ensured under Islamic law. This principle is
confirmed in many Quranic verses such as verse (2:256) that states that “There shall be no
compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong.
So, whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy
handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing.”139Also, God urges the
Prophet (pbuh), and consequently, his followers after him in Quran not to let their keenness to
call non-Muslims to embrace Islam as justification for coercion. In this regard, verse (10:99)
137
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states that “And had your Lord willed, those on earth would have believed - all of them entirely.
then, [O Muhammad], would you compel the people in order that they become believers?”140
This implies that imposing any form of coercion either physically or psychologically141
psychologically133to enforce non-Muslims to embrace Islam is prohibited in Sharia. Muslims
have a general duty to call non-Muslims to embrace Islam by good exhortation and not to coerce
them to do so as verse (16:125) confirms “Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and goodly
exhortation, and have disputations with them in the best manner; surely your Lord best knows
those who go astray from His path, and He knows best those who follow the right
way.”142Consequently, forced conversion to Islam is void under Sharia. Such juristic ruling is
illustrated by the twelfth century Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudamah, who points out that:
It is not permissible to force a non-believer into embracing Islam. For instance, if a
non-Muslim citizen (Dhimmi) or a protected alien (Musta’man) is forced to embrace
Islam, he will not be considered as a Muslim except his embrace of Islam is of his own
choice…The authority of this prohibition of coercion is the words of God Most High
that says: ‘There is no compulsion in religion’.143
Religious freedom in Sharia is not only governed by the principle of non-compulsion to ensure
the full persuasion of any person embraces Islam, but it is also restricted by the principle of the
prohibition of conversion from Islam or apostasy. Such conclusion is justified by the fact that
while the principle of non -compulsion in religion is confirmed in many Quranic verses, Quran
also includes repeated threats and strong warnings of punishment for apostasy in the Hereafter as
a major sin. The act of conversion from one religion to another is also prohibited and punished in
other Heavenly religions, namely Judaism and Christianity.144Apostasy is the English translation
of the Arabic term Riddah which literally means “turning back.”145Apostasy could be defined as
sūrat yūnus (Jonah): verse (10:99).
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“‘turning away from Islam’ (al-rudjfi' 'an din al-islam) or ‘severing the ties with Islam’.”146The
apostate or murtad is the Muslim who renounces his religion. The prohibition of conversion from
Islam or apostasy is stated in many Quranic verses like verse (2:217), which states “And
whoever of you reverts from his religion [to disbelief] and dies while he is a disbeliever - for
those, their deeds have become worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and those are the
companions of the Fire, they will abide therein eternally.”147Accordingly, any Muslim either by
birth or by conversion is not allowed to renounce his religion regardless he subsequently
embraces another faith or not.
3. Main Juristic Opinions Regarding the Legal Consequences of Apostasy in Sharia:
Apostasy in Sharia has different forms, which are classified in three main categories: utterance
related, action related, and belief related.148Utterance related apostasy could be explicit like
mocking or abjuring Islam and its rites,149insulting God (sab Allah), and insulting the Prophet
(sab Al-Rasol).150Using of foul language with regard to God, the Prophet, the angles, other
Prophets, and the Companions of the Prophet constitutes a serious offence of blasphemy.151
Blasphemy offence expression is not stated explicitly in the Quran or Sunnah speeches. Such
offence in Sharia is one of the greatest sins regardless of the religion of its committer was
Muslim or non-Muslim. There is a difference of opinion among jurists regarding the status of the
Muslim committers of blasphemy in Sharia. While most jurists consider the Muslim committers
of this act as apostates condemned to death, some jurists consider them as Muslims deserve death
penalty. The considered punishment of this act is based on certain reported incidents in the
lifetime of the Prophet (pbuh).152If the perpetrator of this act was non-Muslim he will also incur
death punishment.153Implicit apostasy statements include repudiation of some of the Scriptures
by adding or omission Quran verses154and repudiation of the axiomatic articles of faith (ma
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'ulima min al-din bl- darura).155The refusal to judge, or to be judged, according to the Shari'a is
also considered as implicit apostasy156according to verse (5:44) that states “And whoever does
not judge by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who are the disbelievers.”157Action
related apostasy could be committed by any acts mocking Islam like throwing Quran in a dirty
place intentionally, etc.158Also, Apostasy could happen by negative acts like leaving any of the
axiomatic articles of faith (such as praying).159Belief related apostasy happens by merely the
intention of unbelief which “ covers many cases, including doubts about the existence of Allah
and/or about the message of the Prophet Muhammad or any other Prophet; doubts about the
Quran, the Day of judgement . . .”160Like the act of apostasy, which is subjected to certain
conditions, the committer of this act must fulfill specific conditions to be accountable for such
acts.161
In Islam, there is no doubt that apostasy is regarded as a grievous sin.162Apostasy is punished by
death penalty in Sharia.163This opinion is held by the main four Islamic juristic schools and the
majority of Muslim scholars (gumhor al-fuqaha’).164This opinion is primarily based on some
speeches of the Prophet Muhamed (pbuh) in Sunna such as "whoever changes his religion, then
kill him.”165Also, the Prophet Muhamed (pbuh) said “[t]he blood of a fellow Muslim should
never be shed except in three cases: that of a married adulterer, the murder, and one who has
abandoned his religion, while splitting himself off from the community.”166It is important here to
refer that there are two isolated opinions of premodern jurists Ibrahim al-Nakha'I and Sufian alThawri oppose the mainstream position and see that the apostate should be asked forever to
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repent and not be killed.167There is a difference of opinion among jurists regarding the nature or
the categorization of this punishment in Sharia.168This difference is based on the fact that death
sanction is not prescribed for apostasy in Quran. Sharia recognizes three kinds of punishment:
hadd which is fixed punishment, qisas which is retaliation, and ta’zir which is discretionary
punishments prescribed either by the ruler or his deputy (judge).169Some jurists including
Shafi’is believe that the death punishment for apostasy is a hadd.170On the other hand, others
hold the view that this punishment is ta’zir because it is not stated explicitly in Quran. The
predominant opinion of Sharia jurists emphasizes that apostasy death sanction could only be
imposed by the governor (Waly Al-amr) or his deputy after granting the apostate a reprieve of
few days to repent (Istatabah) and remembrance Islam.171 Concerning the legal categorization of
repentance and its duration there are two positions in Islamic jurisprudence. The majority of
jurists consider offering the apostate an opportunity for repentance as obligatory, while others
like Hanafies consider it as a recommended act.172Repentance duration according to the
majority’s point of view is three days, and according to other jurists like some of the Shafi’is the
apostate should be offered repentance immediately and killed unless he reembraces
Islam.173Moreover, there are two opinions in Sharia regarding the punishment of apostate
woman. The first point of view, which is held by Malikis, Shafi’is and Hanbalis, see that “the
apostate woman must repent within three days; otherwise she faces the death penalty.”174The
second opinion, which is held by Hanafies, exclude female apostate from capital punishment and
see that she should be imprisoned and beaten until she repents or dies.175
Apostasy in Sharia entails other legal consequences other than death penalty. Concerning the
apostate’s property, the majority of jurists including Malikis, Shafi’is, Hanafis and Hanbalis176
Hanbalis167see that the apostate does not lose his property by apostasy, but his disposal rights are
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suspended.177Accordingly, the apostate is not allowed to perform any legal transaction of his
property until his situation becomes clear either by repentance or execution. Once he returns to
Islam, he restores these rights. This implies that if the apostate did not repent and died as “as an
unbeliever, his acts are legally void; if he readopts the faith, they are considered to have been
legally from the beginning and without interruption.”178Another opinion is argued by some Hanafi
jurists such as Abu Yusuf and Shaybani who believe that the apostate’s right to ownership of
property is not affected or suspended by apostasy as they consider his situation as “a criminal
awaiting his execution, who does not lose his legal capacity either.”179Also, we have a third opinion
held by some jurists like Abu Ishak Al-Sherazy see that the apostate loses all his property which
transfers to the Islamic state’s public treasury as (fay’).180Some Hanafis also see that female
apostate does not lose any of the mentioned rights because she is excluded from death
penalty.181Concerning the right to inheritance, apostasy in Sharia affects both apostate’s rights as
well as his heirs’. The apostate does not have the right to inheritance even from those whose coreligionist he has become because his conversion is not approved or accepted according to
Sharia.182In Islamic jurisprudence there are three different opinions regulate inheriting apostate’s
estate. The first one, which is argued by Shafi’is, Malikis, and Hanbalis, see that whole apostate’s
property should transfer to the Islamic state’s public treasury as (fay’).183 This opinion is based
upon the Prophet’s speech which states that “a Muslim does not inherit an unbeliever (kafir) and
an unbeliever does not inherit a Muslim.”184Secondly, some jurists like Abu Yusuf see that the
Muslim heirs should inherit everything that the apostate owned either before or after his
apostasy.185 Thirdly, Hanafi legal theory differentiates between property acquired before the act of
apostasy and property acquired after it; while the first part transfers to his Muslim heirs, the other
part of his estate becomes fay’.186Apostasy entails also some legal consequences on marriage in
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Sharia. Apostasy results in annulment of the marriage contract upon apostasy of one or both
partners without need for judicial decision.187Thus, a new marriage is to be contracted if the
apostate repents and wants to return to his or her spouse. Hanafis and Malikis see that spouses
should be separated immediately after committing the act of apostasy, while Shafis and some of
Hanbalis see that spouses may not be separated during the wife’s waiting period ('iddah)188, so
that, if the apostate repents during this period the marriage remains valid.189The apostate does not
have the right to marry even those whose co-religionist he has become because his conversion is
not approved or accepted according to Sharia and his marriage in this case will be considered as
void.190In regards to children, any child whom mother was pregnant with before the apostasy of
the parents (either one or both) is considered as Muslim191and cannot be allowed to follow any
other religion other than Islam.192Our examination of the main consequences of apostasy in Sharia
has shown that the impact of renouncing Islam is not only limited to capital punishment, but it also
affects the whole life of the apostate. According to what was illustrated, the apostate suffers in
Sharia from a civil death as he is not allowed to inherit, marry, and dispose of his property. The
apostate is also separated from his spouse and not allowed to choose another religion other than
Islam for his children in some cases. I think that these consequences are directly related to the legal
nature of Islam as a religion. Islam like many other beliefs (including Christianity and Judaism)
all its rulings and norms are based upon a main principle, which is the distinction between believers
and unbelievers; consequently, embracing Islam or renouncing it automatically results in many
other legal consequences in Sharia. Such legal consequences are related to principal and general
norms in Sharia and their ignorance or elimination is not an allowed choice from religious
perspective. For instance, the apostate husband is separated from his spouse simply because
Muslim woman is not allowed to marry a non-Muslim, and this general principal in Sharia is
confirmed by many Quranic verses such as verse (2:221), which states “And do not marry
polytheistic women until they believe. And a believing slave woman is better than a polytheist,
even though she might please you. And do not marry polytheistic men [to your women] until they
187
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believe. And a believing slave is better than a polytheist, even though he might please you. Those
invite [you] to the Fire, but Allah invites to Paradise and to forgiveness, by His
permission.”193Another example could be added in this regard, the apostate is also deprived from
his right to inherit from any of his Muslim relatives and this deprivation is based upon, as
mentioned above, a general principle in Sharia that “a Muslim does not inherit an unbeliever (kafir)
and an unbeliever does not inherit a Muslim.”194Hence, apostasy consequences in Sharia could not
be eliminated or abolished simply by abolishing death penalty because these consequences are set
in Sharia either because they are related to general norms or because apostasy is a grievous sin and
prohibited act that cannot be approved or accepted from the perspective of Sharia. I believe that it
is essential to refer to this point here before displaying different points of views concerning capital
punishment of Apostasy. The importance of such reference here stems from the fact that usually
the rhetoric of human rights when addresses the legal framework of apostasy in Muslim countries,
as a limitation on freedom of belief, concentrates the discussion on the question whether apostate
deserves the death penalty or not although this sanction is no longer applied in the most of Muslim
countries.195The proponents of this perspective consider capital punishment of apostasy in Sharia
as the main obstacle in achieving reconciliation between the notion of religious freedom in both
Sharia and IHRL. From their point of view, abolishing capital sanction of apostasy in Sharia is a
plausible argument to prove that apostasy rules at all is a disputed matter in Sharia that negates
with the principle of no compulsion in religion196 religion187and, as a result, Muslim states should
ignore them to make their laws and judicial practice consistence with the concept of religious
freedom as defined by IHRL. Our investigation here of apostasy consequences in Sharia has shown
that either applying or abolishing its capital sanction could not justify regarding the whole of its
rules and legal framework in Sharia as a disputed matter that could be abolished from the
perspective of Sharia.
Capital punishment for apostasy has been debated by many scholars as a main feature of the
legal discourse concerning apostasy. Although apostates are no longer being put to death in most
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of Muslim countries since the first half of the last century,197some modernist thinkers, jurists, and
religious scholars challenge the traditional position of pre-modern or classic Muslim jurists and
scholars. As was pointed out earlier, except one or two isolated opinions, there is an almost
consensus or agreement among the main four Islamic juristic schools and the majority of Muslim
scholars (gumhor al-fuqaha’) that apostasy is punished with death penalty. Some modern
thinkers and jurists challenge the traditional position on apostasy and hold that the apostate
should not be put to death on the mere ground of his apostasy. It is believed that their argument
is inspired by their belief that capital punishment of apostasy in Sharia is the main obstacle in
achieving reconciliation between the notion of religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL.
According to this approach, the whole issue should be rethought in the light of significant change
in time and circumstances.198From their point of view, abolishing capital sanction of apostasy in
Sharia is a plausible argument to prove that apostasy rules at all is a disputed matter in Sharia
that negates with the principle of no compulsion in religion and, as a result, Muslim states should
ignore them to make their laws and judicial practice consistence with the concept of religious
freedom as defined by IHRL. In order to support their argument to be accepted by the judiciary
and even the public, they have tried to justify it from within Sharia. Some of these arguments are
going to be displayed here to assess their plausibility from the perspective of Sharia and to see if
it could offer the proposed compatibility with the “international” concept of religious freedom.
The most well-known argument in this issue is that the apostate should not be put to death on the
mere ground of his apostasy because apostasy is mentioned in Quran in many verses without
prescribing any temporal punishment on this act. Apostasy is mentioned in Quran as a grievous
sin whose committer is threatened with a severe punishment in the afterlife; for instance, verse
(2:217) states “And whoever of you reverts from his religion [to disbelief] and dies while he is a
disbeliever - for those, their deeds have become worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and
those are the companions of the Fire, they will abide therein eternally.”199Some modernists
thinkers see that capital sanction for apostasy is based upon two speeches relying on only one
authority (khabar al-ahdd) and were not widely known among the Prophet’s
companions;200consequently, these speeches could not be relied upon to establish a fundamental
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principle of Islam especially that there is no evidence that the Prophet executed an apostate
because of his apostasy.201They claim that apostasy speeches contradict with explicit Quran
verses, like verse (2:256) which makes freedom of belief a basic right in Islam.202Another point
of view asserts that only the apostate who revolts against Islam or constitutes a harm to the
community should be punished with death sanction, while those who abandon Islam quietly as
individuals do not deserve this punishment.203 194In this regard, a contemporary Islamic thinker
Mohammed Al-Awa expresses that:
The [death] punishment is inflicted in cases in which the apostate is a cause of harm to the
society, while in those cases in which an individual simply changes his religion the
punishment is not to be applied. But it must be remembered that unthreatening apostasy is
an exceptional case, and the common thing is that apostasy is accompanied by some
harmful actions against the society or state. A comparison between the concept of
punishing those who commit treason in modern systems of law and those who commit
apostasy in Islamic law would be useful.204
A similar argument corelates between apostasy sanction and treason. The supporters of this idea
contend that apostasy speeches were stated in a time when Islam constituted a socio-political
order, and apostasy in this time did not just mean renouncing Islam but meant treason and
joining enemies.205Accordingly, death sanction was imposed on apostates not because of their
apostasy but because of their treason. They refer to the Prophet’s speech as an evidence, when
He said “[t]he blood of a fellow Muslim should never be shed except in three cases: that of a
married adulterer, the murder, and one who has abandoned his religion, while splitting himself
off from the community.”206Other modernist thinkers also suggest that abolishing death penalty
could be based upon the two isolated opinions of premodern jurists Ibrahim al-Nakha'I and
Sufian al-Thawri, who oppose the mainstream position and see that the apostate should be asked
forever to repent and not be killed.
In this regard, there are many counter arguments that could face the mentioned opinions from the
viewpoint of Sharia. Saying that death sanction of apostasy should be abolished basing on its
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non-prescription in Quran contradicts with the fact that Sunnah is a primary source of norms in
Sharia. A reasonable argument to refute this position could be that the non-prescription of capital
punishment for apostasy in Quran does not negate its existence in Sharia because there are many
provisions of Sharia only mentioned in Sunnah. As was pointed out earlier in this section, the
legitimacy and the importance of Sunnah as a primary source of norms in Islam stems from
Muslims’ belief that the Prophet Muhammad was God’s chosen messenger who understood
God’s messages and orders better than anyone else and acted upon them in his daily life; hence,
Sunnah is a complementary source to Quran as it explains some of its meanings and elaborates
some provisions that are not mentioned explicitly in the Noble Book. For example, this has been
seen in the case of Muslim prayers as the way by which Muslims are praying is only elucidated
in Sunnah and not Quran. Also, the reliance of apostasy speeches on one authority (khabar alahdd) does not affect the authenticity of these traditions as long as the narrator is a trusted
person, and this principle has many evidences in Sharia.207The most of apostasy speeches were
narrated by many well-known companions of the Prophet as Othman,208Ibn Masoud, and the
Prophet’s wife A’esha.209It is important here to refer that a well-known pre-modern jurists like
Al-Shafii210and some proponents of the modernist approach see that some narrators in the
transmission chain (isnad) of some apostasy speeches are not trusted. However, such
observations have not changed the mainstream opinion of pre-modern jurists that apostasy is
punished with death penalty because such penalty is mentioned in other speeches even with more
trusted transmission chains (isnad) and even with different main texts (matn). This could justify
why Al-Shafii himself and his doctrinal school after him considers that apostasy is punished with
death penalty depending on other more authentic speeches.211Furthermore, the assertation that
the Prophet (pbuh) did not execute an apostate because of his apostasy as an evidence to suggest
the non-existence of death sanction could be challenged. It is believed that all apostates who
declared their apostasy since establishing the Islamic state in Al-Madina (a state that could
impose sanctions) during the Prophet age escaped away; accordingly, there is no evidence in
207
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Sunnah that any apostate continued to enjoy his normal life in Al-Madina after declaring his
apostasy.212One of the most repeated arguments in this discourse that apostasy speeches
contradict with explicit Quran verses, like verse (2:256) which makes freedom of belief a basic
right in Islam. The contradiction between Quran and authentic Sunna traditions is not an
acceptable idea in Sharia because it cannot exist either among Quran verses or between Quran
and Sunnah.213It impossible to say that the Prophet (pbuh) God’s chosen messenger who
understood God’s messages and orders better than anyone else could say speeches contradicting
with Quran. Consequently, any belief in the existence of this contradiction is resulted from a
misinterpretation of the interpreter according to his limited understanding to the apparent
meanings of texts. As illustrated above, Sunnah is a complementary source to Quran as it
explains some of its meanings and elaborates some provisions that are not mentioned explicitly
in the Noble Book. After examining reasons for revelation of apostasy speeches and Quranic
texts concerning religious freedom (like verse (2:256) that states “no compulsion in religion”),
the majority of Muslim jurists have agreed upon using the rubric of takhsis al-'amm
(specification of the general term) under Islamic legal theory or Usul al- Fiqh to specify the
apparent generalization of the mentioned Quranic texts by apostasy speeches.214The same
methodology has been used by Muslim jurists in deducing other provisions in Sharia even related
to some prescribed punishments (hudud) in Quran.215Other modern jurists and some human
rights advocates see that only the apostate who revolts against Islam, constitutes a harm to the
community, or commits treason should be punished with death sanction, while those who
abandon Islam quietly as individuals do not deserve death penalty. They deduced this limitation
from their interpretation of some related speeches as I have referred above. From a juristic
perspective such argument is not based upon any real evidence other than their interpretation,
whereas they ignore other reported speeches (and their related incidences) in the same issue
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which confirm that death penalty is directly related to the act of apostasy itself.216Also, the
connection between apostasy and “splitting off from the community” could be understood as a
prima facie connection between apostasy and revolting against community or religion especially
that the apostate suffers in Sharia from a civil death. A serious weakness with this argument,
however, is that there is no one strict definition of treason or harm according to which jurists or
judges could judge when an apostate deserves death penalty. Accepting this point of view also
could imply that death sanction may be abolished only in cases of non-announced (inner belief)
apostasy; otherwise, any announced apostasy (either explicit or implicit) is susceptible to death
penalty because it can be considered as a danger to the state especially when it is accompanied
by calling other Muslims to follow certain thoughts that corrupt their belief. This idea transforms
apostasy from a matter of belief in Sharia to a political issue assessed according to the political
standards of the state or rulers. As I have referred, another opinion proposes that abolishing death
penalty could be based upon the two isolated opinions of premodern jurists Ibrahim al-Nakha'I
and Sufian al-Thawri, who oppose the mainstream position and see that the apostate should be
asked forever to repent and not be killed. Some scholars find that there are some contradictions
related to these opinions, and from a juristic perspective the consensus of the Prophet’s
companions about the issue and their practice could not be refuted by these isolated opinions.217
Sufian al-Thawri narrates this opinion about Ibrahim al-Nakha'I and agrees with him; however,
the most contradicting thing concerning this opinion that it is narrated about Ibrahim al-Nakha'I,
who also agrees with other jurists who see that apostate woman should face death penalty.218

The main goal of the current analysis was to explore the framework of the act of apostasy in
Sharia including main juristic opinions regarding it and its legal consequences. This because the
status of apostasy within Sharia, as the main source of law in Egypt, is the original reference
according to which apostasy is prohibited or criminalized, and its legal consequences are applied
in the Egyptian legal system. Apostasy is punished by death penalty in Sharia. This opinion is
held by the main four Islamic juristic schools and the majority of Muslim scholars (gumhor alfuqaha’). Only two isolated opinions of traditional Muslim jurists see that the apostate should be
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asked forever to repent and not be killed. Some jurists including Shafi’is believe that the death
punishment for apostasy is a hadd. On the other hand, others hold the view that this punishment
is ta’zir because it is not stated explicitly in Quran. Apostasy in Sharia entails other legal
consequences other than death penalty. The apostate suffers in Sharia from a civil death as he is
not allowed to inherit, marry, and dispose of his property. The apostate is also separated from his
spouse and not allowed to choose another religion other than Islam for his children in some
cases. These consequences are set in Sharia either because they are related to general norms or
because apostasy is a grievous sin and prohibited act that cannot be approved or accepted from
the perspective of Sharia. Some modern thinkers and jurists challenge the traditional position on
apostasy and hold that the apostate should not be put to death on the mere ground of his
apostasy. It is believed that their argument is inspired by their belief that capital punishment of
apostasy in Sharia is the main obstacle in achieving reconciliation between the notion of
religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL. According to this approach, the whole issue should
be rethought in the light of significant change in time and circumstances. From their point of
view, abolishing capital sanction of apostasy in Sharia is a plausible argument to prove that
apostasy rules at all is a disputed matter in Sharia that negates with the principle of no
compulsion in religion and, as a result, Muslim states should ignore them to make their laws and
judicial practice consistence with the concept of religious freedom as defined by IHRL. Our
investigation of the most prominent arguments in this issue has led us to some important
conclusions that are to be elaborated here. Firstly, these arguments are refutable from the juristic
point of view. Secondly, even agreeing with abolishing apostasy capital punishment will not
change the fact that conversion from Islam is regarded as a grievous sin in Sharia. Thirdly,
abolishing death penalty could not be accepted from a juristic perspective as a reason for
abolishing apostasy legal consequences and regarding them as disputed matter in religion
because they are set in Sharia, for they are related to general norms and apostasy is a grievous sin
that could not be approved in Islam.
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C. The Scope of Religious Freedom as Considered by International Human Rights
Law:
The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt is not only regulated according its counterpart in
Sharia as the principal source of law in Egypt, but it is also governed and affected by the
international obligation of the Egyptian state to ensure the consistency of its domestic laws with
international human rights law including its definition to the right to freedom of religion. The
source of such obligation is stipulated in Article 151 of the 1971 constitution, which states “[t]he
President of the Republic shall conclude treaties and communicate them to the People’s
Assembly, accompanied with suitable clarifications. They shall have the force of law after their
conclusion, ratification and publication according to the established procedure.”219
210

Consequently, after Egypt had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR) and published this ratification in the Official Gazette it has acquired the force of law in
Egypt. Also, as was pointed out earlier in this research, the SCC has consistently confirmed
through its official reports and publications that the constitution must be interpreted as an organic
whole. This implies that the interpretation of any constitutional text must be consistent with all
governing constitutional principles that are identified by the court. These principles include: the
commitment to democracy and separation of powers, the commitment to equitable social and
economic policies, the commitment to ensure that Egyptian law respects the “rule of law”, and
the commitment that Egyptian law must respect the principles of Sharia. The commitment to
ensure that Egyptian law respects the “rule of law” has been interpreted by the court to mean that
“the government [has] to respect human rights, including ones widely recognized as fundamental
human rights in international agreements and by constitutional courts around the world.”220
Accordingly, the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt has been demarcated by the evident
intention of the Egyptian state, through its legislature and judiciary, to balance between
respecting human rights as recognized in international agreements and the full adherence to
Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt. Having examined the status of apostasy within Sharia
as the original reference according to which apostasy could be criminalized and its legal
consequences are applied in Egypt, I will now move to discuss the notion of the right to freedom
of religion as recognized by the ICCPR. I will focus precisely on legal permissibility of the right
to change one’s current religion with another belief under the covenant. The purpose of this part
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of thesis is to investigate the main features of the concept of religious freedom according to the
ICCPR to assess its compatibility with the legal status of apostasy within Sharia. This would
enable us to track how the state’s attempt to balance between these two competing legal orders
has shaped the ambiguous legal status of apostasy within the Egyptian legal system.

1. ICCPR’s Definition of Religious Freedom:
The right to freedom of religion, conscience, and thought is a fundamental right that has been
stipulated and confirmed by international human rights law through many of its instruments
since the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the United
Nations’ General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948.221The notion of religious freedom
was stipulated for the first time by the United Nations in Article 18 of the UDHR which states
“[e]very one has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance.”222Nine Muslim majority nations out of ten voted in favor of the declaration
including Egypt despite some of their reservations about Article 18’s clause that mentions the
right to change religion or belief.223For the same reason, Saudi Arabia abstained from the final
vote on the declaration. Johannes Morsink refers to the Egyptian reservation in this regard when
he states:
In the plenary General Assembly debate, the Egyptian foreign ministry’s legal adviser,
Wahid Fikry Raafat, noted his country’s support for the UDHR generally, but he had
“reservations” about this right to change religion or belief. These reservations were set
aside when Egypt supported the UDHR text as a whole.224
These reservations by Muslim majority countries were early indicators that the concept of
religious freedom as defined by IHRL will create a continuous source of controversy in these
states due to its apparent contradiction with Sharia norms. It is believed that such
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contradiction results from the secular imprint of IHRL and its instruments that collides with
any religious based laws.225While the UDHR is respectful of all existing religious beliefs, it
abolishes and prevents any restrictions on the right to freedom of religion (according to its
definition) that could be based upon any of these beliefs. According to what will be explained
in our upcoming analysis of Article 18 of the ICCPR, IHRL only permits some political
limitations that could be imposed by the state on some aspects of the right to religious
freedom. Since the adoption of the UDHR its binding legal character has been controversial
and such controversy urged the United Nations to develop it and establish its fundamental
rights into a wide range of legally binding conventions like the ICCPR.226

The ICCPR is considered as the only binding treaty that introduces a comprehensive articulation
of the right to religious freedom as defined by IHRL.227The right to freedom of religion is
emphasized in Article 18 of the ICCPR, which states that:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.228

This article defines subject, content, and limitations of religious freedom. The right to freedom of
religion is entitled to “everyone”. This means any individual in any territory around the world
must enjoy this right. The content of this right includes freedom from coercion to adopt a
225

Id. at 159.
HANA SADIK EL-GALLAL, ISLAM AND THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Peter Lang AG,
Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften 2014), p.31.
227
Id. at 32.
228
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1.
226

48

religion or belief, liberty of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children,
and freedom to manifest religion or belief. The only freedom that can be limited in this right is
freedom to manifest one’s religion. The first draft of this article was faced by reservations and
abstentions from some Muslim and socialist states including Egypt.229This because it included
“freedom to change one’s religion or belief” like article 18 of the UDHR. Later, this statement
was amended to "freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's choice."230It is believed
that the reason for these reservations from Muslim majority countries like Saudi Arabia was
based upon the contradiction of the mentioned clause with the principles of Islam that prohibit
apostasy.231The reached compromise that aimed to acquire the largest number of signatory
Muslim states to the new adopted convention at this time has raised many criticisms by human
rights advocates and scholars who think that it has resulted in a contradiction between Article 18
of ICCPR and Article 18 of UDHR.232According to this point of view, Article 18 of UDHR
ensures a wider protection for religious freedom as it includes freedom to change one’s religion
or belief, whereas Article 18 only refers to the right to freedom to have or adopt a religion or
belief of one's choice.

This supposed difference or contradiction between Article 18 of UDHR and its counterpart in
ICCPR could be solved by arguing that freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's
choice under ICCPR implies freedom to change one’s religion.233The Human Rights Committee
(HRC) held this point of view in its interpretation of the Article. The HRC is established under
article 28 of the Covenant and it is composed of independent experts who must be nationals of
States parties to the Covenant.234The principal mission of this committee is to monitor the
implementation of the covenant by its state parties. It also publishes its interpretation of the
content of human rights provisions, known as general comments. Accordingly, understanding the
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scope of the freedom to change one’s religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR, for the purpose of
this research, requires examining the official interpretation of the Article by the HRC. The
committee interpreted Article 18 of the ICCPR in its general comment no. 22 which was adopted
on 30 July 1993. I think that it is important here to refer that such interpretation was adopted in
1993 after most of States parties to the covenant had signed and ratified it like Egypt that signed
the covenant in 1967 and ratified it on 14 Jan 1982.235 This means that even regarding general
comment no. 22 as the official obligatory interpretation of Article 18 contradicts with the fact
that it has not existed since the adoption of the treaty in 1966 to be taken into consideration by
signatory States. General comment no. 22 included many principles that identify the scope of the
freedom to change one’s religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR, and they could be summarized
in the following points:
•

The scope of protection under Article 18 includes theistic and non- theistic beliefs and
not only limited to traditional religions.236

•

The committee insisted that the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to
replace one’s current religion or belief with another, and it also added that “18.2 bars
coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the
use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to
adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to
convert.”237

•

Imposing any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion must be prescribed by law
for the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.

•

Limitations on the freedom to manifest religion to protect public morals must not be
driven from a single tradition.
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•

Any limitation on the freedom to manifest religion “must not be applied in a manner that
would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18.”238

•

The recognition of a specific religion as a state religion that is embraced by the majority
of the population should not impair the enjoyment of the recognized rights in this
covenant even if this belief is treated as the official ideology in state’s constitutions and
statutes.

Having investigated the scope of the right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion and
focusing precisely on the freedom to change one’s religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR as
identified and interpreted by the HRC, it is important here to restate subject, content, and
limitations of this right. Any individual in any territory around the world must enjoy this right.
The content of this right includes freedom from coercion to adopt a religion or belief, liberty of
parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children, and freedom to manifest
religion or belief. The only freedom that can be limited in this right is freedom to manifest one’s
religion. The scope of protection under Article 18 includes theistic and non- theistic beliefs;
however, it prevents any restrictions on the right to freedom of religion that could be based upon
any of these beliefs. The freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief necessarily entails the
freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or
belief with another. Accordingly, the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel
believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs is banned under this Article.
Imposing any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion must be prescribed by law for the
protection of public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others. Such restrictions or limitations based upon public morals must not be driven from a single
tradition or applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18.
Recognizing any religion or belief as the official ideology in state’s constitutions and statutes
should not impair the enjoyment of the recognized rights in the ICCPR. One of the more
significant findings to emerge from our analysis is that the covenant as an instrument of
international human rights law adopts a secular approach to the definition of the right to freedom
of thought, conscience, or religion. While it is respectful of all religious beliefs including theistic
238
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and non- theistic beliefs, it bans any limitations on religious freedom that could be based upon
any of these beliefs. In contrast, imposing any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion
must be based upon the protection of public safety, order, health or morals. The notable thing
here is that neither the ICCPR nor the HRC comment in this regard introduced a strict or an
obligatory definition of any of the mentioned categories. Consequently, we could say that the
combination between emphasizing the illegality of any limitation on religious freedom that is
driven from a single religion and the absence of any clear strict definition of public safety, order,
health or morals according to which any state could limit freedom to manifest religion has
offered a loophole for states parties to the covenant to breach its concept of the right. This means
that any state could limit any aspect of the right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion as
long as this aspect is categorized by the state as a freedom to manifest religion, which variates
from one belief to another. Furthermore, any state party to the covenant could justify such
limitations by the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, which have no strict
definition. Accordingly, the secular approach of the Article has ensured that only political
limitations could be imposed by the state on some aspects of the right to religious freedom. The
legal framework of apostasy in Egypt is a clear manifestation of this paradigm. The case law of
the Egyptian civil courts regarded apostasy as a part of the practice of belief that is regulated by
the “internal order” of Islam and can be restricted on the bases of public policy.239Public policy
is used to ground apostasy rules, which are based on Sharia principles, into the Egyptian legal
system and to ensure their application without being stated in any statutory law.240
2. The Egyptian Reservation in this Regard:
Egypt ratified the ICCPR in 1982 after declaring that "Taking into consideration the provisions
of the Islamic Shari'a and the fact that they do not conflict with the text [i.e. the Covenant] ... we
accept, support and ratify it”241Although the amended statement still ensure the freedom to
change one’s religion (as it was confirmed in the HRC comment), Egyptian government officials
expressed that “this provision does not violate ‘the rules of Shari'a law.’”242Maurits Berger refers
that some scholars believe that the Egyptian statement in this regard is an exception close or
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reservation, while others interpret it as a confirmation of the consistency the ICCPR provisions
precisely Article 18 with Sharia.243Concerning the legal effect of this kind of reservations on the
binding nature of the ICCPR’s provisions and other human rights instruments, the HRC has
addressed this issue in its general comment no.24. Firstly, the HRC distinguishes between
reservations and declarations to a State’s understanding of the interpretation of a provision as the
comment states that “If a statement, irrespective of its name or title, purports to exclude or
modify the legal effect of a treaty in its application to the State, it constitutes a reservation.
Conversely, if a so-called reservation merely offers a State’s understanding of a provision but
does not exclude or modify that provision in its application to that State, it is, in reality, not a
reservation.”244In addition, the comment insists that the covenant neither prohibits reservations
nor mentions permitted reservations, and the absence of such prohibition does not imply the
permission of any reservation to the covenant provisions.245Reservations under the covenant and
its first optional protocol is governed by international law precisely Article 19(3) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.246Accordingly, the permission for any reservation
concerning the covenant provisions is correlated with its compatibility with the object and the
purpose of the covenant. General comment no. 24 defines the object and the purpose of the
covenant when it states:
The object and purpose of the Covenant is to create legally binding standards for human
rights by defining certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework of
obligations which are legally binding for those States which ratify; and to provide an
efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken.247
Basing on applying the “object and the purpose test”, the HRC considers that all the covenant
provisions represent preemptory norms of customary international law and may not be subject of
reservations. Also, after taking into consideration that there is no there is no hierarchy of
importance of rights under the Covenant, the committee ruled that the suspension of the
243
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operation of certain rights is not allowed. For instance, a State may not reserve to “deny freedom
of thought, conscience and religion [or] to presume a person guilty unless he proves his
innocence.”248Through applying all the mentioned standards and categorizations on the Egyptian
statement or “reservation”, we can assess its legal consequences on its international obligation to
ensure the protection of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as defined by
the ICCPR, in the Egyptian territories. Thus, the Egyptian statement which states “Taking into
consideration the provisions of the Islamic Shari'a and the fact that they do not conflict with the
text [i.e. the Covenant] ... we accept, support and ratify it”249could not be considered as a
reservation according to the distinction set by general comment no. 24, and it is merely a
statement of policy or a State’s understanding of the interpretation of a provision. Even if this
statement is considered according to some scholars as an exception close or reservation, this
reservation could not suspend the operation of certain rights of the ICCPR in Egypt or limit
them. This because the HRC considers that all the covenant provisions represent preemptory
norms of customary international law and may not be subject of reservations, which negates the
object and the purpose of the covenant. I think that it is important here to note that the Egyptian
statement in this issue, as some scholars emphasize, indicates how Sharia as the highest source of
law in Egypt plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the international obligations of the
Egyptian State.250It also, “shows that Islamic Shari’a is a higher source of law in Egypt than
international obligations and that its application is the highest legal obligation according to [the
Egyptian constitution at this time].”251
3. The Judicial Enforcement of this International Obligation by Egyptian Courts:
While ensuring the application of constitutional provisions and their interpretation falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the SCC, the international treaties signed and ratified by Egypt could
be applied by any Egyptian court or called upon by Egyptian litigants.252This stems from the fact
that ratified international treaties acquire the force of law in Egypt after fulfilling certain
procedures. As stated earlier in this research, such legal principle that incorporates the rules of
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ratified international instruments within the Egyptian legal system was set by Article 151 of the
1971 constitution, which reads “[t]he President of the Republic shall conclude treaties and
communicate them to the People’s Assembly, accompanied with suitable clarifications. They
shall have the force of law after their conclusion, ratification and publication according to the
established procedure.”253The same position is emphasized in both constitutions of 2012 and
2014 with some changes.254Consequently, it is believed that “[t]he fulfillment of some formal
requirements is a prerequisite for the legal enforcement of these instruments, [and] the ratified
instruments are only enforceable after their parliamentary approval and publication in the
Official Gazette.”255Ratified international instruments including human rights treaties are
considered as sovereign acts, which are excluded from the jurisdiction of domestic courts
according to Article 17 of the Judicial Authority Law no 64. Year 1972.256The SCC has also
confirmed this rule in various precedents.257On the other hand, the SCC could invalidate the
ratification of an international treaty in the case of the non- fulfillment of the formal
requirements of this process according to the constitution. Thus, our investigation here could
lead us to a conclusion that the ICCPR provisions precisely Article 18 has the force of law before
courts that have to ensure their enforcement within the Egyptian legal system.

III. The Legal Framework of Apostasy in Egypt between Law and Judicial Practice:
The previous analysis of the legal position of apostasy or turning away from Islam in both Sharia
and IHRL proves that we are in front of two contradicting rulings that govern the same conduct
in two different legal orders. From the perspective of Sharia, apostasy is a grievous sin whose
committer predominately faces death penalty (according to the main four Islamic juristic schools
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and the majority of Muslim scholars) and civil death. On the other hand, according to IHRL
precisely Article 18 of the ICCPR, the protected freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief including the right to replace one’s
current religion or belief with another. Accordingly, the use of threat of physical force or penal
sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs is banned under
this Article. The enjoyment of such recognized freedom should not be impaired by the
recognition of any religion or belief as the official ideology in state’s constitutions and statutes.
The normative recognition of Sharia in the Egyptian constitution as the principal source of law
imposed a constitutional obligation on the legislature and judiciary to give effect to Sharia norms
and to ensure the consistency of all Egyptian laws with Sharia principles. As shown earlier in the
previous chapter, the supremacy of Sharia “principles” as a source of law over all other law
sources within the Egyptian legal system has been officially declared by the reports of
constitution drafting committee, SCC’s decisions, and even the Egyptian statement concerning
the ratification of the ICCPR, which indicates how Sharia “principles” as the highest source of
law in Egypt plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the international obligations of the
Egyptian State. Furthermore, the Egyptian state represented in its judiciary and legislature faces
another constitutional obligation to enforce ratified international covenants like the ICCPR,
which acquired the force of law after its conclusion, ratification and publication according to the
established procedure. The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt reflects the political will of the
Egyptian state to balance between these two obligations through the reconciliation between two
contradicting legal frameworks in two different legal orders. This approach has taken place in a
manner that ensures state’s monopoly over interpretation of both Sharia principles and its
international obligation regarding the ICCPR’s notion of religious freedom. Such political
approach has resulted in the current legal position of apostasy in Egypt, which has been formed
by Egyptian legislature and judiciary. Their approach created the current ambiguous legal
framework that, as we will see, violates the standards of religious freedom in both Sharia and
IHRL. Egyptian statutory laws do not explicitly regulate the act of apostasy or conversion from
Islam; rather, they regulate some of its forms like blasphemy and apply some of its legal
consequences. The existence of some apostasy consequences within the Egyptian legal system
has been usually criticized by the proponents of IHRL as an aspect of Sharia enforcement that
“allows the judiciary in some cases to adopt rulings the are irrational, illogical, lacking in
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humanity, and completely incompatible with the progress that has been achieved as a whole in
the field of human rights.”258On the other hand, our analysis here will prove that the criticized
rulings are direct result of a secular reconstruction of Sharia principles by the Egyptian state that
contradict with apostasy rulings in Sharia as well. This chapter seeks to examine the legal
framework of apostasy and to answer many questions including how did the Egyptian legal
system through its statutes and judiciary try to balance between these constitutional obligations
regarding the legal framework of apostasy? How did it address the contradiction between
apostasy rulings in both Sharia and the ICCPR? Does the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt
agree with standards of religious freedom in Sharia and the ICCPR? By which reasoning could
Egyptian courts reach their established jurisprudence in this regard? this chapter will examine all
apostasy and religious freedom related articles in different law fields, and in the light of codified
law we will understand how Egyptian judiciary has applied and interpreted Egyptian statutory
laws to establish its jurisprudence and rulings concerning apostasy related cases. Afterwards, I
will focus on explaining the role of the concept of public policy as a key factor in defining the
scope of religious freedom by the Egyptian judiciary and how it has been used to ground some
apostasy consequences into the Egyptian legal system and ensure their application without being
stated in any statutory law.

Before starting our Investigation of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt, I think it is
important to refer to one of the most impressive literature in this regard. In his article Apostasy
and Public Policy in Contemporary Egypt: An Evaluation of Recent Cases from Egypt's Highest
Courts, Maurits S. Berger introduces a critical analysis of the legal situation of apostasy in
Egypt. Berger points out that the abandonment of Islam in Egypt is sub divided into the act of
apostasy and its legal consequences. From his point of view, apostasy enjoys a limbo status in
Egypt because Egyptian statutory law does not make any reference to apostasy or to its
punishment like in Islamic law. Berger argues that “both the act of apostasy as well as its
consequences, which are two entirely different issues, and their relation to the freedom of
religion can be understood more clearly in light of the concept of public policy.”259He based his
argument on the evaluation of case law of the highest civil courts in Egypt including the Court of
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cassation, the Administrative courts of the State Council, and the SCC regarding apostasy and
religious freedom. His research focuses only on personal status cases related to apostasy and
judicial decision of apex courts that defines religious freedom and its relation to the concept of
public policy. Such research does not include any cases do not deal with apostasy in terms of
conversion per se except Abu Zayd’s case. Berger considers that the legal side of apostasy
manifests itself solely in the realm of Egyptian Muslim personal status.260In addition, he asserts
that Egyptian highest courts have used public policy to ground apostasy legal consequences into
the Egyptian legal system for two reasons “a) because these rules were based on essential
principles of the Islamic Shari'a, and b) to ascertain their applicability in light of a lack of any
statutory rules.”261Berger refers that In Abu Zayd case (that will be discussed in this research) the
Court of Cassation adopted a different approach through using public policy as a mean to protect
Islam and society fundamentals The introduced analysis of the case law of the three highest
Egyptian civil courts concludes that apostasy in the courts' definition does not pertain to a
freedom of belief, but to the practice of a belief which is left to the internal order of that
particular religion, and related to public policy. It also, assumes that there is a blatant
contradiction between, on the one hand, the prohibition of apostasy and, on the other hand, the
constitutional guarantee of "freedom of belief" and similar provisions in the IHRL instruments to
which Egypt has committed itself.262Berger believes that such violation of human rights is not
caused by the political atmosphere like most violations of human right in Muslim countries;
rather, he argues that “this political dimension is absent in the particular case of apostasy in
Egypt: we are dealing with a sound rule of Islamic law that has been upheld for many decennia
by a judiciary that generally is recognized as independent.”263He reasoned this by assuming that
power struggle between Muslim jurists and apex courts in Egypt over the monopoly on
authoritative interpretation of Islamic law has pushed these courts, which are secular courts with
a long-standing reputation of neutrality and non-partiality, to adopt a conservative position with
regard to Islamic law precisely the prohibition of apostasy. Through this approach only these
courts could win the monopoly on authoritative interpretation of Sharia.264
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The current study introduces a wider view of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt to end up
with supporting some Berger’s arguments and challenging some of his conclusions. Through our
analysis we could see how the non-categorization of apostasy in codified laws has resulted in its
legal ambiguous status in Egypt. As Berger refers, only the legal consequences of apostasy rather
than the act itself plays a role in Egyptian case law.265The legal enforcement of some apostasy
consequences in Egypt and its relation to religious freedom could be understood more clearly in
light of the concept of public policy according to the caselaw of apex courts. This research will
illustrate how these courts have used this concept to ground the application of some apostasy
consequences through categorizing apostasy under the practice of a belief which is left to the
internal order of that particular religion, and related to public policy. Such consequences are
considered as violation of the concept of religious freedom as defined by the ICCPR. On the
other hand, this research does not limit the investigation of the legal side of apostasy in Egypt to
the realm of Egyptian Muslim personal status because renouncing Islam in Egypt could result in
other legal consequences in other law fields in Egypt like criminal law and administrative law
fields. Consequently, our analysis will also include some aspects of judicial practice that does not
deal with apostasy in terms of conversion like blasphemy cases in criminal law domain.
Examining a variety of judicial decision concerning apostasy will illustrate that grounding the
enforcement of some apostasy legal consequences has been practiced by some courts under some
legal regulations other than the concept of public policy. For instance, the Court of Cassation and
some lower personal status courts ground their application of some apostasy legal consequences
on personal status matters basing on Article 3 of the Egyptian Personal Status law. Furthermore,
public policy was invoked by some courts to reason the recognition of the abandonment of Islam
in identity cards. The main argument of this research contradicts with Berger’s conclusion that
the political dimension is absent in the particular case of apostasy, and that Egyptian secular
courts adopted a conservative position regarding the prohibition of apostasy. In contrast, this
paper argues that the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt is a manifestation of secular
reconstruction of Sharia by a modern state through its judiciary.
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A. Examining the Legal Framework of Apostasy in Egypt:
The fact that Egyptian codified laws do not regulate the act of apostasy or impose its legal
consequences in explicit and definite law articles has made its legal framework in Egypt
characterized by ambiguity and fragmentation.266Ambiguity is manifested in the legal approach
of the Egyptian state that avoided to make any formal reference to apostasy regulating rules and
consequences through its constitutions or law codes. Such avoidance stems from the State
awareness that imposing any legal limitation on conversion from one religion to another would
be regarded as an obvious breach of the notion of religious freedom as defined by IHRL and, as a
result, it would be considered by international community as a breach of its international
obligations towards IHRL. The fragmentation of apostasy rules within the Egyptian legal system
means that committing the act of conversion from Islam to any other belief entails its legal
consequences in different law fields like administrative law, criminal law, and personal status
law. Our analysis here could prove that the Egyptian state through its legislature and judiciary
has maintained its approach regarding constitutional Islamization or Islamism to shape the legal
framework of apostasy in Egypt. Creating an ambiguous legal framework to replace the need for
a clear codified regulation resulted from a clear political decision by legislature to ensure the
state control over the process. The intended closure of such a political process has promoted the
role of litigation as an alternative process. Similar to the adopted methodology of interpreting
Sharia “principles” in constitutional Article 2, the state judiciary has a flexible position in
interpreting Sharia norms concerning apostasy and choosing which of these norms could be
incorporated within the Egyptian legal system and which could not from the perspective of the
state or “judges”.267The Egyptian judiciary in this case is not restricted by any obligatory
religious interpretation by Al-Azhar or any other institution unlike the case of interpreting IHRL,
where the state is accounted by international community according to the prescribed
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interpretation of religious freedom that I have explained earlier. Accordingly, this flexible
position helps judges to at least formulate their verdicts in a manner that is consistent with the
state formal obligations to apply Sharia principles and respect IHRL.
1. Religious Freedom and the Egyptian Constitution:
As stated earlier in this research, the absence of an explicit regulation of apostasy has always
made the Egyptian constitutions have a direct rule in shaping the legal framework of apostasy in
Egypt. This because the absence of apostasy in the codified laws drives Egyptian courts to
interpret constitutional provisions regarding Sharia and religious freedom to make their decisions
on apostasy related cases. Chapter one of this paper introduced a detailed examination of the
status of Sharia in the 1971 constitution as Egypt’s most enduring constitution that shaped the
legal situation of Sharia and, consequently, apostasy case law for more than forty years. Now, we
have to understand status of religious freedom according to this constitution. Article 46 of the
1971 constitution reads “[t]he State shall guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of
practice of religious rites”268The Supreme Court defined the scope of religious freedom in a
landmark case in 1975 as El Fegiery refers that:
The Court upheld that freedom of religion is not absolute and that the manifestation of
religious beliefs must be subject to and considered in relation to public order, morals and
values. The Court pointed out that Islamic Shari‘a and its principles are constitutive
elements of public order and that under this the constitutional right of freedom of religion
can be restricted.269
This judicial decision has been cited by many Egyptian courts including the SCC, which added
in one of its decisions that “freedom of belief is absolute, while the practice of beliefs may be
subject to restrictions based on public order, morals and the protection of rights and reputation of
others.”270These decisions show that the manifestation of beliefs or the practice of belief is the
only aspect of religious freedom that is subject to restrictions based on public order, morals, and
values. This stable interpretation of the scope of religious freedom in the Egyptian constitution of
1971 could lead us to three main observations; firstly, it apparently agrees with the notion of
religious freedom as defined by the ICCPR as it only restricts freedom to practice belief as long
as these restrictions are based upon public order, morals or values. Secondly, it used the
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ambiguity that blurred the ICCPR’s definition of religious freedom to gain a more flexible
position in defining the scope of religious freedom in Egypt. According to what this paper
referred previously, neither the ICCPR nor the HRC comment in this regard introduced a strict or
an obligatory definition of both the categories of public order and freedom to practice belief.
Consequently, we could say that the combination between emphasizing the illegality of any
limitation on religious freedom that is driven from a single religion and the absence of any clear
strict definition of public safety, order, health or morals according to which any state could limit
freedom to manifest religion has offered a loophole for states parties to the covenant to breach its
concept of the right. This means that any state could limit any aspect of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience or religion as long as this aspect is categorized by the state as a freedom to
manifest religion, which variates from one belief to another. Furthermore, any state party to the
covenant could justify such limitations by the protection of public safety, order, health or morals,
which have no strict definition. The next two sections of this chapter will show us how Egyptian
judiciary has defined public policy and freedom to manifest religion to legitimize and impose
some legal consequences of apostasy in the Egyptian legal system. The third observation is that
the Supreme Court and the SCC after it used Sharia principles (as defined by them), which has
no definite meaning in the constitution, under the cover of public order to base some restrictions
on freedom to manifest one’s belief. Again, we can understand here how the Egyptian State
through its constitutional judiciary has controlled “the terms of the game” through its exclusive
power to define different vague terms like Sharia principles, public policy (al nizam al amm),
and freedom to practice belief. The upcoming analysis of the main features of apostasy related
case law will reflect how constitutional or legal vagueness of these terms lend judiciary more
flexibility in defining apostasy consequences in Egypt. Accordingly, resorting the current legal
position of apostasy in Egypt simply to the role of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt
reflects a superficial understanding of this legal situation.
2. Apostasy in the Egyptian Penal Code:
a. Examining Apostasy Related Articles in the Penal code:
The Egyptian penal code does not regulate the act of apostasy directly; however, it includes some
articles that deal with some offences against religion. Although these articles are not limited to
protect Islam only, they have been used as the legal base to charge Muslim apostates or converts

62

especially when their apostasy is accompanied with any of the criminalized offences like
blasphemy.271This does not negate that they also have been used to charge non-Muslims if they
commit such stated offences against any heavenly religion. Egypt’s main blasphemy law is found
in Article 98(f) of the Egyptian penal code, which also includes other Articles that criminalize
different forms of religious insult. They include Articles 160 and 161. I will start by and focus on
investigating Article 98(f) because it is the main Article which has been used to charge Muslim
apostates in front of criminal courts. Article 98(f) reads:
Detention for a period of not less than six months and not exceeding five years, or paying
a fine of not less than five hundred pounds and not exceeding one thousand pounds shall
be the penalty inflicted on whoever exploits and uses the religion in advocating and
propagating by talk or in writing, or by any other method, extremist thoughts with the aim
of instigating sedition and division or disdaining and contempting any of the heavenly
religions or the sects belonging thereto, or prejudicing national unity or social peace.272

Many important observations concerning the statement of this Article Should be highlighted for
the purpose of our analysis here. Article 9(f) does not refer to apostasy from Islam or conversion
from other heavenly religions as a form of acts that are considered by their nature as disdaining
and contempting of these religions. The scope of protection under this Article is limited to
heavenly religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism). Egyptian legislature has continued to adopt
the same approach to formatting religious related articles, which is using vague expressions and
terms like “national unity” and “social peace” (that was omitted later) to ensure a wide range of
flexibility for judicial interpretations. The legislature also used these vague, secular or nonreligious terms to ensure the apparent consistency of the Article with the ICCPR’s notion of
religious freedom. Finally, Article 98(f) categorized blasphemy as a misdemeanor whose
committer face detention or pay a fine.
The comparison between the criminalization of blasphemy under Article 98(f), as the legal base
to charge Muslim apostates and Egypt’s main blasphemy law, with the legal or juristic position
of apostasy according to Sharia reveals many contradictions between both. The previous
examination of the juristic status of apostasy under Sharia demonstrates that the act of turning
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away from Islam has different forms which are classified in three main categories: utterance
related, action related, and belief related. In Sharia, blasphemy is a synonym for the serious
offence of using of foul language with regard to God, the Prophet, the angles, other Prophets, and
the Companions of the Prophet. As I referred before, depending on certain reported incidents in
the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) mentioned in the hadith literature, the majority of
Muslim jurists consider blasphemy as a form of apostasy that entails death penalty.273On the
other hand, some jurists regard the committers of these offence as Muslims who deserve death
penalty.274Consequently, we could comprehend how Article 98(f) does not represent a legal
regulation based upon a juristic position in Sharia, but in contrast, it’s a secular legal regulation
of a criminalized act by the state that contrasts with its juristic description in Sharia. Such
contradiction is manifested in many aspects. For instance, insulting God, the prophet or the
religion is a grievous sin in Sharia and punished by death penalty, while the discussed Article
categorizes it as a misdemeanor whose perpetrator is punished by either detention or fine.
Moreover, Article 98(f) does not refer to any Islamic juristic source as a base for its rulings;
rather, I think that it only reflects a quick legal interference by a modern state to suppress any
public speech or writing that may lead to sectarian clashes in the future.275

On the other hand, Article 98(f) has been usually criticized by human rights organizations and
advocates as an unjustified and unconstitutional limitation on freedoms of expression and belief
that is incompatible with international human rights standards. In its 2010 special report,
Freedom House described Egypt’s blasphemy and religious insult laws, including Article 98(f),
as “incompatible with international human rights standards [because] they place serious and
unjustified limitations on freedom of expression and freedom of religion, and have a broad and
negative impact on the enjoyment of other human rights.”276The report refereed that the
broadness and vagueness of Article 98(f) terms have made it a tool for “settling personal or
political scores; silencing regime critics, human rights defenders, and opposition parties; and
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targeting vulnerable groups like homosexuals.”277Amnesty International had also confirmed this
in its year 2000 report titled Egypt: Muzzling Civil Society when it emphasized that:
Amnesty International believes that Article 98 (f) of the penal code . . . is vaguely worded
and has been abused in such a way as to allow for the imprisonment of prisoners of
conscience. Some defendants have been sentenced for the publication of materials
discussing religious issues, whilst others have been imprisoned because their religious
practice has been considered a criminal offence. Over the last two years at least 30 people
have been brought to trial under charges based on Article 98 (f) for “exploiting religion
for extremist ideas”, though none of these defendants has used or advocated the use of
violence.278
Other human rights organizations pointed out that religious related Articles in the Egyptian penal
code have been used to suppress any differing interpretations of Islam; for instance, the Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty in one of its published submissions mentioned that “Articles 98(f),
160, 161, 176, and 178 of the Penal Code are consistently used against individuals who engage
in peaceful debate about religion.”279The Egyptian Initiative for Personal rights through one of
its released reports in 2016 argued for the unconstitutionality of Article 98(f) because it does not
agree with the required constitutional standards of drafting penal law articles.280The Article does
not state explicitly the criminalized acts and their composing elements, but instead it includes
vague and broad terms.281Some of the mentioned reports refereed that the abuse of the discussed
Article has been promoted by the practice of Egyptian courts. Freedom House report pointed out
that the 1966 ruling of the Court of Cassation which allowed to convict individuals basing on
Hisba principle promoted the abuse of Article 98(f).282Hisba is “[t]he Islamic legal principle
[that] basically gave citizens, which would be regularly considered to have no personal interest
in the case, the right to file cases against others in the name of protecting the right of God or the
essential elements of the Islamic Faith.”283The report added that the procedural permission of
this principle resulted in the prosecution of dozens of Egyptian academics and intellectuals
during 1980s and 1990s and they were convicted of blasphemy as a result of Hisba suits.284In
277

Id. at 25.
AMNESTY INT'L, EGYPT: MUZZLING CIVIL SOCIETY (2000), available at:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde12/021/2000/en/. [accessed 10 March 2019].
279
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review: Egypt, 4.
280
THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERS. RIGHTS, REASONS FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF BLASPHEMY
ARTICLE (2016).
281
Id. at 9.
282
FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 276, at 26.
283
Nassar, supra note 205, at 26.
284
FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 276, at 26.
278

65

1996 the Egyptian parliament limited the use of Hisba suits by enacting a law that “prohibits
hisba claims from reaching court unless they are first deemed valid by a prosecutor.”285
Furthermore, some human rights organizations consider that enforcing blasphemy and religious
insult articles of the Egyptian penal code as an illegitimate restriction on freedom of
expression.286According to their point of view, this because they have been applied for
prepublication censorship to ban many religious related books and charge their authors of
blasphemy. Recently, such censorship expanded to include internet blogs.287Article 98(f) has
been criticized as a discriminatory Article because the scope of protection under it is limited to
heavenly religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism), while “[u]nrecognized minority religious
groups such as the Baha’i and Ahmadiyya . . . are not protected and are disproportionately
affected by the law.”288Human rights proponents see another feature of its discriminatory effects
is promoted by judicial practices and decisions that use Article 98(f) to punish Muslims who
convert to another belief and violate their right to change their religion.

The Egyptian penal code includes other Articles that criminalize different forms of religious
insult and some acts that are considered as assault on religious rituals. Article 160 reads:
A penalty of detention and paying a fine of not less than one hundred pounds and not
exceeding five hundred pounds or either penalty shall be inflicted on the following: First:
Whoever perturbs the holding of rituals of a creed or a related religious ceremony or
obstructs it with violence or threat. Second: Whoever ravages, breaks, destroys, or
violates the sanctity of buildings provided for holding religious ceremonies, symbols or
other objects having their profound reverence and sanctity in relation to the members of a
creed or a group of people.289
Also, Article 161criminalizes other forms of religious insult that aim to disdain religious
celebrations. It states that:
These penalties shall be imposed on any encroachment that takes place by one of the
methods prescribed in Article 171, on a religion whose rituals are publicly held. The
following shall fall under the provisions of this Article: First: Printing and publishing a
book which is viewed as holy by members of a religion whose rituals are publicly held, if
a text of this book is perverted in a way that changes its meaning. Second: Imitating a
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religious celebration in a public place or public community, with the aim of ridicule, or
for the attendants to watch.290
One of the more significant findings to emerge from our analysis here is that there is no explicit
regulation or criminalization of the act of apostasy or conversion from Islam through the
Egyptian penal code. However, this code includes some articles that deal with some forms of this
act like religious insult and blasphemy. None of them refer to apostasy from Islam or conversion
from other heavenly religions as a form of acts that are considered according to their nature as
disdaining and contempting of these religions. Egypt’s main blasphemy law is found in Article
98(f) that has been used as the legal base to charge Muslim apostates or converts especially when
their apostasy is accompanied with any of the criminalized offences like blasphemy. It does not
state explicitly the criminalized acts and their composing elements, but instead it includes vague
and broad terms. This article represents the adopted secular (non-religious based) approach by
the Egyptian state to deal with some religious related crimes that contradicts with the legal
position of apostasy and the standards of religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL.
b. Criminal Courts’ Approach to Blasphemy Related Cases:
Before investigating the judicial practice of Egyptian criminal courts regarding blasphemy cases
and the practice of other Egyptian courts regarding apostasy related cases, it is important to
understand the structure of the Egyptian court system. The structure of the Egyptian court system
is established in a pyramidal form.291At the top of this pyramid is the Supreme Constitutional
Court whose jurisdiction includes interpreting constitutional provisions, reviewing the
constitutionality of laws and regulations, settling the conflicts on competence between judicial
bodies, and interpreting laws and regulations that have the force of law.292Under the SCC the
Egyptian court system is divided into two parallel systems: common or general justice court
system and administrative justice court system. The jurisdiction of general court system includes
civil, criminal, commercial, and personal status matters.293It has three basic levels: Courts of
First Instance, Courts of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation. The Courts of First Instance
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include: Summary Courts (mahkaim juz’iaa), Elementary Courts (mahakim ibtda’iya), and
Plenary Courts (mahakim kullya). Each of these courts has its prescribed competence and
composition.294Appeals against Summary Courts’ judgments are raised before Courts of First
Instance, while appeals against the decisions of First Instance Courts are placed before the
Courts of Appeal. Courts of Appeal (mahakim al-isti’naf) are divided into two chambers civil
chamber and criminal chamber. The civil one hears appeals for plenary courts’ judgments, and
the criminal chamber that is called criminal court (mahkamit al-jinayat) has competence to
decide on felonies. The rulings of Courts of Appeal, except that of death penalty, are not subject
to appeal before the Court of Cassation concerning the facts of the decided cases. The Court of
Cassation is the supreme court of Egypt’s common court system its main function is summarized
in the following paragraph:
Its [mission] is to control the judgments of the Courts of Appeal following a motion for
cassation introduced by any interested party, including the public prosecutor. The motion
must be founded on an error of law which would have been committed by the lower
court. The allegations can be the misapplication or misinterpretation of law, irregularity
in the language of the judgement or procedural errors. The control of the Court of
Cassation only bears on these questions and not on the facts.295
The administrative justice court system, which is adopted from the French legal tradition, is
headed by the State Council (majlis al-dawla) that represents the entire administrative court
system in Egypt. According to its prescribed competence by constitution and law, the State
Council has an exclusive jurisdiction to take decisions in administrative disputes, disciplinary
cases and appeals, and disputes pertaining to its decisions. It consists of two sections; the first
one is the legislative advisory section, which is responsible for giving legal opinion on draft
laws, draft regulations, and actions practiced by the government or any public entity.296The
second section is the judiciary section. It is structured in three levels of judicial jurisdiction that
includes: administrative courts and disciplinary courts (first instance courts), Court of
Administrative Justice (appeals court), Supreme Administrative Court (apex court).297
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According to the limited scope of the current research, this subsection is not going to introduce a
full survey of all blasphemy related cases, but it will focus on examining some significant
judgments that could enable us to understand how Egyptian judiciary defines the elements of
blasphemy crime in the light of its vague definition in the penal code. It is significant here to take
into our consideration that in most decisions of blasphemy cases there is no direct reference to
the position of apostasy or blasphemy in Sharia because the concerned court only focuses on
applying blasphemy provisions in the penal code. This judicial approach is consistent with the
legal drafting of blasphemy articles that do not refer to any Islamic juristic source as a base for
its rulings and only reflect a quick legal interference by a modern state to suppress any public
speech or writing that may lead to sectarian clashes. Accordingly, in most of blasphemy cases
the defendant could be brought to the court because of his blasphemous statements that evoked
public outrage and could constitute a grievous sin according to Sharia, while the court tries him
for committing blasphemy misdemeanor. Some researches refers that only the office of the
Public Prosecutor can file blasphemy cases basing on Article one of the Egyptian Criminal
Procedures law which rules that criminal lawsuits could be filed only through Public
Prosecutor’s office except in cases provided by law.298However, blasphemy cases like other
cases of misdemeanors and petty offences could be referred to the court directly by the civil
rights plaintiff according to Article 232 of the same law.299This explains the situations when
some writers, actors, etc. were brought to courts to face blasphemy accusations in cases filed by
normal people.

In one of its rulings dated 7 January 1996 on the appeal no. 41774, the Court of Cassation
defined the constituting elements of blasphemy crime which is stated in Article 98(f) of the
Egyptian penal code.300The facts of the case could be summarized as follows: according to the
speeches of both the plaintiff and his father the defendant used a razor to make the sign of the
cross on the plaintiff’s right hand and threatened him to make the same sign using electricity. He
also promised the defendant to give him some money if he converted to Christianity. The
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defendant filed an appeal before the Court of Cassation against the conviction ruling of the first
instance court and the appeal court according to which he was sentenced to detention for one
year under Article 98(f) of the penal code. As a fulfillment of its prescribed competence to
review law application by lower courts, the Court of Cassation reversed the ruling of lower
courts on this case. The court see that the rulings of lower courts did not prove that the criminal
incident satisfy the elements of blasphemy crime. The court reasoned its decision and defined the
elements of blasphemy crime as follows:
According to Article 310 of the Criminal Procedures law any conviction ruling should
include a clear statement of the criminal incident that entails the decided punishment . . .
it is not enough to make a passing reference to such incident, but the ruling should narrate
the significance of each evidence in a comprehensive manner elucidates its support for
the whole criminal incident and its consistency with other facts. . . the crime of exploiting
and using religion in propagating extremist thoughts, which is stated in Article 98(f) of
the Penal code, requires to be exist the presence of a materialistic aspect [the criminal act]
which is exploiting and using religion in advocating and propagating by talk or in writing
or by any other method, extremist thoughts, and the presence of a moral aspect [criminal
intent] that the perpetrator must aim through his acts to instigate sedition and division or
to disdain and contempt any of the heavenly religions or the sects belonging thereto or
prejudicing national unity or social peace.301
In another blasphemy case in 2012, a plaintiff brought an action in the Agouza Summary Court
of First instance (mahkamit al-ajuza al-juza’ya) demanding the punishment of the Egyptian actor
Adel Emam and others according to Article 98(f) of the Egyptian Penal code accusing them of
insulting Islam and Muslims by exploiting religion in their work (movies and plays) to promote
extremist ideas; with the aim of provoking strife, contempting Islam in general and Islamic
political groups in particular.302After reviewing the case facts the court dismissed both criminal
and civil actions on the grounds that the case facts and incidents do not represent a criminal act at
all. Although the court dismissed both criminal and civil actions, its reasoning behind the
decision could reflect the secular approach of the judiciary in defining blasphemy and even
apostasy consequences within Egyptian legal system. In this ruling the judge explains that the
court as a part of the Egyptian legal system, which belongs to civil law systems, is not restricted
in its reasoning by precedent case law. The court refers that in contrast to common law systems,
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the court’s obligation to follow precedent case law could only represent a moral obligation rather
than a constitutional or legal obligation. This assumption is based on the ruling of Article 1 of the
Egyptian Civil code no. 131 of the year 1948 that mentions sources from which judges should
deduce legal rules if there is no law provision governing the reviewed case or issue, and they do
not include precedent case law:
1.Legislative texts shall apply to all matters dealt with in these texts in their explicit
language or in their content.
2. If there is no legislative text to be applied, the judge shall rule by custom, if there is no,
under the principles of Islamic law, if it does not exist, in accordance with the principles
of natural law and the rules of justice.303
Accordingly, depending on its interpretation authority, the court believes that Article 98(f) aims
to protect national unity and social peace not heavenly religions or their sects.304Thus,
committing blasphemy crime under Article 98(f) requires the existence of a criminal intent to
prejudice national unity or social peace and instigate sedition.305Through this ruling the court
emphasizes that its “role is to interpret the codified law itself, article 98 (f), and not Islamic
Shari’a.”306Also, the judge adds that:
if the perpetrator aimed to obstruct the holding of rituals of a religion, the legislature
could intervene to criminalize such acts under Articles 160 and 161; but whoever has
another opinion should refer to an evidence either from Quran or Sunnah because
contempting religion is not punished by hadd or qisas in Sharia as verse (5:105) states
that “ O you who have believed, upon you is [responsibility for] yourselves. Those who
have gone astray will not harm you when you have been guided. To Allah is you return
all together; then He will inform you of what you used to do.”307
Despite the court’s emphasis on its role to interpret codified law precisely blasphemy related
provisions in the penal code and not Sharia, the ruling introduces the court’s understanding of the
concept of religious freedom in Sharia to support its adopted interpretation. According to this
interpretation, the notion of religious freedom in Sharia is based upon the principle of no
compulsion in religion; thus, this means that there is no compulsion to follow or embrace an
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orthodox religious though. There is no prohibition against criticizing any religious thought, and
this does not contradict with saying that there is a punishment for apostates in Sharia.308 292In
accordance with some modernist thinkers who challenge the traditional position of pre-modern
or classic Muslim jurists and scholars regarding apostasy, the judge adopted some of their
arguments (that was discussed and refuted previously in this paper) to support his understanding
of religious freedom in Sharia. For instance, the judge argues that the apostate should not be put
to death on the mere ground of his apostasy because apostasy is mentioned in Quran in many
verses without prescribing any temporal punishment on this act. Apostasy is mentioned in Quran
as a grievous sin whose committer is threatened with a severe punishment in the afterlife. The
judgment refers that there is an almost consensus or agreement among the main four Islamic
juristic schools and the majority of Muslim scholars (gumhor al-fuqaha’) that apostasy is
punished with death penalty; however, the court concurs with some modernist opinions
considering apostasy capital punishment as a political sanction, and as a result, an apostate
should not be killed for his mere apostasy except if this act was followed by a harm to the
community or the state. The judge assumes like some modernist thinkers that capital sanction for
apostasy is based upon a speech relying on only one authority (khabar al-ahdd) "whoever
changes his religion, then kill him.”; consequently, according to this assumption, this speech
could not be relied upon to establish a fundamental principle of Islam because there is a juristic
rule in Usul Al- fiqh considers single narrated speeches as a non-authoritative source from which
juristic or legal rules could be deduced in Sharia.309The court believes that its interpretation of
Article 98(f) is consistent with one of recent fatwas issued by the Grand Mufti of Egypt at this
time which rules that the apostate should be asked forever to repent and not be killed.
Furthermore, from its perspective this interpretation is also consistent with the ICCPR’s
definition of religious freedom.
On the 28th of December 2015 South Cairo Elementary Court issued an important ruling on the
case no. 21078.310In this case the court reviewed the appeal of the ruling issued by a first
instance court (Misr Al-kadima Misdemeanors Court) on a blasphemy case. The defendant
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brought the appeal to South Cairo Elementary Court after he was sentenced to five years of
detention as a punishment for blasphemy crime. This case acquired its fame in the media in
Egypt because it is related to media censorship. The defendant is a TV program presenter called
Islam Bahery, and he was brought to the court basing on his opinions and sayings that he
expressed through a TV program called “With Islam Bahery” and his social media
accounts.311The plaintiffs brought an action in Misr Al-kadima Misdemeanors Court demanding
the punishment of the defendant according to Articles 98(f), 160, and 161of the Egyptian Penal
code accusing him of insulting Islam and Muslims through exploiting religion in his TV program
aiming to instigating sedition and disdaining Islam in general. They added in their plea that the
defendant aimed to disdain Imams, jurists, scholars, and followers in particular, who carried the
burden of transferring the Prophet’s sunnah to us through a unique scientific methodology.
Consequently, they consider that his approach leads to prejudicing national unity and social
peace.312South Cairo Elementary Court refers that its ruling on this appeal is guided by the Court
of Cassation’s definition of the constituting elements of blasphemy crime on the appeal no.
41774 (that was examined previously) and also its decision on the appeal no. 653 which states:
Saying that freedom of belief is guaranteed according to the constitution does not allow
to any person argues against the axiomatic articles of any religion to intentionally disdain
or contempt this religion. If it became apparent that these arguments intended to prejudice
the sanctity of a religion, it could not be protected under the cover of religious freedom.
The existence of the moral aspect [of blasphemy crime] – like in all crimes- could be
concluded by the court through the facts of the case. It is not required in this case that the
conviction ruling includes explicit statements of the convict to prove his criminal intent,
but it is sufficient that his statements and speeches as whole could prove his intention.313
After reviewing the case facts, the court confirmed the accusations of the plaintiffs against the
defendant. The ruling explains that the court reached its decision through its belief that the
criminal incident satisfy the elements of blasphemy crime. The ruling states that the defendant
speeches through his television program constitutes the materialistic aspect of blasphemy crime
(exploiting and using religion in advocating and propagating by talk or by any other method
extremist thoughts), and they include the following opinions:
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•

He stated that jurists and scholars the authors of tradition (juristic) books did not
construct a valid science, but in contrast their writings represent backwardness, deviance
and racism.

•

He described the science of hadith as a trivial science; accordingly, he believes that every
Muslim should judge any hadith according to his thinking and could refuse it even if it is
authentic.

•

He described the four Imams (the founders of the main Sunni doctrinal legal schools in
Islamic law: Abu Hanifa, Malik, Al-Shafii, and Ebn Hanbal) as corrupt and terrorists who
should be killed.

•

He said that the Islamic tradition is rubbish.

•

He described the ruling of adultery punishment in Quran and its conditions as fool
speech.314

Concerning the fulfilment of the moral aspect of blasphemy crime in the discussed incidents, the
court refers that “after reviewing the case facts and watching the related videos it concluded that
the convict intended through his speeches and writings to instigate sedition by disdaining Islam
to prejudice national unity.”315This criminal intent is manifested in his insulting statements and
extremist methodology that he used to present his opinions to the public. Accordingly, the
criminal incident satisfies the elements of blasphemy crime according to Article 98(f). At the
end, the court decided basing on its discretion authority to decrease the detention punishment of
the convict from five years to one year. After this, the convict was released by a presidential
clemency before finishing the detention period.

Now, let us answer the key questions of this chapter regarding the criminal aspect of the legal
framework of apostasy in Egypt. How did the Egyptian legal system through its penal code and
criminal courts try to balance between its constitutional obligations to respects the “rule of law”
(respect human rights and enforce ratified international covenants like the ICCPR) and respect
the principles of Sharia? In consistency with the Egyptian penal code that does not criminalize
the act of apostasy explicitly and only deals with some offences against religion like blasphemy,
314
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which is used as the legal base to charge Muslim apostates especially when their apostasy is
accompanied with any of the criminalized acts, in most decisions of blasphemy cases there is no
direct reference to the position of apostasy or blasphemy in Sharia because the concerned court
only focuses on applying blasphemy provisions in the penal code. Accordingly, the legislature
used many vague secular or non-religious terms, as I referred previously, to ensure the apparent
consistency of the statues with the ICCPR’s notion of religious freedom. On the other hand,
ignoring the juristic rulings of apostasy or blasphemy in Sharia to be considered in the penal
code reflects the legislature’s monopoly over interpreting Sharia principles including the
authority to choose which of these norms could be incorporated within the Egyptian legal system
and which could not. How did the discussed approach could deal with the contradiction between
apostasy rulings in both Sharia and the ICCPR? In order to escape from solving this conflict or
facing the consequences of privileging any of the contradicting normative orders over the other,
the Egyptian legislature avoided to regulate or categorize the act of apostasy in the penal code.
Does the criminal aspect of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt agree with standards of
religious freedom in Sharia and the ICCPR? According to the elaborated juristic rulings of
apostasy in Sharia, we could easily conclude that Article 98(f) and other religious insult Articles
do not represent a legal regulation based upon a juristic position in Sharia, but in contrast, it’s a
secular legal regulation of criminalized acts by the state that contrasts with their juristic rulings
in Sharia. Such contradiction is manifested in many aspects; For instance, insulting God, the
prophet or the religion is a grievous sin in Sharia and punished by death penalty, while the penal
code categorizes it as a misdemeanor whose perpetrator is punished by either detention or fine.
Such example is manifested in the decision of Islam Bahiry’s case. The court proved that the
convict described some Quranic rulings as fool speech and repudiated some of the axiomatic
articles of faith. These speeches are considered as implicit apostasy whose committer deserves
apostasy punishment (includes the corporal punishment and civil death) from the perspective of
Sharia. In this case the convict was sentenced to one year of detention as a punishment for
blasphemy crime in contrast to Sharia rulings. On the other hand, assessing religious related
articles on the penal code precisely Article 98(f) and their implementation by Egyptian courts
according to the ICCPR’s standards of religious freedom could show some contradictions to
these standards. In spite of its secular wording that aimed to ensure the apparent consistency of
the Article with the ICCPR’s notion of religious freedom through non basing its ruling upon any
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religious norm, the scope of protection under Article 98(f) is limited to heavenly religions (Islam,
Christianity, and Judaism) in violation of the scope of protection under Article 18 which includes
theistic and non- theistic belief. The practice of criminal court in this regard has focused on
reviewing cases of religious insult or assault according to law and not apostasy or religious
conversion cases. However, as it was mentioned in this chapter, many human rights
organizations have criticized Egyptian courts approach as they believe that the vague wording of
penal law articles and has been abused by judges in such a way as to allow for the imprisonment
of prisoners of conscience and to charge authors of religious related books and accusing them of
blasphemy. By which reasoning could Egyptian courts reach their established jurisprudence in
this regard? Egyptian courts based their decisions on blasphemy related cases upon the existence
or the absence of the constituting elements of blasphemy crime in any examined case. These
elements include the materialistic aspect of blasphemy crime (exploiting and using religion in
advocating and propagating by talk or by any other method extremist thoughts) and the moral
aspect (to instigate sedition by disdaining Islam to prejudice national unity).

3. Apostasy Situation in the Domain of Personal Status Law:
Identifying Historic Evolution of Personal Status Law:
As it was pointed out to earlier in this research, most of the Arab countries during the
colonization era since the early nineteenth century received the colonizers’ law, which had been
developed to serve as state law. On the other hand, Sharia that was the common law of Muslim
countries before this time was given effect and recognized to operate in particular law fields like
personal status law. The term “Personal Status Law” was not originated from Sharia, but it could
be equivalent to the idea of family rights norms in Sharia.316In order to identify its substance and
scope, the Egyptian Court of Cassation was keen to explain the meaning of personal status law in
one of its early decisions in 1934; the court defines the Personal Status Law as: “what
differentiates one person from another in terms of natural and family characteristics and which is
taken into consideration by the law to entail legal effects governing his/her social life: whether
he/she is a man or a woman; a spouse, a widow, a divorcee, a father, a legitimate child; whether
316
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he/she enjoys full legal capacity or not.”317Thus, Family Law regulates the personal lives of
individuals including marriage, divorce, inheritance, children rights, donations, alimony, . . . etc.
The first promulgated in Egypt to regulate family relationships was Law No. 25 of 1920, and it
was based on the Hanafi school that was the Islamic doctrinal school adopted by the Ottoman
Empire.318This promulgated law was amended and by many subsequent laws like Law No. 25 of
1929, Law No. 44 of 1979, Law No. 100 of 1985, and Law No. 1 of 2000. All these laws were
promulgated as temporary solutions to face some of the new arising social and economic
realities, but not as a comprehensive code governing family rights.319Concerning the jurisdiction
over personal status cases, before 1955 personal status domain in Egypt has been a system of
multiple Jurisdictions.320Since the falling of Egypt under the political domination of the Ottoman
Empire, each religious group in Egypt had its own courts with competence to review personal
status cases.321Sharia courts were competent to review personal status cases among Muslims. It
also had jurisdiction over non-Muslims if one of the spouses was a Muslim or when two nonMuslim courts had competence to judge the same case.322In 1955 by virtue of law No. 462 of
1955 Sharia courts and all other religious courts were abrogated. National courts instead have
become competent to hear personal status cases.

The Applicable Law in Personal Status Cases:
Regarding the applicable law in personal status matters, Article 3 of the Egyptian Personal Status
law states that:
Judgments [in personal status matters] shall be issued in accordance with the Personal
Status and Endowment Laws in force. In cases where the codified laws do not state a rule
the most predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine shall be applied. However,
judgments shall be rendered in personal status disputes between non-Muslim Egyptians
who belong to the same sect . . . according to their religious laws as long as they do not
contradict with public order.323
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In addition, the Court of Cassation has been confirming this approach through its jurisprudence.
In one of its rulings dated 3 January 2005 on the appeal no. 485, the Court of Cassation
elaborated the role of Sharia in personal status cases:
According to the stable rule in the Cassation Court’s jurisprudence Sharia is the general
applicable law in personal status matters. . . according to the most predominant opinion of
Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine except in cases where the issued laws included articles
regulating the reviewed matters. In these cases, codified law rules should be applied.
Accordingly, any silence of the codified law concerning any matter should not be
understood as an intention by the legislature to contradict with any statement in Quran,
authentic Sunnah, or a ruling constituted a consensus reached by Muslim jurists.324
Through the mentioned rulings we could understand that in Egypt “the application of a law in
personal status matters is based on the religion of the parties”325unless the legislature issued
another ruling in the same matter. In these cases, Muslims are governed by Sharia rules precisely
in accordance to the most predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine. Non-Muslims who
belong to the same sect are governed by their religious laws as long as they do not contradict
with public order. Thus, in cases where non-Muslim litigators are not belonging to the same
religious sect or their religious rules regarding the reviewed matter are considered by the issue
court as contradicting with public order, they are governed by Sharia rules. This legal situation
justifies why the domain of family law in Egypt has been the most affected legal field by Sharia
even after the abrogation of Sharia courts. According to our upcoming analysis, the main reason
of this impact of Sharia is caused by the fact that many of personal status cases are judged basing
upon a direct application of Sharia norms with a direct reference to their sources in Sharia and
the adopted juristic opinions. Such implementation of Sharia norms in family cases has taken
place under the control of the legislature who chose the incorporated norms in the codified law,
the matters to be silent about in the law, and the juristic doctrine to be followed by courts in these
silence cases. Accordingly, the legislature has incorporated Sharia norms in personal status law
field in a more prominent manner due to the nature of the judged cases. This religious nature also
has resulted in arising apostasy issue in family cases more than any other field of Egyptian law.
The issue court has to be sure about the religious identity of the litigators because any change in
it could result in changing the applicable law or the court ruling. On the other hand, sometimes
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some litigators convert to another religion or sect to change the applicable law or the decision of
the court in their favor. Furthermore, any party could claim the apostasy of the other litigator to
affect the court decision.
a. Apostasy Consequences in Personal Status Law and Egyptian Courts Competence
to Declare Someone an Apostate:
Regarding Sharia as the general applicable law in personal status matters in cases where codified
law is silent about makes Sharia norms applicable on apostasy related cases. This because
personal status statutes do not regulate apostasy consequences in family matters. Thus, apostasy
consequences are to be determined by the court through seeking the guidance of the most
predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine in Sharia. For instance, basing on juristic
rulings of apostasy consequences in Sharia that was reported in more detail in this research, if
the court examines a marriage of an apostate it should base its decision on the juristic rule of
Hanafi doctrine that Apostasy results in annulment of the marriage contract upon apostasy of one
or both partners without need for judicial decision. Hence, Egyptian courts have to follow Hanafi
juristic doctrine’s approach in apostasy consequences in marriage, inheritance, property,
children’s religion, . . etc. I think that it important before examining the judicial practice of
personal status courts in apostasy related cases to understand the scope of this practice. The
previous analysis of our research to the juristic situation of apostasy crime in Sharia has shown
us that the impact of renouncing Islam is not only limited to capital punishment, but it also
affects the whole life of the apostate, who suffers in Sharia from a civil death. Such legal
consequences are related to principal and general norms in Sharia and their ignorance or
elimination is not an allowed choice from religious perspective. In contrast, the application of
apostasy consequences in family trials is only limited to the discussed case and its facts.
Accordingly, if the issue court established the apostasy of any person basing on the reviewed
facts, this would only affect the court decision on this case without resulting in depriving the
apostate from any other civil rights basing on his apostasy except by another court decision.
Therefore, depriving from civil rights converted from an inevitable consequence of apostasy in
Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court on the demand of harmed plaintiffs.
Again, we could see how the legislature’s approach and the practice of courts limited the scope
of the applied Sharia norms even in the domain of personal status Law the most affected legal
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field by Sharia in Egypt. Through this approach, the Egyptian state could control the substance
and the borders of apostasy consequences in family matters.
If, as mentioned before, religion determines the applicable law in personal status matters in
Egypt, how can Egyptian courts judicially establish conversion from Islam? In his article
Submitting Faith to Judicial Scrutiny through the Family Trial: The "Abu Zayd Case", Kilian
Bälz identifies Egyptian courts approach in this regard.326Since embracing a belief or conversion
from it is a purely spiritual affair that could be hardly judicially established, Bälz refers that the
Court of Cassation in the past followed a pragmatic approach for this problem.327This pragmatic
approach means that:
apostasy can only be established in two cases: (i.) if someone pronounces an
acknowledgement [iqrar] declaring to have turned away from Islam, or (ii.) if a document
has presented according to which he has opted for another religion. In other words,
someone who considers himself a Muslim is also legally considered a Muslim. The
question whether someone is truly a Muslim is beyond judicial scrutiny: A court has no
right to declare someone an infidel but is bound to the submissions of the parties.328
Bälz reports that this pragmatic approach has been replaced by Egyptian courts in some latter
cases with another approach, which allows for a judicial scrutiny of faith:
In contrast to the aforementioned approach, however, there are cases in which courts have
permitted the establishment of apostasy on the basis of evidence presented by witnesses.
The performance of duties and acts of worship of Christianity, for example, have been
considered sufficient evidence for turning away from Islam. The second approach thus
allows for a judicial scrutiny of faith.329
Family courts are competent to review personal status matters including, for instance, an action
for dissolution of marriage on grounds of apostasy.330Accordingly, in any apostasy related case
personal status courts are competent to establish apostasy as a preliminary question falls within
the jurisdiction of the court. The issue court could establish it basing on the acknowledgement of
the litigant himself, an official document, or evidence presented by witnesses or other parties.
The Court of Appeals reasoned this approach by distinguishing between apostasy as a crime with
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a substantial element that falls under judicial scrutiny and belief which is matter of conscience
that does not fall under judicial examination.331The Court also defined apostasy as:
Apostasy [ridda] ... is legally defined as 'turning away from Islam' [ruju' ‘an din al-Islam].
The apostate [murtadd] is the one who turns away from Islam to unbelief [kufr]. This
requires a declaration of unbelief through an explicit declaration or an act in which it is
implicit .... [These conditions are met if] someone denies what is established through the
verses of the Qur'an or the Hadith of the Holy Prophet.332
This definition is consistent with apostasy definition in Sharia as it includes both explicit and
implicit apostasy forms. Now, let us examine the approach of personal status courts to the
application of apostasy consequences in the light of the displayed legislative situation.
b. Personal Status Courts’ Approach in this regard:
Due to the nature of their jurisdiction, personal status courts have to deal with apostasy
consequences in family cases. Regarding Sharia as the general applicable law in personal status
matters in cases where codified law is silent about makes apostasy consequences in Sharia
applicable in family cases. According to the limited scope of the current research, this subsection
is not going to introduce a full survey of all apostasy related cases in family caselaw, but it will
focus on examining some significant judgments that could enable us to understand how Egyptian
personal status courts apply apostasy consequences basing on Sharia norms and their adopted
reasoning behind their decisions. Following the same categorization in Sharia, our analysis will
include apostasy consequences in inheritance, marriage, property, apostates’ children religion.
1) Inheritance:
In one of its old rulings in 1966, the Court of Cassation elaborated two important standards
governing apostate’s inheritance in Egypt.333Firstly, the ruling confirms that apostasy could be
only judicially established basing on the acknowledgement of the person himself because the
question whether someone is truly a Muslim is beyond judicial scrutiny. Secondly, apostasy is a
de jure impediment to inheritance. The court based this on the juristic consensus among Muslim
jurists that the apostate does not have the right to inheritance even from those whose co331

Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
333
Court of Cassation, Jan. 19, 1966, appeal 28 Judicial year 33.
332

81

religionist he has become because, as it was mentioned before, his conversion is not approved or
accepted according to Sharia. The decision adds that the silence of the codified law concerning
this matter should not be understood as an intention by the legislature to contradict with this
juristic ruling because in such cases the legislature states that the most predominant opinion of
Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine shall be applied.334The discussed ruling could lead us to some
significant observations. The Court of Cassation in this old ruling followed the pragmatic
approach to assess apostasy judicial establishment. Also, basing on our previous analysis to
apostasy consequences in Sharia, the court applied Sharia ruling concerning apostate’s
inheritance depending on the juristic consensus in this regard. However, this decision was not
concluded through deducing this rule from Sharia primary sources or making any reference to
them; rather, it was reached through applying the most predominant opinion of Imam Abu
Hanifa doctrine according to the law and the court’s jurisprudence.
2) Property:
In another apostasy related case in 1990, the Court of Cessation issued a significant decision
regarding the legal situation of apostate’s property.335The ruling includes three important
principles that guided the court decision. Firstly, adopting the pragmatic approach, the ruling
asserts that apostasy could be only judicially established basing on the acknowledgement of the
person himself because the question whether someone is truly a Muslim is beyond judicial
scrutiny. Also, the explicit statement of Al- Shihadateen336is considered satisfactory by the court
to consider any person as a Muslim. Secondly, the court sees that the that the apostate does not
lose his property by apostasy, but his disposal rights are suspended. Thirdly, the apostate should
be asked to repent, and in case of repentance only he could restore his property and disposal
rights that were suspended by apostasy. This decision is consistent with the adopted reasoning of
the aforementioned ruling; however, it added another point concerning the act of apostasy itself.
Despite the court refers that the apostate should be asked to repent, the ruling does not mention
334
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the legal procedures of this action or the responsible entity for this act. I think this because
apostasy is not categorized or criminalized by law.
3) Apostates’ Children Religion:
Identifying apostate’s children religion is one from other questions that Egyptian courts have to
answer in order to judge apostasy related cases in personal status field. In this regard, the Court
of Cassation issued a ruling on the appeal no. 255 in 1998.337The court decided that apostates’
children are considered Muslims if they were born before apostasy. Children who were born
after apostasy are not considered Muslims or follow their parent’s new belief, but they choose
their religion after reaching puberty age.338The court reasoned this decision as follows:
According to Islamic jurisprudence, apostates’ children are considered Muslims if they
were born before apostasy because they follow them in Islam and not apostasy. Sons who
were born between non-Muslim parents after apostasy do not become Muslims. Children
subordination to parents in Islam ends after the appearance of puberty signs or reaching
the age of fifteen because the Prophet (pbuh) said “any baby born with instinct until his
tongue identifies him either thankful or infidel.” Accordingly, apostate’s son could choose
any religion or sect after puberty and he will be considered belonging to this religion
because Islam supported religious freedom for non-Muslims as our God said “no
compulsion in religion” which means that do not compel anyone to embrace Islam.339
After this, the court also followed the pragmatic approach through confirming that religious
belief could be only judicially established basing on the acknowledgement of the person himself
because the question whether someone is truly a Muslim is beyond judicial scrutiny. The court
ruling concerning the religion of apostates ‘sons is consistent with the legal position of apostate’s
children in Sharia. In addition, the reasoning of the court in this case is directly based upon the
main opinion in Islamic jurisprudence with a passing reference to a speech of the Prophet from
Sunnah and a Qur’anic verse. The court ignored to discuss the act of apostasy itself or
repentance, like the last ruling, and focused its investigation to identifying the religion of
apostates’ sons.
4) Marriage:
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Like in Sharia, apostasy in personal status field in Egypt entails legal consequences on marriage.
The most discussed case in this regard was the Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd case because of the many
controversial legal questions that have been raised by this case.340These questions include the
competence of a secular court to declare someone an apostate or infidel, basing apostasy on
academic writing, the relation between apostasy and fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Egyptian constitution, and the right of a third party to bring an action to a court demanding
dissolution of a marriage on grounds of apostasy.341In 1996, the Egyptian Muslim scholar Nasr
Abu Zayd was declared an apostate by the Egyptian Court of Cassation. The facts of the case
could be summarized as follows: in 1993 a group of lawyers in Cairo brought an action against
Abu Zayd, an assistant professor of Islamic studies and literature at Cairo University, in Giza
First Instance Court to demand the dissolution of Abu Zayd’s marriage and his wife.342The
plaintiffs accused Abu Zayd of apostasy basing on some of his writings that they considered as
heretical. Since apostasy could be only invoked in personal status cases, the claimants who had
no relation to Abu Zayd used the procedure of hisaba to “invoke his apostasy as a legal
impediment to his marriage.”343 The claimants used this way because it was the only legal mean
to affirm Abu Zayd’s apostasy. The plaintiffs’ action was dismissed by first instance court
because it considered them as a third party who were not entitled to the action. The plaintiffs
appealed against the ruling of first instance court in front of the Cairo Court of Appeals. The
court reversed the ruling asserting that “Abu Zayd was an apostate and that his marriage must
therefore be dissolved.”344The public prosecutor and the defendants appealed against the ruling in
the Court of Cassation, which upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals. After this, the
defendants filed a petition to the executive judge in Giza First Instance court demanding to
suspend the execution of the decision.345On 25 Sep. 1996 the execution court ruled that
dissolving the marriage of Abu Zayd cannot be executed.
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In this ruling the Court of Cassation permitted the establishment of apostasy basing on evidence
presented by plaintiffs, which was some of Abu Zayd’s writings. The Court of Cassation
reasoned its decision as follows:
According to the majority of the Muslim legal scholars, among them the Hanafis, it
suffices to consider a person an apostate once he deliberately speaks or acts in unbelief, as
long as he meant to be degrading, contemptuous, obstinate, or mocking.
He denounces that the Quran is the word of God, describing it as "a cultural product," . . .
and as being affiliated to a human culture, rendering it an incarnated human text. . .
He attacks the application of the Shari'a by describing it as backward and reactionary. He
claims that the Shari'a is the reason behind the backwardness of Muslims and their
degradation…He denies that God Almighty is [physically] on His great Throne and that
His Chair encompasses the Heavens and Earth . . . He is an apostate, because he has
revealed his unbelief after having been a believer, even if he claims to be a Muslim. An
apostate cannot be excused when he claims to be a Muslim, because he has adopted a
stance contrary to Islam.346
In order to justify its reasoning in a manner making it consistent with the constitutional freedom
of religion, the Court of Cassation linked apostasy with public policy.347Maurits Berger refers
that when apostasy rules are dealt as a matter of fact, Egyptian courts used to focus on applying
its consequences on apostates. In this case public policy has been used to ground these
consequences into the Egyptian legal system for two reasons “a) because these rules were based
on essential principles of the Islamic Shari'a, and b) to ascertain their applicability in light of a
lack of any statutory rules.”348In Abu Zayd case the Court of Cassation adopted a different
approach through using public policy as a mean to protect Islam and society fundamentals as the
ruling states that:
To depart from Islam is to revolt against it, and this necessarily finds its reflection in the
loyalty of the individual to the Shari'a, the state, and his ties with the society. This is what
no law or state tolerates. ... No individual has the right to proclaim that which contradicts
the public policy or morals (al-nizam al-'amm aw al-'adab), use his opinion to harm the
fundamentals upon which the society is built, to revile the sacred things, or to disdain
Islam or any other heavenly religion.349
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The controversy of this case and describing it as the most prominent apostasy case in Egyptian
law350have been caused by the huge criticisms which faced this ruling. This decision has been
usually criticized by many legal scholars and human rights advocates as a manifestation of the
legal abuse of family trials in Egypt to submit faith to judicial scrutiny or an example of how the
highest court in Egypt committing takfir. Accordingly, for the purpose of this research, it is
important to assess this ruling from different aspects. IHRL advocates see that the court enabled
a third party to exploit the Islamic legal principle of hisba to abuse a family trial to declare
apostasy of a Muslim who considers himself a believer.; as a result, Sharia principles have been
applied in Egypt to shape the legal framework of apostasy and limit religious freedom.351The
plaintiffs in this case used family trials because it was the only legal mean to affirm Abu Zayd’s
apostasy basing on his writings that provoked outrage of the public. Thus, such abuse of family
trials is caused by the ambiguous legal status of apostasy in Egypt as a neither criminalized nor
permitted act. Also, it is an extension to the Egyptian state’s approach to legal Islamization that
promoted the role of litigation as an alternative process to a political legislative solution through
which Sharia norms could be enforced. Such ruling could be considered as a breach to standards
of religious and expression freedoms according to IHRL because the ruling is based on a single
tradition; however, the Cassation Court used public order loophole to protect its decision. As it
was asserted before in this research, any state party to the ICCPR could justify limitations on the
freedom to manifest religion by the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, which
have no strict definition. The court in this case “argued that a Muslim making public statements
contrary to the orthodoxy of Islam violates Egyptian public policy.”352Consequently, the court
here interpreted public policy not in terms of religious freedom, but in terms of freedom of
expression because the convict who considered himself a Muslim wrote opinions disdaining
Islam.353In contrast to the pragmatic approach , the Court of Cassation established Abu Zayd’s
apostasy on the basis of evidence presented by witnesses, and considered his writings equivalent
to an acknowledgement of explicit unbelief.354I think that this ruling is only a reflection of the
limited application of apostasy consequences in personal status law field in Egypt. The ruling
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tried to absorb public outrage through confirming that declaring Abu Zayd’s apostasy was based
upon adopting the opinion of the majority of Muslim scholars, among them the Hanafis, to
protect Islam from disdaining, while turned a blind eye to the opinion of this majority who sees
that the apostate should face death penalty and be deprived from all other civil rights to end up
with deciding the dissolution of Abu Zayd’s marriage and his wife! The notable thing that even
this dissolution was not executed after this. This approach is consistent with all apostasy related
cases ‘rulings in personal status field, which converted depriving from civil rights from an
inevitable consequence of apostasy in Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court
on the demand of plaintiffs. Moreover, this ruling is not based on an Islamic juristic reasoning,
but in contrast like in most of personal status it is based on a legal secular reasoning that aims to
enforce the state’s definition of Sharia principles and the scope of their implementation
according to law.

Finally, let us answer the key questions of this chapter regarding the legal situation of apostasy
within the field of personal status law in Egypt. How did the Egyptian legal system through its
personal status law try to balance between its constitutional obligations to respects the “rule of
law” (respect human rights and enforce ratified international covenants like the ICCPR) and
respect the principles of Sharia? in Egypt the application of a law in personal status matters is
based on the religion of the parties unless the legislature issued another ruling in the same matter.
In these cases, Muslims are governed by Sharia rules precisely in accordance to the most
predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine. In consistency with the state’s approach
regarding apostasy, no rule prohibiting apostasy can be found in the codified part of personal
status law. The legislature avoided to issue any statutory law prohibiting apostasy or imposing its
legal consequences to avoid any explicit statement in law that criminalizes conversion from
Islam in contradiction with the ICCPR. On the other hand, apostasy rules can be found only on
caselaw as application of Sharia rules because the Court of Cassation has confirmed in its
jurisprudence that any silence of the codified law concerning any matter should not be
understood as an intention by the legislature to contradict with any statement in Quran, authentic
Sunnah, or a ruling constituted a consensus reached by Muslim jurists. How did the discussed
approach could deal with the contradiction between apostasy rulings in both Sharia and the
ICCPR? Since religion is a governing factor in family cases, family courts focus only on
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answering the question whether any of the parties is an apostate or not. In case of the
establishment of apostasy, it is “perceived as a legal impediment to almost all personal status
rights by virtue of the apostate having incurred civil death.”355The apostate in this case is only
deprived from the examined right in the discussed case and not all civil rights like in Sharia. In
most of personal status cases in this regard there is no reference to religious freedom or the
punishment of the act of apostasy itself; however, in cases related to blasphemy or published
writings like Abu Zayd’s cases the Court of Cassation categorizes the application of apostasy
consequences under public policy to avoid any apparent contradiction with the ICCPR’s
definition of religious freedom or freedom of expression and the constitutional obligation with
these rights. Does the legal framework of apostasy rules in personal status field in Egypt agree
with standards of religious freedom in Sharia and the ICCPR? The answer is no because it
contradicts with both. From the perspective of IHRL imposing any legal consequences as a
punishment for conversion from any belief to another basing on a single tradition. On the other
hand, even if we could agree that the imposed apostasy consequences in family trials are
consistent with its ruling in Sharia this legal framework contradicts with the juristic position of
apostasy rules in Sharia as it converted depriving from civil rights from an inevitable
consequence of apostasy in Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court only on
the demand of plaintiffs in separated cases. By which reasoning could Egyptian courts reach
their established jurisprudence in this regard? According to our analysis, we could find that issue
courts did not conclude their rulings through deducing apostasy rules from Sharia primary
sources by using Islamic legal theory; rather, they were reached through applying the most
predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine according to the law and the court’s
jurisprudence through a legal secular reasoning that reconstructs the implementation of apostasy
consequences in some cases under secular categorizations like public policy.
4. Apostates’ Legal Situation According to Administrative Law:
a. The Recognition of Conversion from Islam in Administrative Law:
Apostasy or conversion from Islam has also arose in administrative law domain in Egypt. Most
of these cases are related to Egyptian Muslims who converted from Islam and filed cases against
the government whose representatives refused to record their new religious status in identity
355
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cards and documents.356As it was stated previously in this research, the State Council’s judicial
section has an exclusive jurisdiction to take decisions in administrative disputes precisely that
related to state actions “in all cases in which a state administrative body is involved.”357
Accordingly, cases concerning the registration of new religious status in identity cards are
examined by administrative courts. In these cases, the government represented in the Civil Status
Department of the Ministry of Interior refused to acknowledge conversion from Islam through
recording the new religion of the convert in identification cards.358Identity card in Egypt is an
obligatory requirement by law from citizens to operate their legal rights like work, health
insurance, marriage, etc.359Computerized identity cards must include the religion of the person
that could only be from the three heavenly religions. Accordingly, apostasy related cases in this
regard in Egypt could be classified into three categories: “cases filed by citizens who were
Christians but converted to Islam and then reverted to Christianity, cases filed by citizens who
were born and brought up as Christians and whose fathers [embraced] Islam before they reached
16 and could hold their own identity cards, and the third category includes cases filed by
Muslims who converted to Christianity and who failed to have their new religious status
registered in their identity cards.”360
b. Administrative Courts’ Approach to Conversion from Islam
In order to understand the approach of the State Council concerning the right of apostates to
record their new religious status in identity cards, it is essential to examine its reasoning in
different cases of conversion from Islam. In his article Islamic Law and Freedom of Religion:
The Case of Apostasy and Its Legal Implications in Egypt Moataz El Fegiery introduces a critical
analysis of a series of recent decision of the State Council in this regard that could be useful for
this research. Thus, I will depend on this analysis here to examine the practice of Administrative
judiciary concerning apostasy cases. Through his analysis, El Fegiery concludes that “[t]he
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jurisprudence of the State Council has exhibited three trends in its handling of the issue: the
hardline approach, the liberal approach and the pragmatic approach.”361

1) The Hard-line Approach: The Non-Recognition of Conversion from Islam:
The hardline approach is considered as the mainstream approach regarding conversion from
Islam in the jurisprudence of the State Council.362According to this approach that was followed
by the State Councils’ courts for three decades, Egyptian Muslims are not allowed to modify
their religious status in identity cards to reflect conversion from Islam to any other religion. It is
believed that this approach is based on the prohibition of apostasy in Islam to protect public
order in Egypt as a Muslim majority country.363For instance, the court of Administrative Justice
followed this approach in the case of Nabil Hassan Sabry in 1980.364Nabil was a Muslim
reverted to Christianity, and he filed this case after the refusal of the Civil Status Department of
the Ministry of Interior to modify his identity card to record the new religion of the convert. El
Fegiery summarizes the plaintiff’s claims as follows:
The plaintiff argued that the Civil Code does not prohibit any individual from changing
his religion. He also invoked the Law of Civil Status which allows citizens to change data
in their documents as long as they present proof of the new data. The plaintiff cited
Article 46 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, which guarantees freedom of religion.
He then argued that Islamic law is not applicable in this case, since there is a clear
provision in the Law of Civil Status, which includes the changing of religious
information.365
On the other hand, the Court of Administrative Justice confirmed the illegality of the required
modification, and reasoned its decision by arguing that:
[T]he rules of Islamic law are applicable in this case based on Article of 2 of the
Constitution and Article 1(2) of the Civil Code, which allow judges to refer to customary
law, Islamic Shari‘a and the rules of equity in the absence of a legal provision applicable
to the case being examined. It then stated that there was no law regulating the issue of
apostasy for those who embrace Islam; that customary law in this case is related to moral
issues and that, therefore, the rules of Islamic law are applicable in this case. Apostates,
according to the Court, have no civil rights in Islamic law. The right to change religious
affiliation can only be provided for non-Muslims, but Muslims cannot denounce their
361
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religion, whether to convert to another religion or to become non-religious. The Court
affirmed that based on Islamic Shari‘a, apostasy must be prevented. The Court then
moved to the facts of the case and observed that since the plaintiff converted to Islam, he
was subject to its rules, and the refusal to make the required modification was legal,
because the state could not condone his apostasy. Such an act, according to the Court,
would violate a rule of public order, and therefore the state cannot legally recognize this
act. The Court in this case also argued that the scope of Article 46 of the constitution on
freedom of religion should be in line with Article 2, which considers Islamic law as the
main source of legislation [and since the plaintiff has embraced Islam, he must then
submit to its law which does not condone apostasy].366
Through its decision, the Court of Administrative Justice has established many principles that
have governed the right of apostates to record their new religious status in identity cards in
Egypt. Firstly, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court’s definition of the scope of the
constitutional right of religious freedom, which was elaborated in its mentioned ruling in
1975.367According to this definition, the scope of the constitutional right of religious freedom is
limited by “the consideration of public order, to which the rules of Islamic law are
fundamental”368Secondly, the ruling differentiates between the scope of religious freedom basing
on the religion of the convert.369While non-Muslims are free to change their religion, Muslims
are not allowed to abandon their religion. Thirdly, this ruling has also affirmed the supremacy of
Sharia rules over all other law sources to be applied on apostasy related cases basing on the
supremacy clause of the constitutional Article 2. Fourthly, the decision refers that according to
Sharia apostasy must be prevented.

The discussed ruling demonstrates the followed reasoning behind the hardline approach. The
ruling asserted the fact of the supremacy of Sharia or Islamic law over all other law sources in
the Egyptian legal system. Accordingly, all constitutional rights, including the right of religious
freedom, should be interpreted in a manner that does not contradict with what the court considers
as Sharia rules like the prohibition of apostasy in Sharia. However, in consistency with
judiciary’s approach in most of the discussed rulings in different law fields in this research, the
court limited the application of apostasy rules in Sharia to a specific right and ignored the
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application apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia regarding other civil rights and capital punishment.
Furthermore, the court reasoned the obligatory nature of the application of apostasy rules in
Sharia by categorizing it under a secular categorization which is public policy rather than using
any Islamic juristic reasoning based upon Islamic legal theory.

The Court of Administrative Justice also followed the hardline reasoning in the case of Jerjes
Malak Wasef.370The plaintiff brought the case to the court to claim his right to record his new
religious status in identity card after conversion from Islam. The plaintiff’s father was a Christian
who embraced Islam in 1990. He changed his son’s religion to Islam in his birth certificate when
he was 7 years old.371The court refused the plaintiff’s claim and reasoned its decision as El
Fegiery refers that:
The Court made a distinction between the right of a person to embrace religious beliefs
and his or her right to manifest these beliefs in society. It reasoned that while the former
concerns the individual and his private relationship with God, the latter affects society
and can be limited. It, therefore, argued that the constitutional right of religious freedom
should not infringe on public order and public morals, as affirmed before by the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in 1975. Then, the Court observed that Islam is the majorityreligion in Egypt, and although its rules respect the right of non-Muslims to believe in
any divine religion, Islamic rules prohibit those who become affiliated with Islam, to
leave it. This rule according to the Court is a part of public order that must be respected
in the country. . . It has also pointed out that Egyptian legislators have not criminalized
apostasy. However, when the judiciary examines claims brought by apostates to secure
legal recognition of their conversion, the Court affirmed that judges should be guided by
the requirements of public order, where Islam represents the main component of it. The
Court has ruled that persons who voluntary decided to become Muslims are not allowed
to manipulate religion after that and employ the state’s institutions to legitimize their
apostasy. . . Moreover, the Court has argued that the ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) cannot be invoked in this case by the
claimant, because Egypt made a general reservation on the convention on the basis of the
rules of Islamic law. Therefore, it cannot be applied in a way that violates rules of Islamic
law that are an integral part of the public order in Egypt.372
Through its issued ruling in Malak Wasef ‘s case, we could note how the Court of
Administrative Justice added some new aspects to its reasoning behind the hardline approach.
Firstly, the court categorized conversion from Islam or apostasy under the right to manifestation
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of belief that could be limited by public order, public morals, etc.. Secondly, the court interpreted
the Egyptian statement regarding the ratification of the ICCPR as a general reservation on the
convention on the basis of the rules of Islamic law and, as a result, the ICCPR’s provisions
including Art. 18 cannot be applied in a way that violates rules of Islamic law that are an integral
part of the public order in Egypt.
1) The Liberal Approach: a Solution for Converts of Christian Origin:
The liberal approach or reasoning constitutes, like the pragmatic approach, an exception to the
mainstream reasoning regarding conversion from Islam in the jurisprudence of the State Council.
According to this reasoning, the Court of Administrative Justice accepted the claims of only
plaintiffs who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards. Such
approach was adopted by the court under the leadership of Judge Farouk Abd el-Qader between
April 2004 and September 2006 in 22 cases.373For instance, in Mohammed Mahdy’s case the
Court ordered the Ministry of Interior to change the plaintiff’s affiliation in his identity card after
his reversion to Christianity.374El Fegiery summarizes the Court reasoning in this case as he
states that:
In these cases, the Court considered the Ministry’s refusal to alter the identity card an
unjustifiable interference in his personal choice. The Court has also argued that the act is
just an administrative procedure that reflects reality and that this registration is necessary
to establish rights and duties based on the correct religious status. In its response to the
argument based on public order, the Court affirmed that Article 40 of the Egyptian
constitution provides for equality between citizens in all rights and duties without
discrimination based on religion, language, origin and sex. It also referred to Article 46,
which protects the rights of individuals not only to freely believe in religions but to
manifest religious faith. The Court cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Arab Charter of Human Rights while also arguing that many centuries ago, Islam
demonstrably recognized freedom of religion. To show the compatibility between Islam
and religious freedom, the Court cited several Quranic verses that highlight the principles
of freedom and non-compulsion in religious conviction. However, the Court’s
understanding of freedom of religion in Islam was not applied to citizens who are born and
brought up as Muslims and decided to convert to any other religion. In explaining this
position, the Court ambiguously submitted that, according to Islamic jurisprudence, a
Muslim cannot be considered apostate unless he or she feels comfortable with his or her
apostasy. This argument infers that the Court would only guarantee the rights of persons
373
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who became Muslims for a while and then decided to apostatize from Islam. By this
reasoning, the Court avoided engaging in a thorough discussion on the issue.375
Through this approach, we could understand how the Court of Administrative Justice, like the
whole Egyptian judiciary, could use its exclusive authority of interpretation to define Sharia
principles, human rights, and public order to establish its arbitrary reasoning of contradicting
judicial rulings regarding the legal position of apostasy in Egypt. After taking into consideration
the exceptional nature of this reasoning in comparison with the mainstream reasoning regarding
conversion from Islam in the jurisprudence of the State Council, I think that the arbitrariness of
the court reasoning stems from the fact that its reasoning either in this case or in the other
discussed cases does not reflect a clear interpretive, juristic, or legal theory. Rather, it could
reflect the conflicting judgments of the court, which demonstrate how a modern state through its
judiciary could exploit its interpretive authority to impose its definition of the scope of religious
freedom in contradiction to its definition in Sharia or the constitution. Accordingly, the limitation
of the court’s rulings as a transformation from a conservative interpretation of religious freedom
in Sharia to a more liberal one does not introduce a real understanding to the legal position of
apostasy in Egypt. This because the former does not constitute a conservative and the latter does
not constitute a liberal from the perspective of Sharia. Also, the court’s arguments regarding the
constitutional religious freedom in the light of public order refute each other. Concerning
apostasy in Sharia, the court in this ruling the Court cited several Quranic verses that highlight
the principles of freedom and non-compulsion in religious conviction to demonstrate the
compatibility between Islam and religious freedom, and as a result, establish its decision. In
contrast to its approach regarding Christian reverts, the Court see that according to Islamic
jurisprudence citizens who are born and brought up as Muslims and decided to convert to any
other religion are not allowed to register their new religion in their identity cards. This because,
according to the juristic explanation of the court, Muslim cannot be considered apostate unless
he or she feels comfortable with his or her apostasy. Our previous analysis of the juristic position
of apostasy in Sharia could let us see how the court used this arbitrary argument to create such
distinction between apostasy of apostates of Muslim origin and Christian reverts. In addition, the
court’s approach contradicts with its precedent rulings that established the non-permission of
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Muslim converts to secure a legal recognition of their conversion basing on the application of
Sharia principles which prohibit apostasy. Both arguments contradict with each other and
contradict with the juristic situation of apostasy in Sharia. The court only misused or
reconstructed some Islamic terms to justify its decision even in adopting contradicting
approaches. Concerning the interpretation of the constitutional right of religious freedom in the
light of public order, the court in cases that belong to the liberal approach argues that that Article
40 of the Egyptian constitution provides for equality between citizens in all rights and duties
without discrimination based on religion, language, origin and sex. It also refers to Article 46
which protects the rights of individuals not only to freely believe in religions but to manifest
religious faith. This argument contradicts with what has been elaborated by the mainstream
reasoning regarding conversion from Islam in the jurisprudence of the State Council. The
hardline approach followed the Supreme Court’s definition of the constitutional right of religious
freedom as a non-absolute right and that the manifestation of religious beliefs must be subject to
and considered in relation to public order and its constitutive elements including Sharia
principles. Thus, we could say here that the Court of Administrative Justice in its liberal
approach did not even respect the interpretation authority of the Supreme Court in defining the
scope of the constitutional right of religious freedom to justify its limitation under the category
of public order like the mainstream approach.
2) The Pragmatic Approach:
The pragmatic approach has been adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court in some
cases.376The court aimed through this reasoning to permit the registration of the new religion of
only persons who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards
without raising or solving the legal issue of apostasy and religious freedom in Egypt. The court
believes that allowing the registration of the new religion of Christian reverts agrees with the
requirements of Egyptian law to include true information in citizen’s identity cards to avoid any
legal errors.377For example, on the 9th of February 2008, the Supreme Administrative Court
issued a similar ruling in the case of Beshay Rizq.378The court reasoned its decision by arguing
that:
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the Egyptian law requires that each citizen carries an identity card, by which he/she can
interact with the state and society, and that the card should include true information about
a citizen’s sex, profession, religion and marital status. Any change in this information
should be reported to the mandated authority as stipulated in Article 47 of the law of civil
affairs. This Article does not limit the changing of information related to their religion, as
long as the change occurs among the three monolithic religions. The Court highlighted
the fact that the registration only reflects the real status of a person who has already
changed his religion. It does not mean that the mandated authority accepts the act or that
it establishes a new legal status by the registration itself. The Court made an analogy with
the change in legal status resulting from marriage, in which the registration does not
establish this legal status, but that rather the satisfaction of the legal pillars and conditions
of marriage, as stipulated in the law, is the basis under which the legal status of marriage
can be established. The Court also argued that the registration of the new religious status
of the claimant is necessary to protect the public order and societal interest, and it will
protect against societal complexities or impermissible acts such as the marriage of nonMuslim male to a Muslim woman [which is prohibited in Islam]. . . Rather, the
registration of this new religious status is a requirement of a modern nation state. Finally,
the Court decided that while the claimant can register his affiliation to Christianity in his
official documents, his previous affiliation to Islam should also be mentioned in these
documents.379

Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court used the mentioned argument to avoid any legal
discussion about apostasy or religious freedom. The court reasoning focused on the legal
requirement to include true information in citizen’s identity cards to establish its ruling.
However, the court also categorized the registration of the new religious status of the claimant
under the protection of public order, which has been usually invoked by all State Council courts
to reason their rulings regardless of their approach. The Supreme Administrative Court also
maintained the discriminatory approach that was followed in liberal approach rulings as it
limited the permission for the registration of the new religion for only persons who reverted to
Christianity and not for converts of Muslim origin.380I think that this discrimination is very
sufficient to refute all the court’s invoked arguments to allow changing the religion of Christian
reverts in identity cards. In addition, the court in this approach insisted that the previous
affiliation to Islam should be mentioned in identity card, which is considered by some human
rights advocates as a kind of social stigmatization through referring to their rejection to Islam.381
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Finally, let us answer the key questions of this chapter regarding the legal situation of apostasy
within the field of Administrative law in Egypt. How did the Egyptian legal system through its
Administrative judiciary try to balance between its constitutional obligations to respects the “rule
of law” (respect human rights and enforce ratified international covenants like the ICCPR) and
respect the principles of Sharia? As it was stated previously in this research, Apostasy or
conversion from Islam has arose in administrative law domain in Egypt mostly in cases which
are related to Egyptian Muslims who converted from Islam and filed cases against the
government whose representatives refused to record their new religious status in identity cards
and documents. Accordingly, Administrative courts have discussed apostasy and religious
freedom in cases during “the process of reaching a ruling on the administrative issue, which is
within the jurisdiction of the court.”382This means that Administrative courts have tried to
balance between these constitutional obligations through limiting its judicial review to answer
the question of the legality of registering the new religion of Muslim converts in their identity
cards to decide the legality of state actions in this regard. How did Administrative judiciary’s
approach could deal with the contradiction between apostasy rulings in both Sharia and the
ICCPR? According to the displayed analysis we are talking here about three different
approaches. The hardline approach asserted the fact of the supremacy of Sharia or Islamic law
over all other law sources in the Egyptian legal system. Accordingly, all constitutional rights,
including the right of religious freedom, should be interpreted in a manner that does not
contradict with what the court considers as Sharia rules like the prohibition of apostasy in Sharia.
However, in consistency with judiciary’s approach in most of the discussed rulings in different
law fields in this research, this reasoning limited the application of apostasy rules in Sharia to a
specific right and ignored the application apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia regarding other civil
rights and capital punishment. Furthermore, it reasoned the obligatory nature of the application
of apostasy rules in Sharia by categorizing it under a secular categorization which is public
policy rather than using any Islamic juristic reasoning based upon Islamic legal theory. Through
this categorization Administrative courts could avoid any apparent contradiction with the
ICCPR. Through the liberal approach the Court of Administrative Justice accepted the claims of
only plaintiffs who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards.
Concerning apostasy in Sharia, the court in this approach the cited several Quranic verses that
382
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highlight the principles of freedom and non-compulsion in religious conviction to demonstrate
the compatibility between Islam and religious freedom, and as a result, establish its decision. In
contrast to its approach regarding Christian reverts, the Court see that according to Islamic
jurisprudence citizens who are born and brought up as Muslims and decided to convert to any
other religion are not allowed to register their new religion in their identity cards. This because,
according to the juristic explanation of the court, Muslim cannot be considered apostate unless
he or she feels comfortable with his or her apostasy. The Supreme Administrative Court aimed
through the pragmatic approach to permit the registration of the new religion of only persons
who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards without raising
or solving the legal issue of apostasy and religious freedom in Egypt. The court believes that
allowing the registration of the new religion of Christian reverts agrees with the requirements of
Egyptian law to include true information in citizen’s identity cards to avoid any legal errors.
However, the court also categorized the registration of the new religious status of the claimant
under the protection of public order, which has been usually invoked by all State Council courts
to reason their rulings regardless of their approach. Does the legal framework of apostasy rules
in administrative law domain in Egypt agree with standards of religious freedom in Sharia and
the ICCPR? The answer is no because it contradicts with both. From the perspective of IHRL the
three adopted approaches contradict with the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
which necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace
one’s current religion or belief with another. This because the mainstream approach of State
Council’s courts rules that Muslims converts regardless of their religious origin are not allowed
to modify their religious status in identity cards to reflect conversion from Islam to any other
religion, whereas the two other exceptional approaches allow this modifications for only
Christian reverts. On the other hand, I think that from the viewpoint of Sharia the three adopted
approaches contradict with apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia. Firstly, the arising of apostasy
related cases within the field of administrative law in Egypt has continued the legal
fragmentation of apostasy rules in different law domains in Egypt to contradict with the juristic
position of apostasy rules in Sharia as it converted depriving from civil rights from an inevitable
consequence of apostasy in Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court only on
the demand of plaintiffs in separated cases. Secondly, both permission or non-permission for
changing the religion of Muslim converts in their identity cards contradicts with apostasy juristic
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rulings in Sharia. The non-permission for registering the new religion of Muslim converts, which
represents the hardline approach, will lead to prohibited acts according to Sharia such as the
marriage of non-Muslim male to a Muslim woman. As it was illustrated previously in this
research, Islam like many other beliefs (including Christianity and Judaism) all its rulings and
norms are based upon a main principle, which is the distinction between believers and
unbelievers; consequently, embracing Islam or renouncing it automatically results in many other
legal consequences in Sharia. The Supreme Administrative Court has invoked this argument
through its pragmatic approach. Furthermore, the permission for registering the new religion of
Muslim converts also contradicts with apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia because apostate suffers
in Sharia from a civil death as he is not allowed to inherit, marry, and dispose of his property.
Accordingly, even if the registration of the new religion in identity card does not establish this
legal status, as stated by Supreme Administrative Court, it simply enables apostates to practice
and enjoy all their civil in contrast to Sharia norms. By which reasoning could Egyptian courts
reach their established jurisprudence in this regard? The hardline approach reasoned the nonpermission of registering the new religion of Muslim apostates basing on the supremacy of over
all other law sources in the Egyptian legal system and the protection of public order. The liberal
approach reasoned its permission to Christian reverts to modify their religion in identity cards
basing on the court’s interpretation of the constitutional rights of religious freedom and equality
between citizens from one side, and religious freedom in Islam from another side. The pragmatic
approach reasoned its permission to Christian reverts to modify their religion in identity cards
basing on the legal requirement of the Egyptian law to include true information in citizen’s
identity cards and the protection of public order.
B. Understanding the Role of Public Policy as a key factor in Imposing State’s
Definition of Religious Freedom and Apostasy Consequences in Egypt:
1. Examining Cassation Court’s Definition of Public Policy:
According to the introduced analysis of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt, we could note
how the concept of public order has been used by Egyptian judiciary to define the scope of the
(international and constitutional) right of religious freedom and ground the application of some
apostasy consequences in Egypt without the existence of any reference to the prohibition of
apostasy or its legal consequences in Egyptian statutory law. In order to understand the role of the
concept of public policy in demarcating the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt, it is important
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to display its definition by Egyptian courts precisely the Court of Cassation. Egyptian law
borrowed the concept of public policy among other legal concepts from the French law by the end
of the nineteenth century.383Such legal concept usually refers to fundamental legal principles to a
society, which are not allowed to be contradicted or violated by any normative rules or laws of this
society.384The Court of Cassation has defined public order as:
[Public order] comprises the principles (qawa’id) that aim at realizing the public interest
(al-maslaha al-‘amma) of a country, from a political, social as well as economic
perspective. These [principles] are related to the natural, material and moral state of
affairs (wad‘a) of an organized society, and supersede the interests of individuals. The
concept of [public order] is based on a purely secular doctrine that is to be applied as a
general doctrine (madhab ‘amm) to which society in its entirety can adhere and which
must not be linked to any provision of religious laws. However, this does not exclude that
[public order] is sometimes based on a principle related to religious doctrine, in the case
when such a doctrine has become intimately linked with the legal and social order, deeprooted in the conscience of society (damir al-mujtama), in the sense that the general
feelings (al-shu’ur al-‘amma) are injured if it is not adhered to. (…) The definition
(taqdir) [of public order] is characterized by objectivity, in accordance with what the
largest majority (aghlab ‘a amm) of individuals in the community believe.385

Two main conclusions could be concluded from this definition. Firstly, there is no clear
definition of the mentioned “principles” or “interest” that constitute the concept of public policy
because they are considered according to the circumstances and standards of a given society at a
particular time.386Thus, the courts are responsible for defining them on ad hoc basis to assess any
legal act at or statute to be considered as a breach of public order or not.387Secondly, the
paradox388of the public order stems from the irresolvable tension between formal legal equality
and the values of the majority. This means that the issue court could base its ruling concerning
any right on public order either because it decided to apply (what the court considered) formal
legal equality among all citizens or the values of the majority. For instance, the discussed cases
in this research could show us how Egyptian courts have adopted public policy in some times to
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impose apostasy consequences basing on the application of Sharia principles as the values of
majority, and to deny the application of these consequences in other rulings basing on the legal
equality among all citizens to practice, what the court considered, their constitutional and legal
rights of religious freedom. For this reason, it is believed that the “active principle of secularism”
is manifested in the legal notion of public order as the issue court has the authority to decide
what constitutes values of the majority, legal equality rules, essential religious principles of
society, and when to adhere to any of these rules or make exceptions to them under the umbrella
of public order.389In his article entitled Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a
Secular or a Religious State? Hussein Ali Agrama illustrated this paradox of public order when
he explained that:
The paradox of the public order arises not just from the tension it embodies between
formal legal equality and the substantive values of the majority, that is, between
competing norms. It is also because those substantive values have become identified with
state sovereignty, which, in turn, is legally expressed through exceptions. This results in a
profound confusion about whether a court, in invoking the public order, is promoting
norms or making exceptions to them.390
2. Public Policy as a legal Base for Imposing State’s Definition of Religious Freedom
and Implementing of Apostasy Consequences in Egypt:
Egyptian judiciary’s definition of public policy has shaped the scope of the right to religious
freedom in Egypt. According to what was demonstrated in this research, the ICCPR’s confirms
that any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion must be prescribed by law for the
protection of public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others. Such restrictions or limitations based upon public morals must not be driven from a
single tradition or applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18.
Consequently, we could say that the combination between emphasizing the illegality of any
limitation on religious freedom that is driven from a single religion and the absence of any clear
strict definition of public safety, order, health or morals according to which any state could limit
freedom to manifest religion has offered a loophole for states parties to the covenant to breach its
concept of the right. This means that any state could limit any aspect of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience or religion as long as this aspect is categorized by the state as a freedom to
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manifest religion, which variates from one belief to another. Furthermore, any state party to the
covenant could justify such limitations by the protection of public safety, order, health or morals,
which have no strict definition. While the Egyptian constitution confirms that State shall
guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites, the Supreme Court
considers that freedom of religion is not absolute, and that the manifestation of religious beliefs
must be subject to and considered in relation to public order, morals and values. In its landmark
ruling in 1975, the Court pointed out that Islamic Shari‘a and its principles are constitutive
elements of public order and that under this the constitutional right of freedom of religion can be
restricted. Accordingly, the case law of the Egyptian civil courts, as it was shown in this
research, regarded apostasy as a part of the practice of belief that is regulated by the “internal
order” of Islam and can be restricted on the bases of public policy.391However, in some cases
Egyptian courts use or exploit their exclusive interpretive authority to enlarge the scope of
religious freedom through the ambiguous concept of public order. For example, the liberal
approach, which was adopted by the Court of Administrative Justice in a series of cases,
considered that the recognition of conversion from Islam in identity cards agrees with Article 46,
which protects the rights of individuals not only to freely believe in religions but to manifest
religious faith, and consistent with public order. Accordingly, we could understand how the
paradox of public order works between invoking norms or making exceptions to them.

On the other hand, this study has illustrated the fact that the concept of public order has been also
used by Egyptian judiciary to ground and limit the application of some apostasy consequences in
Egypt without the existence of any reference to the prohibition of apostasy or its legal
consequences in Egyptian statutory law. Through our examination of some apostasy related case
law, we could understand the duality392of apostasy in the Egyptian legal system which
subdivided it into the act of apostasy and its legal consequences. Public policy has been used by
judiciary to define and to categorize both. Concerning the act of apostasy, as it was mentioned
before in this research, in some cases judges considered acts constituting apostasy (unless they
are not criminalized by criminal law) like reviling the sacred things or to disdaining Islam as acts
violating society fundamentals and, in this case, they adopt public policy as a mean to protect
391
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Islam and society fundamentals like in Abu Zayd case.393However, according to what this study
demonstrated, such protection against these non-criminalized acts by law usually takes place
through verbal statements and condemnations in court’s rulings without any legal punishments
for these acts like in Sharia. Concerning the application of apostasy consequences, in this case
public policy has been used to ground these consequences into the Egyptian legal system for
two reasons “a) because these rules were based on essential principles of the Islamic Shari'a, and
b) to ascertain their applicability in light of a lack of any statutory rules.”394However, public
policy has been invoked by Egyptian courts in some cases also to refuse the application of some
apostasy consequences. For instance, when the Supreme Administrative Court in some cases
adopted the pragmatic approach to permit the registration of the new religion of only persons
who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards, it argued that the
registration of the new religious status of the claimant is necessary to protect the public order and
societal interest, and it will protect against societal complexities or impermissible acts such as
the marriage of non-Muslim male to a Muslim woman. Again, public order has been invoked by
Egyptian courts to justify the application of some apostasy consequences or deny their
application at the same time.
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IV. Conclusion:

The Dominant Debate: Criticizing Egyptian Jurisprudence as a Limitation on Freedom of
Belief as Defined by IHRL:
The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt has been usually criticized as a violation of the
Egyptian state’s international obligation to ensure religious freedom as defined by IHRL.395This
research has shown that such violation does exist. Having investigated the scope of the right to
freedom of thought, conscience or religion and focusing precisely on the freedom to change
one’s religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR as identified and interpreted by the HRC, we
reached that the scope of protection under Article 18 includes theistic and non- theistic beliefs;
however, it prevents any restrictions on the right to freedom of religion that could be based upon
any of these beliefs. The freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief necessarily entails the
freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or
belief with another. Accordingly, the use of threat of physical force, penal sanctions, or
deprivation of any civil rights to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious
beliefs is banned under this Article. Human rights organizations and advocates usually hold that
the legal situation of Muslim “converts” in Egypt also contradicts with Article 46 of the Egyptian
constitution that guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites.
Apostates in Egypt could face some legal consequences of conversion from Islam in different
law fields. The Egyptian penal code does not regulate the act of apostasy directly; however, it
includes some articles that deal with some offences against religion. Although these articles are
not limited to protect Islam only, they have been used as the legal base to charge Muslim
apostates or converts especially when their apostasy is accompanied with any of the criminalized
offences like blasphemy. Egypt’s main blasphemy law is found in Article 98(f) of the Egyptian
penal code, which also includes other Articles that criminalize different forms of religious insult.
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Besides, in the domain of personal status law regarding Sharia as the general applicable law in
personal status matters in cases where codified law is silent about makes Sharia norms applicable
on apostasy related cases. As a result, the apostate could be deprived from any of his civil rights
like inheritance, property disposal right, marriage, etc. if the court decided so upon the demand
of any concerned plaintiff. In Administrative law field, Egyptian Muslims who converted from
Islam, as it was explained, could face legal refusal to record their new religious status in identity
cards and documents. Consequently, all these legal consequences of apostasy in Egypt are
considered according to the standards of IHRL as a violation of the right to religious freedom.

Such point of view that criticizes the non-recognition conversion from Islam and the
implementation of some apostasy consequences usually argues that this approach contradicts
with the general approach of Islam to freedom of belief as apostasy rules at all is a disputed
matter in Sharia and negates with the principle of no compulsion in religion.396This study has
found that such argument is refutable from the perspective of Sharia. The proponents of this
perspective argue that Quran forbids religious coercion in many of its verses. In addition, they
challenge the traditional position on apostasy and hold that the apostate should not be put to
death on the mere ground of his apostasy. It is believed that their argument is inspired by their
belief that capital punishment of apostasy in Sharia is the main obstacle in achieving
reconciliation between the notion of religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL. According to
this approach, the whole issue should be rethought in the light of significant change in time and
circumstances. From their point of view, abolishing capital sanction of apostasy in Sharia is a
plausible argument to prove that apostasy rules at all is a disputed matter in Sharia that negates
with the principle of no compulsion in religion and, as a result, Muslim states should ignore them
to make their laws and judicial practice consistence with the concept of religious freedom as
defined by IHRL. Our investigation of the most prominent arguments in this issue has led us to
some important conclusions that are to be elaborated here. Firstly, these arguments are refutable
from the juristic point of view. Secondly, even agreeing with abolishing apostasy capital
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punishment will not change the fact that conversion from Islam is regarded as a grievous sin in
Sharia. Thirdly, abolishing death penalty could not be accepted from a juristic perspective as a
reason for abolishing apostasy legal consequences and regarding them as disputed matter in
religion because they are set in Sharia, for they are related to general norms and apostasy is a
grievous sin that could not be approved in Islam.
The limitation of apostasy legal problem in Egypt as a mere human rights problem that has been
caused by conservative interpretation of disputed Sharia norms has led the advocates of this point
of view to consider Egyptian courts’ approach in this regard as conservative interpretation and
implementation of Sharia rules; as a result, they see that such violation of could be resolved
through adopting more lenient Sharia rulings.397The most obvious finding to emerge from this
study is that the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt does not represent a conservative
interpretation of Sharia rulings; in contrast, it contradicts with the juristic position of apostasy in
Sharia and represents a manifestation of secular reconstruction of Sharia rulings by Egyptian
state through its statutes and judiciary. The rhetoric of human rights has always limited the
problem of apostasy in Egypt to the conservative interpretation of Sharia. Such rhetoric confirms
that there are juristic solutions in Sharia that to achieve the standards of religious freedom as
defined by the ICCPR through the recognition of conversion from Islam to any other belief
without imposing any legal impediments on converts. Accordingly, Egyptian judges have to
adopt non conservative or liberal interpretation of apostasy rules in Sharia to fulfil Egyptian
international obligation to Article 18 of the ICCPR.

The Ignored Debate: The Legal Framework of Apostasy in Egypt as a Manifestation of
Secular Reconstruction of Sharia by a Modern State:
The ambiguity of Article 2 or Sharia supremacy clause in the Egyptian constitution has a direct
rule in shaping the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt. This because the absence of any
regulation of apostasy in the codified laws drives Egyptian courts to interpret the constitutional
provision regarding Sharia principles as the main source of law to make their decisions on
apostasy related cases. The ambiguity of the discussed clause has resulted in promoting the role
of the Egyptian judiciary in demarcating Islamization and all its related cases, like apostasy, in
397
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Egypt. This could give us an explanation for the absence of any explicit regulation of the act of
apostasy in statutory laws in Egypt. The Egyptian state has always maintained this legal
ambiguity to impose its own definition of Sharia principles. The political intention of adopting
Article 2 or Sharia supremacy clause since 1971 was not to enforce Sharia principles within the
Egyptian legal system; rather, it was adopted to consolidate the political power of the ruling
regime at this time. Consequently, Article 2 was formulated and kept with its vagueness without
a definite interpretation of Sharia principles or the methodology of their deduction to push all its
related political and legal conflicts to courts and litigation process. This process has been the
only remained channel to discuss or reform constitutional Islamization after the closure of all
other political channels including legislation. The vague form of Article 2 has enabled the state
through its constitutional judiciary to have an ultimate control over the definition of Sharia
principles and the scope of its enforcement. Also, the ambiguity of the definition of Sharia
principles has been backed up by liberals or secularists who have opposed any further mandatory
constitutional definition of these principles that could lead to a more conservative interpretation
of Sharia. The present findings confirm that “the introduction of Article 2 has not substantially
changed the Egyptian legal system, which has maintained its secular features.”398
The SCC has adopted a modernist approach to interpret and deduce Sharia principles and norms
to maintain the secular nature of the Egyptian legal system. In the absence of a clear definition of
Sharia principles by the adopted constitution of 1981 and precisely by the discussed Article, on
one hand, and renouncing a comprehensive Islamic review of the existing laws to be carried out
by legislatures, on the other hand, the SCC had to innovate an interpretation theory to face the
increasing resort to litigation procedure to reach political ends. The constitutional court managed
to innovate its interpretation theory to balance between two requirements; firstly, to have an
Islamic template to be accepted by the public, Islamists, and judges of other courts. Secondly, to
create an interpretation methodology that ensures a liberal or modern interpretation of Sharia
sources and norms as a fulfillment of its international commitments to protect international
human rights and economic liberalism. In order to achieve this balance, the court’s methodology
has relied upon a process of a secular reconstruction of Islamic law. The paradigm of operational
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closure and cognitive openness is manifested in the court’s adopted methodology. The court’s
theory ensures that Egyptian courts leaded by the SCC are the official readers and interpreters of
Sharia texts and norms; thus, they have the authority to categorize sacred texts and Sharia
sources, determine their obligatory nature, choose adopted juristic opinions, and choose the
incorporated principles of Sharia. The system of secular law has maintained its operational
closure by reconstructing principles of Islamic law within itself. However, such adopted
interpretation methodology has not introduced a real alternative theory of Islamic interpretation
to be followed by judges to take over the process. The SCC has only misused Islamic technical
terms to Islamize its interpretation of Sharia upon which its decisions were built.

Affected by the legal ambiguity of Sharia principles, the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt
enjoys a limbo399status. The fact that Egyptian codified laws do not regulate the act of apostasy
or impose its legal consequences in explicit and definite law articles has made its legal
framework in Egypt characterized by ambiguity and fragmentation. Ambiguity is manifested in
the legal approach of the Egyptian state that avoided to make any formal reference to apostasy
regulating rules and consequences through its constitutions or law codes. Such avoidance stems
from the State awareness that imposing any legal limitation on conversion from one religion to
another would be regarded as an obvious breach of the notion of religious freedom as defined by
IHRL and, as a result, it would be considered by international community as a breach of its
international obligations towards IHRL. The fragmentation of apostasy rules within the Egyptian
legal system means that committing the act of conversion from Islam to any other belief entails
its legal consequences in different law fields like administrative law, criminal law, and personal
status law. The Egyptian state through its legislature and judiciary has maintained its approach
regarding constitutional Islamization or Islamism to shape the legal framework of apostasy in
Egypt. Creating an ambiguous legal framework to replace the need for a clear codified regulation
resulted from a clear political decision by legislature to ensure the state control over the process.
The intended closure of such a political process has promoted the role of litigation as an
alternative process. Similar to the adopted methodology of interpreting Sharia “principles” in
constitutional Article 2, the state judiciary has a flexible position in interpreting Sharia norms
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concerning apostasy and choosing which of these norms could be incorporated within the
Egyptian legal system and which could not from the perspective of the state or judges. The
Egyptian judiciary in this case is not restricted by any obligatory religious interpretation by AlAzhar or any other institution unlike the case of interpreting IHRL, where the state is accounted
by international community according to the prescribed interpretation of religious freedom that I
have explained earlier. Accordingly, this flexible position helps judges to at least formulate their
verdicts in a manner that is consistent with the state formal obligations to apply Sharia principles
and respect IHRL.
Through the adopted approach, the implementation of apostasy legal consequences has been
limited and fragmented in different law fields in contrast to its the juristic status in Sharia. The
Egyptian penal code does not regulate the act of apostasy directly; however, it includes some
articles that deal with some offences against religion. Although these articles are not limited to
protect Islam only, they have been used as the legal base to charge Muslim apostates or converts
especially when their apostasy is accompanied with any of the criminalized offences like
blasphemy. Egypt’s main blasphemy law is found in Article 98(f) of the Egyptian penal code,
which also includes other Articles that criminalize different forms of religious insult. They
include Articles 160 and 161. In most decisions of blasphemy cases there is no direct reference
to the position of apostasy or blasphemy in Sharia because the concerned court only focuses on
applying blasphemy provisions in the penal code. This judicial approach is consistent with the
legal drafting of blasphemy articles that do not refer to any Islamic juristic source as a base for
its rulings and only reflect a quick legal interference by a modern state to suppress any public
speech or writing that may lead to sectarian clashes. Accordingly, Egyptian courts based their
decisions on blasphemy related cases upon the existence or the absence of the constituting
elements of blasphemy crime in any examined case. These elements include the materialistic
aspect of blasphemy crime (exploiting and using religion in advocating and propagating by talk
or by any other method extremist thoughts) and the moral aspect (to instigate sedition by
disdaining Islam to prejudice national unity). According to the elaborated juristic rulings of
apostasy in Sharia, we could easily conclude that Article 98(f) and other religious insult Articles
do not represent a legal regulation based upon a juristic position in Sharia, but in contrast, it’s a
secular legal regulation of criminalized acts by the state that contrasts with their juristic rulings
in Sharia. In personal status law field, the application of a law in personal status matters is based
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on the religion of the parties unless the legislature issued another ruling in the same matter. In
these cases, Muslims are governed by Sharia rules precisely in accordance to the most
predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine. In consistency with the state’s approach
regarding apostasy, no rule prohibiting apostasy can be found in the codified part of personal
status law. The legislature avoided to issue any statutory law prohibiting apostasy or imposing its
legal consequences to avoid any explicit statement in law that criminalizes conversion from
Islam in contradiction with the ICCPR. On the other hand, apostasy rules can be found only on
caselaw as application of Sharia rules because the Court of Cassation has confirmed in its
jurisprudence that any silence of the codified law concerning any matter should not be
understood as an intention by the legislature to contradict with any statement in Quran, authentic
Sunnah, or a ruling constituted a consensus reached by Muslim jurists. Since religion is a
governing factor in family cases, family courts focus only on answering the question whether
any of the parties is an apostate or not. In case of the establishment of apostasy, the apostate is
only deprived from the examined right in the discussed case and not all civil rights like in Sharia.
In most of personal status cases in this regard there is no reference to religious freedom or the
punishment of the act of apostasy itself; however, in cases related to blasphemy or published
writings like Abu Zayd’s cases the Court of Cassation categorizes the application of apostasy
consequences under public policy to avoid any apparent contradiction with the ICCPR’s
definition of religious freedom or freedom of expression and the constitutional obligation with
these rights. Even if we could agree that the imposed apostasy consequences in family trials are
consistent with its ruling in Sharia this legal framework contradicts with the juristic position of
apostasy rules in Sharia as it converted depriving from civil rights from an inevitable
consequence of apostasy in Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court only on
the demand of plaintiffs in separated cases. Furthermore, according to our analysis, we could
find that issue courts did not conclude their rulings through deducing apostasy rules from Sharia
primary sources by using Islamic legal theory; rather, they were reached through applying the
most predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine according to the law and the court’s
jurisprudence through a legal secular reasoning that reconstructs the implementation of apostasy
consequences in some cases under secular categorizations like public policy. Apostasy or
conversion from Islam has also arose in administrative law domain in Egypt. Most of these cases
are related to Egyptian Muslims who converted from Islam and filed cases against the
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government whose representatives refused to record their new religious status in identity cards
and documents. According to the displayed analysis, administrative courts adopted three
different approaches in this regard. The hardline approach asserted the fact of the supremacy of
Sharia or Islamic law over all other law sources in the Egyptian legal system. Accordingly, all
constitutional rights, including the right of religious freedom, should be interpreted in a manner
that does not contradict with what the court considers as Sharia rules like the prohibition of
apostasy in Sharia. However, in consistency with judiciary’s approach in most of the discussed
rulings in different law fields in this research, this reasoning limited the application of apostasy
rules in Sharia to a specific right and ignored the application apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia
regarding other civil rights and capital punishment. Furthermore, it reasoned the obligatory
nature of the application of apostasy rules in Sharia by categorizing it under a secular
categorization which is public policy rather than using any Islamic juristic reasoning based upon
Islamic legal theory. Through this categorization Administrative courts could avoid any apparent
contradiction with the ICCPR. Through the liberal approach the Court of Administrative Justice
accepted the claims of only plaintiffs who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in
their identity cards. Concerning apostasy in Sharia, the court in this approach the cited several
Quranic verses that highlight the principles of freedom and non-compulsion in religious
conviction to demonstrate the compatibility between Islam and religious freedom, and as a result,
establish its decision. In contrast to its approach regarding Christian reverts, the Court see that
according to Islamic jurisprudence citizens who are born and brought up as Muslims and decided
to convert to any other religion are not allowed to register their new religion in their identity
cards. This because, according to the juristic explanation of the court, Muslim cannot be
considered apostate unless he or she feels comfortable with his or her apostasy. The Supreme
Administrative Court aimed through the pragmatic approach to permit the registration of the new
religion of only persons who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their
identity cards without raising or solving the legal issue of apostasy and religious freedom in
Egypt. The court believes that allowing the registration of the new religion of Christian reverts
agrees with the requirements of Egyptian law to include true information in citizen’s identity
cards to avoid any legal errors. However, the court also categorized the registration of the new
religious status of the claimant under the protection of public order, which has been usually
invoked by all State Council courts to reason their rulings regardless of their approach.
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The concept of public order the “active principle of secularism”400has been used by Egyptian
judiciary to ground and limit the application of some apostasy consequences in Egypt without
the existence of any reference to the prohibition of apostasy or its legal consequences in
Egyptian statutory law. Through our examination of some apostasy related case law, we could
understand the duality of apostasy in the Egyptian legal system which subdivided it into the act
of apostasy and its legal consequences. Public policy has been used by judiciary to define and to
categorize both. Concerning the act of apostasy, as it was mentioned before in this research, in
some cases judges considered acts constituting apostasy (unless they are not criminalized by
criminal law) like reviling the sacred things or to disdaining Islam as acts violating society
fundamentals and, in this case, they adopt public policy as a mean to protect Islam and society
fundamentals like in Abu Zayd case. However, according to what this study demonstrated, such
protection against these non-criminalized acts by law usually takes place through verbal
statements and condemnations in court’s rulings without any legal punishments for these acts
like in Sharia. Concerning the application of apostasy consequences, in this case public policy
has been used to ground these consequences into the Egyptian legal system for two reasons “a)
because these rules were based on essential principles of the Islamic Shari'a, and b) to ascertain
their applicability in light of a lack of any statutory rules.”401However, public policy has been
invoked by Egyptian courts in some cases also to refuse the application of some apostasy
consequences. Again, public order has been invoked by Egyptian courts to justify the application
of some apostasy consequences or deny their application at the same time.

The Implausibility of the Balance between the Two Contraries:
The evidence from this study suggests that the balance or reconciliation between the standards of
religious freedom regarding apostasy in Sharia and the right to conversion from Islam according
to IHRL is implausible. This research has demonstrated that we are in front of different law
sources or normative orders one of them generally prohibits renouncing Islam, while the other
permits or even encourages conversion from one belief to another upon the free will of the
convert. Such contradiction could appear clearly even from naming the same act either by Sharia
or IHRL. The word “apostasy” itself could reflect the prohibition of the act in Islam and its
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negative categorization by Sharia. On the other hand, the word “conversion” could reflect the
neutral or the permissive approach of IHRL concerning replacing one belief with another. In
Sharia, Apostasy is punished by death penalty in Sharia. This opinion is held by the main four
Islamic juristic schools and the majority of Muslim scholars (gumhor al-fuqaha’). Only two
isolated opinions of traditional Muslim jurists see that the apostate should be asked forever to
repent and not be killed. The apostate suffers in Sharia from a civil death as he is not allowed to
inherit, marry, and dispose of his property. The apostate is also separated from his spouse and
not allowed to choose another religion other than Islam for his children in some cases. These
consequences are set in Sharia either because they are related to general norms or because
apostasy is a grievous sin and prohibited act that cannot be approved or accepted from the
perspective of Sharia. On the other hand, under Article 18 of the ICCPR, any individual in any
territory around the world must enjoy the right to freedom of religion including the freedom to
change one’s religion. The content of this right includes freedom from coercion to adopt a
religion or belief, liberty of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children,
and freedom to manifest religion or belief. The only freedom that can be limited in this right is
freedom to manifest one’s religion. The scope of protection under Article 18 includes theistic
and non- theistic beliefs; however, it prevents any restrictions on the right to freedom of religion
that could be based upon any of these beliefs. The freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s
current religion or belief with another. Accordingly, the use of threat of physical force or penal
sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs is banned under
this Article. Imposing any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion must be prescribed by
law for the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others. Such restrictions or limitations based upon public morals must not be driven
from a single tradition or applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article
18. Recognizing any religion or belief as the official ideology in state’s constitutions and statutes
should not impair the enjoyment of the recognized rights in the ICCPR. Consequently, one of the
more significant findings to emerge from this research is that any legal attempt to balance
between these direct contradicting norms could lead to the emergence of a legal framework that
contradicts with both, like the case in Egypt.
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Towards Resolving the Criticized Legal Situation of Apostasy in Egypt:
Resolving the complicated legal status of apostasy in Egypt starts from realizing that the legal
framework of apostasy in Egypt as a single indication among others of legal pluralism in Egypt.
Consequently, reforming religious freedom related laws and their jurisprudence including
apostasy legal framework could not be achieved by limiting the discussed issue as a human
rights problem that can be resolved by adopting more liberal law provisions within the existing
legal system; otherwise, it is a problem that stems from the conflict between different law
sources and their interpretation by the state. This means that such reform would take place
through renouncing the Egyptian state’s interpretation of religious freedom (the reason of the
current legal ambiguity regarding apostasy) and replacing it with a clear legal regulation of the
act itself and its legal consequences basing on giving effect to one source of law to regulate and
categorize apostasy. In this case, the concept of legal pluralism could help in regulating the
relations between different law sources to avoid internal conflict of laws and uncertainty of the
applicable law. Accordingly, resolving the current situation of legal duality or conflict could be
achieved through either agglomeration or integration between apostasy related regulations in
Sharia and IHRL to enact clear legal regulations to categorize and deal with apostasy and
identify its legal consequences. For instance, as we explained previously, agglomeration in this
case could be applied through giving effect to one source of law to be applied in this law field,
while limiting the application of other contradicting legal norms of other law sources in this
field.

Reforming the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt through a clear legal regulation should
happen through a political process rather than judicial resolution. In this case, the legal process
or litigation would act only as a guarantee to the implementation of the reached legal solution.
As we referred previously in this research, the Egyptian state has maintained the ambiguity of the
legal framework of apostasy and blocked all possible political channels to reform it by the
legislature. As a result, the state could choose and limit the applied legal consequences of this act
through litigation. I believe that the reason of such approach stems from the fear that opening
any public political discussion by the legislature to reform the legal situation of apostasy or the
act of renouncing Islam could lead to a more conservative implementation of Sharia rules in this
regard. Accordingly, the state has chosen legal ambiguity that leads to a modernist
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implementation of Sharia rules rather than legal certainty that could lead to a more conservative
implementation of Sharia to deal with or punish renouncing Islam. Through this policy the
Egyptian state could maintain its formal respect to human rights including ones widely
recognized as fundamental human rights in international agreements like the right to religious
freedom. This means that adopting or starting any political discussion about reforming the legal
situation of apostasy is conditioned by the permission of the Egyptian state through its executive
and parliament.
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